A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION ON INTUITIONISM AND ITS ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS

Chidiebere Obi, Stanley Ifeanyichukwu

Abstract


The paper captures a thought-provoking investigation of intuitionism from a critical point of view. A quick brainstorming on intuitionism produces the following questions begging for answers: What are the implications of intuitionism to ethics? Does intuitionism as a Meta-ethical theory have an objective definition void of constructive criticisms? Or are there questionable remarks about its legitimacy? Should intuitionism be completely relegated to the background? Using the analytic method, it was discovered that the line of approach for a philosophical researcher on intuitionism is wide open. As a result, the work concentrates on a panoramic view of intuitionism while paying particular attention to the rationalists and empiricists versions of intuitionism. The rationalist version of ethical intuitionism models ethical intuitions on a priori, non-empirically-based intuitions of truths, such as basic truths of mathematics. The empiricist version of ethical intuitionism models non-inferential ethical knowledge on experience, not inference. The researchers further examine the merits and demerits of this meta-ethical theory while taking cognizance of intuitionism as inventive skill and creative vision; intuitionism as the clearest and most certain kind of knowledge. Still focusing on the analytic method, it was realized that there are serious difficulties against any form of intuitionism since it seems to downplay the fundamental anthropology of the human person as a rational being. But this is without any bias or preconception to the fact that we tend to intuitively decide on our course of action sometimes but oftentimes, we are faced with conflicting alternatives to choose from which demands a carefully thought out decision other than just intuition. It also concludes that man as a material being cannot do without the natural concretization of moral goodness as against the claim of the ethical intuitionists.

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xxviii Cf. Ibid. xxix Cf. Chidiebere Obi, Elementary Ethics For Beginner,(Mama Believe Digital Printing, 2019), P. 49. xxx Cf. Ibid. xxxiCf. ibid xxxiiBoethius, Contra Eutichen et Nestorium, c. 4, in B. Mondin, Philosophical Anthropology, Rome 1991, 247. xxxiii Cf. K NIELSEN, “Meta-Ethics†in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 3,128. xxxiv Cf. Austine. Fagothey, op; cit. pp, 114-115.


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