ON THE PLAUSIBILITY OF MORAL OBJECTIVISM: A RESPONSE TO J. L. MACKIE'S NOTION OF THE SUBJECTIVITY OF VALUES

Edward Uzoma Ezedike

Abstract


This paper is a critical response to J. L. Mickie's notion of the subjectivity of moral values as encapsulated in his work, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. In its basic form, the paper grapples with the perennial ethical problem of discovering and elucidating the nature of morality. The objective of this study is to defend the plausibility of moral objectivity in a human society. I argue in this paper that there are real objective moral truths that are independent of individual, subjective interpretations, or rather, subject to personal or group's feeling or disposition. This is to say that the ethically objective judgments on moral issues are themselves transcendentally independent of any action that is being examined in any society. In this paper, I refer to these set of values as 'first order values' because of their primacy, such as truth telling, promise keeping and respect for the sanctity of human life. My core thesis is that the formation of human societies is dependent to a great extent on some of these universally recognizable objective values. I posit that they promote common good and that without such values society may not exist let alone survive. I conclude by suggesting a reconciliation of the notions of objectivism and subjectivism with two set of values, namely; 'First order' values and 'second order' values. First order values are fundamentally objective by nature as earlier stated while 'Second order' values are secondary and subjective, such as offering some assistance to someone in need and avoiding inflicting of pain on others.  Keywords: Morality, Objectivity, Subjectivity, Values, Society

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References


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