TRACING THE PATH OF ELECTORAL VIOLENCE AND FRAUD IN NIGERIA: MUSINGS FROM THE NOVELTY OF 2003 GENERAL ELECTIONS

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Abstract

21st century Nigeria has inherited a terrible and unimaginable all-round structured failure system in the spheres of economy, politics, governance and social sectors¹. Democracy devoid of veritable election process is simply diagnosed of faulty physiognomy. It is sad that elections have remained a force and a farce in Nigeria. Violating the peaceful conduct of elections in Nigeria and the militarization of this process could comfortably be traced back to the 1963 'Operation Harmony', the 1964 elections which threatened national unity and a host of other electoral exercises preceding and following the 2003 general elections. The absurdities, electoral fraudulence and manipulations that became visibly apparent when General Obasanjo refused to step aside after his first tenure relatively gave vent to the litany of enigmatic political assassinations, violence and the introduction of intriguing new variables within the national political space in order to encage the opposition's clout. Massively rigged in other to maintain the presidents' and Peoples Democratic Party's grip on power, Nigeria got sucked into a vortex of violence triggered off by diverse claims, resulting in the loss of over 10,000 lives in the various crises - Odi, ZakiBiam and Plateau state, taking their toll on peoples' confidence in Democracy². Within developed climes, fair elections and electoral processes not only legitimizes democracy, but remain its focal software. Certified as the first 'successful' transition from a civilian to another civilian government in Nigeria without military intervention, this paper submits that in presenting an electoral failure system that has continued to haunt Nigeria's electoral process even into the 2020s, a monumental mistake was made when practically no positive steps were taken by both the political class and the nations leadership towards deserved reforms. Intriguing as they may be, periscoping these egregious developments through the ambit of factual historical analysis not only enables eviden-based objectivity, but elicits an orderly political culture driven by the rule of law.

Keywords: Politics, Violence, Fraud, Democracy, Election

Introduction

That Nigeria even in the 21^{st} century has continued as not only a negative referral but a perfidious democratic entity is no more news, rather what demands proactive urgent attention is prescription – guided solutions. Since fraud and electoral violence have no positive contribution to globally accepted democratic etiquette, this study is apt to understudy the evolutionary dimensional impact of the 2003 general elections and its bequeathed depredations on the Nigerian political polity. An adjectiveless democracy is one without confusion and ambiguity, owing its existence to the will of the people, who through the atmosphere of free and fair elections held at periodic intervals, could either retain or vote out any whose stewardship is found wanting *vi a vis* their interests. Within a democracy, equal rights and opportunity, including the many freedoms and fair election, can only give value and meaning to human life only where there is rule of law.

The annals of Nigeria's history are dotted with many incidents of election violence post 1960, though relatively devoid of national spread and dimension. However, some scholars finger the following as possible causes of electoral violence: greed, electoral abuses and rigging of elections, abuse of political power, desire to perpetrate oneself in office, alienation, marginalization and exclusion and the political economy of oil³. Others ascribe poverty, unemployment⁴, ineffectiveness of security forces and culture of impunity, weak penalties, weak governance and corruption, proliferation of arms and ammunitions⁵; still others argue that the causal factors are: lack of security, partisanship of traditional rulers who are supposed to be the custodians of cultural heritage, abuse of office by elected officials, zero-sum politics of winner takes it all syndrome, lucrative nature of political office, poor handling of election petition, lack of faith in the judiciary, lack of compliance with the extant electoral laws, enforcement of the enabling laws, the partisan disposition of the police and other security agencies detailed to monitor the

election and secure lives and properties, corrupt INEC staff and adhoc officials who collect bribe from politicians, conflict of interests between and among politicians, greed and selfish political interests coupled with ideological bankruptcy⁶.

Be that as it may, the most prevalent forms of political violence in Nigeria exude in political assassinations, arson, violent campaigns, thuggery, snatching of ballot boxes and election-related ethnoreligions crisis, among others. Such violent acts are usually carried out by gangs whose members are openly recruited and paid by politicians and party leaders to attack their sponsors, rivals, intimidate members of the public, rig elections and protect their client patrons from similar attacks.

Analysts believe that this has remained consistent because elections in Nigeria is seen as a 'do or die' affair. The architects, sponsors and perpetrators of violent acts generally enjoy complete immunity, hence perpetrate impunity because of both the powers of intimidation they wield and the tacit acceptance of their conduct by the police and government official at all levels who has a share in their lawless practice⁷. It is against this backdrop that Nigeria's governing elite have been crudely implicated in acts of electoral violence, corruption, and fraud so pervasive as to resemble criminal activity more than democratic governance⁸. The tradition has been sustained in Nigeria, whereby members of the political class who are used to instigating these plethora of violence including their foot soldiers who actually perpetrate these violent acts are never brought to book. Political behaviourist have argued that violent electoral behavior which is either intended to hurt or kill political opponents or their supporters has a devastating human rights impact on ordinary electorates, however one must understand that this scenario appear to be Nigerianised because of the prevalent nature and reality of the national psyche and socialization visible in the 'winner takes all' outcome, hence portraving the deep attitudinal and structural dislocation in the country's political evolutionary growth. The fraud and violence witnessed during election campaigns, the election proper and post-election periods, evidenced in physical altercations and clashes between supporters of rival political factions, remain a matter of serious concern, hence such 'has actively and continuously rewarded corruption and violence with control over governorship parliamentary seats and other positions of public trust despite existing laws⁹.

Filled with oddities and not designed to be accountable, apart from the politicization of ethnicity and the judiciary who has been sucked into political brigandage, one can boldly assert that the Nigerian electoral laws are designed to be unaccountable, hence it becomes simply odious to see lawfully established and designate institutions like the Independent Electoral Commission, manipulate the psyche of the electorate through fraudulent 'inconclusive elections'.Then Joseph Stalin would be right in stipulating that the power of who would win in any election is simply bestowed on those who actually count the ballots, and never the voters. No wonder on the other hand as Modibo Keita asserted 'when citizens of a country or nation deem their most accomplished thieves as the most electable, then they lose the right to complain when theft becomes their national creed.

Election as A Concept

Election has been variously defined by different authors and scholars alike. But each definition points to the fact that election is the process of selecting people for a leadership position. Thus, Ojo defines election as "formal expression of preference by the governed, which are then aggregated and transformed into a collective decision about who will govern, who should stay in office, who should be thrown out, and who should replace those who have been thrown out¹⁰. To Awopeju, the term election connotes the procedure through which qualified adult voters elect their politically preferred representatives to the parliament of a country or any other public positions for the purpose of running the government of the country or the public office¹¹. Nwachukwu and Uzodi sees election as a set of activities leading to the selection, is the formal process of selecting a person for public office or of accepting or rejecting a political proposition by voting¹².

On the other hand, election violence is any random or organized act that seeks to determine, delay or otherwise influence electoral process through threat, verbal intimidation, hate speech, discrimination, physical assault, forced protection or blackmail, destruction of property or assassination¹³. According to Nwolise, electoral violence is a form of organized acts or threats, physical, psychological and

structural aimed at intimidating, harming or blackmailing a political stakeholder before, during and after an election with a view of determining, delaying or otherwise influencing an electoral process¹⁴.

Electoral violence in Nigerian electoral process has been a source of concern to Nigerians and the international community who expects an improvement in the electoral process each time a general election is to take place. This high expectations of Nigerians and the international community always hit the rock after each election with the rate of electoral violence in the current election higher than the preceding ones which is expected to be improved on. Between 1999 and 2019, Nigeria had had six general elections with the rate of violence increasing in each electoral year.

The unbridled quest for power by man in his ever insatiable quest for relevance and advantage has indeed, generated so much tensions and hostilities. Thus Election is seen as the major feature of democracy to the extent that not only is it impossible to imagine a democratic regime without elections¹⁵, but also there is now a real risk of transparent elections with democracy. Indeed, in direct democracies of Ancient Greece, elections were used to nominate people to the most important positions and for which a minimum level of competence is considered as vital. The indispensability of election to democracy appears obvious in contemporary democracies described as representative democracy. Democracy is defined as a system in which people are governed through their representatives; election remains the most appropriate widespread mechanism for selecting their representatives who will be responsible for governing on behalf of and for the people.

Conceptually, the term election according Ojo is a "formal expression of preferences by the governed, which are then aggregated and transformed into a collective decision about who will govern, who should stay in office, who should be thrown out, and who should replace those who have been thrown out¹⁶. In concurring, Awopeju defines election as a procedure that allows members of a given society to choose representatives who will hold positions such as leaders of local, state and national government¹⁷. To Dye, election is an important mechanism for the employment of administrative governance in a democratic social order, a major involvement in a democracy and the way of giving approval to a regime¹⁸.

Robert traces modern and democratic elections to the 17th century, and a means through which modem democracies and newly independent colonies of former colonial masters can choose those to represent them in the affair of governance and effective management of the common wealth of the country to the benefit of all. The conducts of elections into governmental offices are always branded with various preparatory events and political schemes that contenders embrace to emerge as its party's contestant, in advance to contesting against other party's candidates in a general election. These strategies ranges from campaigns, political movements, lobbying, promotions, and private connections¹⁹. Thus, from the above definitions, it could be deduced that election is a process of choosing representatives into political offices, this elections usually comes periodically and with high expectation of it being free and fair.

On the other hand, violence was conceptualized by Johan Galtung in terms of influence (to mean harm), and explains the relations between the influencer, influenced and a mode of influencing; categorized in terms of a subject, an object and action²⁰. He accepted though within the limited assumption, that the end of state of violence is its somatic incapacitation or deprivation of health of the individual by means of killing which is an extreme form of violence in the hands of actors who intend it to be the consequence of their action²¹. He sees violence as 'present when human beings are being influenced (harm) so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realization".

On the strength of this, he went further beyond the limited assumption to theoretically conceptualize and empirically clarify that violence is "defined as the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual and between what could have been and what is. Violence is that which impedes the decrease of the distance. Thus, if a person died from tuberculosis in the eighteenth century it would be hard to conceive of this as violence since it might have been quite unavoidable, but if he dies from it today, despite all the medical resources in the world, then violence is present according to our definition. In other words violence occurs in a situation where the possibility of averting impediment to its escalation are apparent but those responsible to do so are not willing to take deliberate responsibility. This can be termed, "shunning the process of conflict resolution mechanism". Shunning process in conflict resolution is the deliberate refusal to resolve a conflict in spite of the available instruments at one's disposal.

It is therefore clear that violence can start or occur, covertly with a built-up emotion and in the process manifest gradually from hate approach in terms of negative/hate speeches and comments made with aggressive attitudes/behaviour, manifesting in the form of hostility and confrontation through furious behaviour that involves assault, intimidation, fighting and attacks among other methods.

The concept of electoral violence is therefore made up of two distinct concepts in one, which includes electoral and violence. In this review, the two concepts are defined and then reviewed in the context of the subject matter of the current study. The word electoral in the opinion of Bamgbose is the process involved in the conduct of elections either at the public or private level²². He further states that electoral process at the public level is the process of planning and conducting elections to choose representatives of the people in public offices of governance such as the executive, legislative and judicial arms of government at state and national level²³. In the same vein, Laakso defines electoral violence as an activity motivated by an attempt to affect the results of elections either by manipulating the electoral procedure and participation or by contesting the legitimacy of the results. It might involve voters and candidate's intimidation, killing, attacks against their property, forceful displacement, unlawful attentions and rioting.

Ojo conceptualized electoral violence to mean any act of violence perpetrated in the course of political activities, including pre, during and post-election periods and may include any of the following acts; thuggery, use of force to disrupt political meetings or voting at polling stations or the use of dangerous weapons to intimidate voters and other electoral process or cause bodily harmto any person connected with the electoral process²⁴. To Anifowose, election violence is the use or threat of physical act carried out by an individual or individuals within a political system against individual or individuals with the intent to cause injury or death to persons or destruction of property; and whose objective, choice of target or victim, surrounding circumstances, implementation have political significance²⁵.

Theoretical Analysis

Theoretically, this paper utilized two theories namely, the Frustration/Aggression Theory and the Marxian Theory of Conflict. The Frustration/Aggression theory was developed in 1939 by Dollard and colleagues. They published a monograph on aggression, which later was known as the Frustration-Aggression theory, anchored on the assumption that "aggression is always the consequence of frustration." This theory primarily focuses on aggression, as Dollard has it that "the occurrence of aggressive actions always presumes the existence of frustration and contra wise, and that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression"²⁶. Frustration-aggression reflects one of the reasons for electoral violence because men who want to live above their social means do not accept their limitation in defeat. This results into violence as the last resort in order to achieve their aims of living beyond their social means. Frustration/Aggression Theory addresses the pre-election and aggression comes into play when a certain aspirant is power-hungry and possibly realizes the indications that he/she may possibly lose to the rival, thereby adopting vehemence for their own personal gains²⁷.

Therefore, the Frustration/Aggression Theory provides an explanation for electoral violence that has been occurring in Nigeria. The relevance of this theory to this study is that events surrounding electoral violence in Nigeria are as a result of fear of defeat exhibited by electoral candidates, which triggers frustration and then transfer of aggression, through the employment of human mercenaries in perpetrating violence in pre, during and after elections. To achieve peace, fairness and transparency of elections in Nigeria, the theory specifies the need for enlightenment on the importance of citizens coming out to vote in their masses in support of a free and fair election, making their votes count and as well make provisions for well-equipped security personnel that would safeguard life and property of voters during elections.

On the other hand, the Marxian Theory of Conflict maintains that social classes arises from the relations of production under capitalist mode. Marx observed that the social relations of production under capitalism generates two major and distinct classes in the society based on access to the means of production²⁸. The structure is such that those who possess the means of production (bourgeoisie) control, dominate, subjugate and exploit those who do not possess capital but depend only on their labour as a means of living (proletariats/have-nots). Conflict theory holds that social order is maintained by domination and power, rather than consensus and conformity. That is to say that those who control wealth and power try to hold on to it by any means possible, chiefly by suppressing the poor and powerless. Conflict theory has been used to explain a wide range of social phenomena, including wars and revolutions, wealth and poverty, discrimination and domestic violence.

This theory is therefore very apt for this study because it juxtaposes electoral violence and political stability. It reveals that electoral violence in Nigeria is as a result of quest for political offices, which is anchored on primitive accumulation, It is important to note that the failure of the Nigerian leaders to establish good governance, forge national integration and promote real economic progress, through deliberate and articulated policies, have led to mass poverty and unemployment. This has resulted into communal, ethnic, religious, electoral and class conflicts that have now characterized the nation in recent time.

The review of related literature revealed the thoughts of authors on electoral violence. Thus, Robert states that electoral violence depicts acts of aggression, thuggery, and other similar acts that are displayed in the course of the electoral processes²⁹.Balogun sees electoral violence as any form of violence that arises at any stage (pre, during and post-election) from differences in opinions, feelings and engagements of electoral processes³⁰. LadanBaki noted that electoral violence during general elections include the snatching of ballot boxes to rig and manipulate election result³¹, causing pandemonium in polling stations to hinder voters from voting; beating up electoral officers and sometimes killing some in the process when weapons such as guns and cutlass are used during the elections.

Igbuzor, also wrote on electoral violence; to him, electoral violence is 'any act of violence perpetuated in the course of political activities, including pre, during and post-election periods, and may include any of the following acts: thuggery, use of force to disrupt political meetings or voting at polling stations, or the use of dangerous weapons to intimidate voters and other electoral process or to cause bodily harm or injury to any person connected with electoral processes³².

Electoral violence is one major problem that has affected Nigeria's democratic sustainability and achievement of good governance. Absence of proper, dedicated and committed democratic institutions militates against the sustainability of democracy in Nigeria. Thus democratic institution such as the independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) should put in place structures and election ethos with a view to conducting smooth and credible elections, built on the notion of "one man, one vote" for the purpose of achieving a violence free election.

Electoral Violence in Nigeria: An Overview

The electoral history of Nigeria from independence is replete with massive irregularities. The British colonial administration left behind several contradictory policies that affected not only the nature of governance but some strange political relationship between and among the ethnic groups. Thus, the ethnic groups relate with one another on grounds of suspicion and conspiracy. Therefore, virtually all elections that were conducted in Nigeria were definitively violent, often making the state unproductive.

The only periods when there was minimum or no violence at all were elections conducted by the military in 1979 and 1999. This was obvious as the military would not tolerate any act of violence neither could the politicians allow it, in order to avoid a situation where the military might renege in returning power to civilians, although, the military habitually tend to impose theirpreferred candidate on the people. Again, the military may hold back to power on grounds that the politicians were yet to demonstrate appreciable political maturity to rule. Thus electoral violence is historical accomplice to Nigerian politics.

The collapse of Nigeria's first republic in 1966 was precipitated by electoral violence of 1964 and 1965 in Western Nigeria³³ but aggravated by coincidental and reactive crisis taking place in the North, particularly the Tiv crisis of 1963 and 1964; as well as the controversial 1963 population census. The official death toll in the 1965 election was put at 153 people, out of which police killed 64 in direct confrontation. However the unofficial figure speculated up to a total of 2,000 deaths³⁴.

Nigeria's Second Republic which lasted from 1979 to 1983, before another coup took place was pregnant with serious political violence especially with the 1983 election which gave ShehuShagari what the ruling party, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) called a "landslide victory" but was dubbed by General Danjuma as "a gunslide victory"³⁵, and was later to be replaced by military slide coup in 1983, revealing the extent to which violence was displayed to win the election. In Ondo state for instance, the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) declared Chief Akin Omoboriowo of NPN as the elected Governor. However, a counter announcement was made over the state radio by the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) pronouncing Adekunle Ajasin as the true winner. The later allegedly went round Akure, the state capital in an open van "calling on his supporters to come out and defend their votes"³⁶. Chief Omoboriowo's desperadoes have richly added to Nigeria's violent political history.

In Oyo and Imo states Chief Bola Ige and Sam Mbakwe's press conferences and radio broadcast threatened that 'if NPN went ahead to rig that election as planned the wives of those who helped them will become widows and their children orphans". Indeed both Oyo and Ondo states experienced monumental violence that eventually led to the collapse of the Second Republic. The weight of rigging in the 1983 election was so massive that there were not only calls for its cancelation but there was also moves towards confederation³⁷.

Meanwhile there began a second phase of military interregnum in 1983 which lasted till May 1999. During this period Nigeria experienced some military coups and counter coups. However, efforts were made to organize elections to return the country back to civil rule. The most feasible election which was adjudged the most free, fair and credible was the 1993 elections which were fundamental to the quest of Nigerians for liberal democracy, but the military leadership under General Ibrahim Babangida however annulled the elections. The presumed winner of the election Chief MoshoodAbiola, popularly known as (MKO) and his running mate Ambassador BabaganaKingibe were both Muslims, Nigerians voted for him because he was accepted across the country irrespective of his religious background. The election was conducted peacefully but the reason for the annulment which Nigerians are yet to be told precipitated the post-election violence³⁸. For the second time in 1993 Nigerians began to move back to their home state of origin for fear of impending war. The first experience was in 1967 during the Nigeria/Biafran war, And for the third time in 1993 the western part of Nigeria was held up as the theatre of violence. Giving the impending doom, General Babaginda abdicated and handed over power to an interim government headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan, Abiola's kinsman from Abeokuta, Ogun state.

This arrangement however did not avert the doom as the Interim government was declared illegal by the court, the outcome which made General SaniAbacha surreptitiously upturn the Interim regime and took over power in military styled coup. In the process, Nigeria experienced for the first time serial bombings, killings and threats to life and property. Nevertheless, General SaniAbacha began a series of transition programmes that would have led to his transmutation to a civilian president but for his death in 1998. At the time GeneralAbdulsalami took over power after the death of General SaniAbacha, it was not possible for the military to hang on to political power in spite of options given to him, including the extension of tenure to cushion the turbulent environment before election. Therefore Abubakar began a quick-fixed transition programme which led to the election of Chief (General) OlusegunObasanjo that opened up Nigeria's Third Republic on the 29th May 1999.

Unlike the 1979, the 1999 elections were conducted presumably in a peaceful atmosphere as it was done under military vigilance. However subsequent elections conducted by Obasanjo in 2003 and 2007 were marred by serious irregularities and violence. It could be recalled that immediately the military left the political stage, Nigeria began to experience several ethnic and religious conflicts earlier suppressed and

bottled up by the military. According to the records of Human Rights Watch between 1999 and 2011 more than 157,000 people died in communal conflicts, political and sectarian violence since the return to civil rules in 1999³⁹. Immediately after the inauguration of democratic rule in 1999, Nigeria erupted into violent conflicts as ethnic groups saw the democratic opening as a means to express their demand for self-autonomy and domination which has been bottled up during the long period of military rule.

The Magic of 2003 Elections

The 2003 general election was presided over by President Obasanjo's regime which came into power in the previous 1999 election organized by General AbdusalamiAbubakar, and again President Obasanjo was returned to power. That election was described as the "most fraudulent election" in the history of Nigeria. In fact, the election results proved and confirmed that proper National Assembly, Gubernatorial and Presidential elections were not conducted in accordance with the INEC guidelines and the Electoral Act. Rather, figures were literally manufactured in Government Houses or collation centres as results for the return of President Obasanjo and the PDP to power. The alleged electoral malpractices of the ruling PDP were regarded as the most sophisticated in the electoral history of Nigeria.

Further to the massive rigging were pockets of violence in different parts of Nigeria. A number of people have argued that there were no elections in 2003, but merely the intimidation of voters and the selection of already decided winners by elites and caucuses. They appear to be making reference to Anambra state where Dr. Chris Ngige was selected by Chris Uba to be the governor, despite the fact that Mr. Peter Obi won the election, his victory did not see the light of the day until a court of appeal in Enugu sacked Dr. Chris Ngige and installed Mr. Peter Obi. Both internal and external observers were unanimous on the unfairness of the competition in the electoral process which was said to have been manipulated by the ruling party, the Peoples' Democratic Party⁴⁰.Many incidents of violence were recorded during the April 12 and 19 elections in 2003. By the time the state houses of assembly elections began around May 3, much of the electoral violence had run its course. In several states, including the South-south and the South-east, this was at least partly because opposition parties started boycotting the polls, complaining of rigging and fraud in the earlier elections and urging their voters not to cast useless votes. Independently from these party boycotts, many voters had simply become disillusioned following the experience of the first two phases of the elections. Others were deterred by the prospect of fresh violence. Nonetheless, some serious incidents were recorded around the May 3 elections.

According to the Human Rights Watch report, between April and May 2003, about one hundred people were said to have been killed and many more injured during Federal and State elections in Nigeria and that most of the violence was perpetrated by the ruling PDP and its supporters⁴¹. Also, the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), a coalition of over ninety Civil Society Groups, in its report on the 2003 general elections, passed a vote of no confidence on the elections⁴². Some political parties and their candidates decided to challenge some of the results before the various Election Petition Tribunals and did went ahead to do so while others declared"mass action" to pressure a government without popular mandate to abdicate power. Most of them were however denied justice by a corrupt judicial system.

In Delta state, several offices of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) were burnt down and electoral materials destroyed. Also in Delta state in the South-South, private houses were burnt and a couple visiting one of the parliamentarians was burnt to death. In Edo state, a staff of INEC and members of the ANPP were killed and in Rivers, some state assembly candidates were beaten by armed thugs⁴³.

Human Rights Watch recorded that on March 5, 2003, Marshall Harry, the National Vice Chairman for the South-South Zone of the largest opposition party, the ANPP, became the most senior national figure to have been killed, since Justice Minister and Attorney General Bola Ige was killed in December 2001., while many more Nigerians lost their lives in small-scale political clashes than in targeted assassinations, these high-profile deaths provoked perhaps greater turmoil in Nigeria, and in some cases a slightly more focused response by government and police. In many of these cases it is difficult to confirm the exact motive for the crime.

In Imo state, an ANPP senatorial candidate and former commissioner OgbonnayaUche, was shot in his home in Owerri on February 8, 2003, and he died two days later. Speaking to journalists before his death in the hospital, Uche reportedly said he believed the attack was political, and explained that two days before the shooting, he had been trailed to the party secretariat by a group of armed men, who had asked his driver his whereabout. Another death in Imo shortly followed; Theodore Agwatu⁴⁴ a principal secretary to the Irno State governor, was shot and killed in his home on February 22, 2003⁴⁵. From all indications, these killings were not unconnected with the 2003 elections in the state. This is because politicians view the election as a war that must be won by all means.

Furthermore, one common element in almost all the states in Nigeria in the 2003 election has been the snatching and stuffing of ballot boxes. This was reported in 2003 in Benue, Kogi and Nassarawa in North-Central; in Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe in North-East and in Jigawa and Zamfara in North-West. It was also recorded in AkwaIbom, Cross River, Delta, Edo, and Rivers in the South-South and Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo in the South-East⁴⁶. In Irno state this included the destruction of ballot boxes from non-cooperative areas. Non-cooperative areas are those voting areas who were discovered to be massively voting for the opposition party. Again, ballot snatching and stuffing was reported in Ekiti, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo in South-West. It was assumed that if security was adequately provided, such actions could have beenprevented. But it was quite unfortunate that even in some cases where the security forces were on ground - the police and the army, they were at times involved or bribed to look the other way as nothing is going wrong⁴⁷. In fact, it was evident that security personnel perpetrated electoral malpractices and fraud in collaboration with political parties⁴⁸.

Also worrying has been the provision of results even for areas where voting did not actually take place, which has been the case in many states. In the 2003 elections, doubtful results were declared in Kogi, Kwara, Nassarawa and Plateau in the North-Central; in Adrnnawa, BauchiBorno, Gombe in North-East; Kaduna, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara in North-West; and in Abia, Anambra and Enugu in South-East. Moreover, fake results were provided in Benue, Kogi and Kwara in North-Central; Delta, Edo and Rivers in the South-South; and Osun in South-West⁴⁹. Other irregularities recorded included, under age voting especially in the northern states of Nigeria, kidnapping before elections, shooting at distribution and collation centres as well as snatching of electoral materials particularly result sheets as recorded in almost all states in Nigeria, and the announcement of suspicious figures as authentic results⁵⁰.

Election violence in Nigeria has conspicuously evolved that the citizens always await two results after elections; the number of ballot papers cast and the number of victims of election violence, heralding the country's political underdevelopment.

Emergent Fallouts

Electoral violence has had tremendous negative effects on the democratic stability of Nigeria. A persistent and uncontrolled electoral violence has the potentials of truncating democratic stability in a country. A major consequence to this is sabotaging the will of the electorates at the elections. It may lead to a situation where leaders that emerge are elected by the minority because the majority that has fears for their lives will not go near the electoral process⁵¹,hence election apathy.

Again, large scale electoral violence has adverse effect on democratic stability because it negates the essential purpose of elections as a popular basis for government. For instance; a government which by electoral violence sustains itself in power against the wishes of the majority of the electorate lacks the legitimacy or the moral authority that popular mandate bestows⁵². Nigerian politics has always been marred by violent conflicts even in the colonial period where state repression was a common. The women's protest (Aba women's riot) of 1929, the Egba uprising of 1931, the general strike of 1945, the Enugu Colliery Strike of 1949 and the Kano Riots of 1953 are cases of violence in Colonial Nigeria⁵³. In the early years of independence, the prospects of violence reared its head in the Western Region and the Middle Belt. The violence that ensued ultimately led to the collapse of the first Republic.

Pre, during and post-election violence is capable of truncating democracy and ushering military intervention in politics which generates another violence. The intervention of the military in politics in 1966 also generated more violence in the scale that was unprecedented. Not only were political assassinations the order of the day, but the pogrom against Easterners in the North and the Nigeria/Biafran war in which over 2 million Nigerians lost their lives showed the desperation of the political elite for power and the extent they could go to maintain it. Electoral violence has created room for the emergence of incompetent persons who occupy vital electoral positions made possible by some political demagogues, The fact that such people are mediocre, they cannot deliver the dividends as expected by the masses, it is also important to note that due to political violence, some of the best brains in political and economic management are not in governance as a result of victimization, while others have been brutally eliminated. The assassination of Funso Williams, Chief Bola Ige and Chief MKO Abiola are still fresh in national memory.

Electoral violence breeds political apathy among the electorates. Once an election records violence such as shooting, snatching of ballot boxes, kidnapping and other physical injuries, it becomes certain that the electorates turns cold feet in coming to carry out their civic responsibility. This in turn gives the political opportunist free hands to perpetrate their planned evil act.

Conclusion

From the foregoing, it appears electoral violence and fraud have been integral parts of the electoral process in Nigeria. This is because virtually all elections conducted in Nigeria since independence has a mark of violence on it. Every facet of the electoral process engages in electoral violence directly or indirectly. Political parties tips their members to commit electoral violence, politicians encourage their supporters to perpetrate violence in order to retain or achieve their political mandates, electoral bodies at all levels collect bribe to short-change submitted names or cause omission of names of candidates which in turn ignite violence. With every part of the process been fingered as an accomplice to electoral violence, one wonder what should be done to achieve a free and fair electoral process devoid of electoral fraud and violence and ensure that votes cast during election count? This study therefore recommend the following as panacea to electoral violence.

Recommendations

Appointment of impartial and independent electoral umpire that will not be bought over by politicians or be influenced by the material gifts offered to them by politicians. One is aware of how powerful politicians influence the appointment and promotion of heads of electoral bodies who in turn reciprocate this kind gesture by rewarding their sponsors with unmerited victory. So for an end to this ugly experience, heads of electoral umpires to be appointed must be people of integrity and unquestionable characters so as not to trade victory for gifts.

Delisting and deregistering of political parties involved in electoral violence and outright disqualification of those elected under that platform. This will send strong signal to other political parties who would want to use violence to achieve their political victory.

Prosecuting and banning of politicians involved in electoral violence. Politicians who are involved in electoral fraud should be banned for life. They should also be prosecuted and made to face the full wrath of the law so that others should be called to order by learning to play the game by the rule.

When these measures are put to action, it will go a long way towards bringing sanity to the electoral process and make the country have self-worth when it comes to election matters.

The best way to address issues of electoral violence is to punish electoral offenders. The national parliament should enact laws so that any person found as contributing to electoral violence by a competent court shall have between five to 10 years in prison with fine irrespective of his or her status.

Every electoral petition should be dispensed with before the swearing-in of elected officials. The current situation where someone alleged to have stolen the vote enjoys the fruits of office, and even spends public funds on his petition defence before eventually losing at the court, should be discouraged.

Again, there should also be the formation of an Electoral Offences Commission to strengthen the state's capacity to punish electoral offenders. Such a commission should be made to dispense justice faster than the conventional courts, without necessarily sacrificing the principles of justice and fair play. If one must reform and redeem Nigerian democracy, then electoral cheats and those who aid and abet them in INEC must be made to face the full wrath of the law. Furthermore, recognition and acceptance of independent candidature will enrich the Nigerian democratic process and curb cases of imposition in the parties and lack of internal democracy, knowing that an alternative platform is open to aggrieved but popular candidates.

Any elected office holder found guilty should not only be barred from future elections, but should also go to jail for the offence. A national database should be created as every rigged elections starts with a padded voter register. The existing Permanent Voters Card (PVC) will go a long way to address the issue of electoral violence. The PVC captures the biometrics of the voters on the roll. Lastly, there should be a war against poverty to discourage vote selling. This is because poverty is the major reason people sell their PVC.

End Notes

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