A HERMENEUTIC CONSIDERATION OF KARL POPPER'S FALSIFICATION THEORY

Abstract

Karl Popper a scientist, mathematician and philosopher was deeply concerned with a theory that can distinguish science from non-science as well as developing a principle for deciphering truth in science. He rejected the verification principle of meaning because it does not adequately demarcate scientific statements from non-scientific statements, especially metaphysical, ethical, and theological statements. The outcome of this rejection is the formulation of the falsification theory. Karl Popper did not accept the general belief that science uses an inductive method to arrive at the truth because any experiment carried out in this manner is tentative. Hence, the procedure can only result in probability and never in truth; therefore inductive generalization is not justified. To show his contempt for induction, he argued that the theory of falsification should be used to test the truth of hypotheses and theories. The theory emphasizes that a scientific statement or theory is true if and only if it can be tested and conceivably proven false. Using a hermeneutic approach, the objective of this research is a continuous engagement to discuss the inherent problem of Popper's verification principle, show why Popper rejected it and why he introduced the theory of falsification as an alternative.