A COMPONENT ANALYSIS OF DIVISION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS OVER MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER IN NIGERIAN FEDERATION

Abstract

The power of any government over maintenance of law and order stems from hypothetical social contract theory. Under the terms of social contract the citizens under any government surrender some of their personal liberties in exchange for protection by and from the government. In the relationship between the government and the citizens reciprocity of duties is the watchword. In the Nigerian constitutional arrangements the respective governments namely the federal and state governments under section 5 (1) and 5 (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN) are respectively given executive powers that extends to maintenance of law and order. It is the province of this paper to examine this shared power over maintenance of law and order in Nigerian federation. The objective is to determine whether there is a balance in exercise thereof that accords with the tenets of the Federalism implicit in the achievement of balance in power divisions in a federal system of government. It is discovered that the chief instrument of maintenance of law and order in the nature of police and the attendant legislative control is not decentralized. Nigeria therefore, in the main operates a uniformed centralized police force leaving no room for State police. This paper queries this character of Nigerian federal set up as defeating the purposes of social contract at the state and local level by disallowing the state to have executive and legislative control over policing at this level. The paper therefore recommends for the establishment of state police in Nigeria like most other federal states to make room for dual federalism.