SEPARATION OF POWERS AND GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA

BAKO, KEFAS; IBRAHIM, NUAIMU DANBALA & SULEIMAN, ENGAYA

Abstract


It is right to posit that the pace of democratization across the political landscape of Africa is producing strong chief executives that undermine the autonomy of legislative institutions. Note that the choice of the leadership of the National Assemble should entirely be the business of the National Assembly and not executive arm, political parties or any other outside forces. In Nigeria, the appointment, selection or the election of the leadership of the Senate, House of Representative, States’ Assemblies, and leaders of the local governments’ Council are keenly watched, monitored and are subject to the manipulations of the executives (President or Governor and other stakeholders of influence). This and many more are obstacle against the peaceful and independent relationship that should exist between both organs. This paper therefore, is an attempt to look into the constitutional relations and examine how the executive and legislature coexisted so far in Nigerian democratic dispensation. Secondary sources of data and Elite Theory were used. This paper finds out that there is a conflicting relationship between the executive and legislative arms of government and when there is a cordial relationship, the legislative is often called “robber stamp”. Therefore, this paper recommends strong adherences to the principle of separation of power for effective and smooth running of governance in Nigeria. Also the two arms should see themselves as co-equal in the business of good governance not as master and servant relationship. There is urgent need to reform the political finance system in Nigeria. Thus, unless parties are funded independent of holders of executive power and moneybags, the chief executives will continue to control the proceedings in legislature.

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ISSN:2504-8694, E-ISSN:2635-3709Â