PETER STRAWSON ON THE PROBLEM OF PERCEPTION IN EPISTEMOLOGY

Funmilayo Ade-Ali

Abstract


The issue of perception in epistemology is connected with the possibility of knowing with perceptual clarity. Perception as a unique and fundamental theory of inquiry without doubt raises series of epistemological problems and questions such as what are the correct methods of knowing reality? What is the relationship between the object as it is and as it appears? How do we know or how can we be so sure of what we claim to know? Is the object of perception the same in the real sense of viewing? Is appearance the same as reality? This paper shall through philosophical expository and analysis engage the dilemma of perception in epistemology. Given the task that perception is to study events and the world as they appear to the eyes directly or through optical instruments; this paper examines Strawson’s contribution to theory of perception as a causal concept and that there is no clear cut way of describing perceptual experiences without employing physical-object involved.

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