RONALD DWORKIN’S LEGAL THEORY AND THE NIGERIAN LEGAL SYSTEM

Abstract

The devastating effects of the 2023 election in Nigeria has continued to cast a dark shadow on the country in general and on the country’s judiciary/legal system in particular. We saw for the first time in the history of political elections in Nigeria how the perpetrators and the prime beneficiary of the savagery that passed for presidential election colluded and told those who were brazenly swindled to go to court. When they went to the Supreme Court, the judges sold their integrity, brought shame to the judiciary, destroyed democracy, put revolting question marks on the legal profession and plunged Nigeria into an unprecedented political turmoil. All of this raises important question about law in general and about Nigeria legal system in particular. All of this too is an off-shut of a legal interpretation and practice devoid of meaningful moral contents. Dworkin’s legal theory rejects legal positivism on the principal ground that a separation between law and morals is impossible. It is his view that law can possess no integrity once devoid of morality. This paper employs the hermeneutic and critical methods to offer a comparative study of Ronald Dworkin’s jurisprudence and Nigerian legal system. It finds that Nigerian legal system can only confer itself with dignity when the system learns to treat law and morals with no disparity.