THE JOSEPH NWOBIKE CASE, THE VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE AND CLARIFYING AN OTHERWISE UNEXPLORED JURISPRUDENCE

Abstract

A critical intersect of constitutional law, criminal law and public policy is the concept of due process whichamongst other things requires that a person shall not be convicted of a criminal offence unless that offence isdefined and the penalty prescribed in a written law. Using the recent Supreme Court decision in Nwobike v FRNas a background, this paper examined the void for vagueness doctrine which stipulates that a written law creatinga penal regime should be couched in sufficient clarity of language that those required to obey it should understandthe limits of prescribed behaviour. In lieu thereof, the statute is declared void for being vague. Part 1 set out thefactual background and part 2 examined the basic constitutional rule requiring creation of penal regimes onlyvide written enactments. Part 3 examined the necessity of advance knowledge of what constitutes criminal conductas the basis of the void for vagueness doctrine; and part 4 analysed clarity in language as a prerequisite ofadvance knowledge of prohibited conduct. Part 5 questioned and suggested restricted use of ejusdem generis inconstrual of criminal statutes. Part 6 detailed the offending provisions of the statute in the Nwobike case andpointed out its shortcomings as a criminal statute. Part 7 theorised that though the courts may find statutes voidonly where requisite parameters are lacking, they should not be reticent. This led to the conclusion, that untilperfection in use of language is attained, void for vagueness challenges would continue, and the only executivemachinery for reducing textual imprecision is careful legal drafting.