SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE NIGERIA SOLUTION

Abstract

The contemporary Nigerian state appears to encompass two separate levels of governance and leadership. Whereas, governance at the federal level seems to be an appreciably people-driven system, tailored along the line of democratic governance and the rule of law, the situation at the State levels appears to be in sharp contrast. The massive corruption, arbitrary rule and highhanded leadership by State Governors with autocratic tendencies to rule by law are some pointers. Given the fact that the structure of governance at the state levels is modeled along the structure of governance available at the federal level, it is curious that governance at the State levels have taken a path outside the rule of law, thereby gearing towards the undemocratic route. However, the view has been expressed that the difference in governance at the state levels and federal level is a direct result of the absence of subnational constitutionalism at the state levels and the seamless presence of constitutionalism at the federal level. Again, the view has also been maintained that the national Constitution, which is relatively autochthonous to the Nigerian state, has greatly aided governance at the federal level. The same cannot be said of governance at the State level. The paper therefore appraises the situation obtainable at the State levels with particular emphasis on the argument for the need for subnational constitutionalism and subnational constitutions which should be indigenous to each State and reflects the special aspirations of the people of the particular State.