

**PLATEAU STATE AND THE TRAVAIL OF ETHNO-RELIGIOUS  
CRISIS: A STUDY OF JOS METROPOLIS, 2001-2015**

**<sup>1</sup>Abdulrasheed Abdulyakeen**

*abdulrasheedabdulyakeen90@gmail.com*

&

**<sup>2</sup>Nurain Abayomi Mumun**

*lordmumuni@gmail.com*

<sup>1&2</sup>Department of Political Science, Al-Qalam University,  
Katsina, Katsina State.

**Abstract**

*The aim of the study was to ascertain Plateau State and the Travail of Ethno-Religious Crisis: A Study of Jos Metropolis, 2001-2015. To understand and provide possible solutions to this phenomenon, theoretical and empirical approaches were used to gather data needed for this work. Findings of the study revealed that groups are more loyal and sympathetic to their identity and interest rather than any state goal. This may be as a result of government and groups not playing their roles well. They sometimes use machinery of state to enhance themselves and their group interests. The paper concludes that politicians favor some ethnic and religious groups in their policy decisions, power sharing, distribution of resources and equity. This has brought inequality and dissatisfaction among groups and citizens. These and other external forces bring inequality which often results in crisis. Part of the solution is to evolve consensus building mechanism that will put in place a state ideology. There should be a framework upon which group interests and actions will be harmonized to meet collective good.*

**Key words:** Democracy, Ethnicity, Insecurity, Inequality, Republic.

**Introduction**

Nigeria is a plural, highly complex, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-cultural and multi-religions polity, with a diversity of ethnic groups.



(Danfulani, 2009: Smyth and Robinson, 2001). This identity is played out in the way the country is bifurcated along the lines of religion, language, culture, ethnicity and regional identity (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005:4) of the population of over 150 million people, the country is almost half Christians and half Muslims, aside other religions (Paden, 2008; Schwartz, 2010).

In Nigeria, as in all of Africa, “political competition, via the electoral process, embraces inevitably and inescapably, an uneasy tension between conflict and consensus” (Diamond, 1982:630); violent identity conflicts have become, since 1999, a method of collective action by diverse ethnic and religious groups engaged in contestations for political power. The most prominent of these conflicts are those that have pitted Muslims against Christians in a dangerous convergence of religion, ethnicity and politics. Jos, the capital of Plateau State in Nigeria has, over the past decade, witnessed violent communal clashes across ethnic and religious fault lines. These clashes have claimed “thousands of lives, displaced hundreds of thousands of others, and fostered a climate of instability throughout the region.

Since 2001, violence has erupted in Jos city, capital of Plateau state, in Nigeria’s Middle Belt region. The ostensible dispute is over the “rights” of the indigene Berom/ Anaguta/Afizere (BAA) group and the rival claims of the Hausa-Fulani settlers to land, power and resources. Indigene-settler conflicts are not new to Nigeria, but the country is currently experiencing widespread inter-communal strife, which particularly affects the Middle Belt. The Jos crisis is the result of failure to amend the constitution to privilege broad-based citizenship over exclusive indigene status and ensure that residency rather than indigeneity determines citizens’ rights.

The Jos crisis refers to a series of violent attacks by the Hausa/Fulani ethnic groups in Jos on the Jos indigenes and Christian residents and counter attacks by the Jos indigenes on the Hausa/Fulanis. In the last 18 years Jos, the capital city of Plateau State, Nigeria, has been plagued by

incessant spurts of violence resulting from conflict between the rival groups. This happened in 1994, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2008, 2010, 2011 and in 2012. These incidents of violence are characterized by gross violations of human rights and the perpetration of heinous crimes such as mass murders, bombings, arson, looting and destruction of public and private properties. Victims, including children, women and the aged are usually hacked to death', burned alive', and murdered in a chain of cruel and indiscriminate killings, while some disappeared and were never found. The systematic and organized manner in which most of these attacks were executed shows clearly that they were well planned and sponsored. Although the horrific crimes committed in Jos spread to neighbouring towns and villages within Plateau state, they are all referred to as the Jos crises because the violence occurred mainly in Jos. This work will discuss the events in the neighbouring towns and villages where relevant. The recurrent violence in Jos is attributable to a number of immediate and remote, direct and indirect causes, chief among which are the dispute over the ownership of Jos and the issue of indigene status which has manifested in a long-standing communal suspicion, distrust and bitterness among the indigenes and the Hausa/Fulani community in Jos. The ethno-religious difference between the two rival groups further magnifies the conflict

### **Statement of the problem**

Ethnic and religious conflicts have seriously and negatively affected the socio-economic and political development of Plateau State. This has negative effects on the state's security, stability and integration. The manipulation of religion and ethnicity has been a major obstacle to Plateau State efforts towards attaining greater height. Ethno-religious conflicts in Jos metropolis have become major boundaries that create divisions among people. Ethnicity and religion have also become potent tools for mobilization and manipulation in the Jos metropolis. They have been so manipulated that virtually all institutions in the public and private sectors have been polarized along ethnic and religious lines. Civil servants, community and social workers are most victims of



intimidation and oppression in their places of work. Survival and job security are strongly based on who is of the same ethnic group and religion with the boss. These are ideologies that do not promote peaceful and harmonious co-existence among Jossites. Our ethnic and religious values should have been a force that will encourage Nigerians to appreciate the great benefits derivable from working together as Nigerians in honesty and for a better future irrespective of our ethnic and religious differences. This research is very timely, judging by the fact that Plateau state is in dire need of cohesion among the multi-ethnic and religious groupings. Therefore, this research will set the tone to embrace national integration and religious tolerance as the core functions of New Plateau. Through this investigation, therefore, we will understand their shortcomings and subsequently drive a synergy aimed at curtailing religious crises in Nigeria. The significance of this thesis is to highlight the ethno-religious violence in Jos Metropolis and to educate people on it. This thesis can thus serve as guide to understanding the religious violence in Nigeria and as well can potentially be a useful guidebook for the policymakers on how to approach and tackle religious violence not only in Nigeria but also in other part of the world. Finally, (by expanding the body of knowledge and analysis on ethno-religious violence) it can be a resource to other researchers and scholars for future research on similar issues.

### **Objective of the Study**

The primary research question for this study is: why is Plateau State so prone to ethno religious conflict and how can it be stopped or managed? Other sub-questions or secondary questions of the research are:

- i. To evaluate how ethno-religious crisis affect Jos Metropolis as a whole?
- ii. To examine the main factors that necessitated ethno-religious crisis in Jos Metropolis?
- iii. To ascertain the associated securities challenges facing Jos Metropolis?



- iv. To strategize how to minimize or neutralize the impact of this instability on Nigeria's national security?

## **Background, Causes and Impact of the Jos Crisis**

### **Historical Background to the Jos Crisis**

Jos is the capital of Plateau state, which is located in the north-central part of Nigeria. Jos has a population of about one million people. As a result of its early commercialization as a tin mining city, it has a high population of settlers from different parts of Nigeria. The recurrent struggle that has engulfed Jos over the last 18 years has been a struggle between the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere ethnic groups, on the one hand, and the Hausa/Fulani ethnic groups on the other hand, over political and economic control of resources in the state. This has degenerated into ethno-religious violence of a magnitude never before witnessed in Nigeria. The issue of indigenship<sup>4</sup> also features prominently in the crisis. Although not defined expressly in the 1999 Constitution, classification as indigene and non-indigene is a discriminatory practice deeply rooted in the policy and administration of virtually every state in Nigeria. It determines distribution of a state's resources, including political appointments, elections to office, job distribution, scholarship and, most importantly, land ownership at the local and community level in a state.

Hence the indigenes of a state are the primary beneficiaries of a State's limited resources, thus making indigenship a covetous status. Notwithstanding the claim of the Hausa/Fulani Muslims<sup>4</sup> to indigenship of Jos, the various Commissions of Inquiries setup to investigate the Jos crisis and the 2004 Plateau Peace Conference have ascribed the ownership and indigenship of Jos to the Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere ethnic groups only. This division is further clearly defined and expanded by the religious differences between the rival groups: the indigenes who are mainly Christians and the Hausa/Fulanis who are predominantly Muslims. Christians and Muslims, indigenes and non-



indigenes thus become both perpetrators and victims in a series of retaliatory attacks.

### **The Nature and Causes of Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Jos, Plateau State (2007-2012)**

The confrontation between the indigenes and the Jasawa continued over the following years. Time and again, Jos residents feared an imminent outbreak of another round of violent clashes. The emergency rule then seemed to have offered a respite, as no major crisis was recorded in 2007 until 2008 when a crisis which trailed the 2008 local government election in Jos North Local Government area claimed property worth billions of naira and scores of people killed. It was the year Governor Jang became the governor of the state and the Fulani's viewed him as opposition with Berom motive. The political tension, expectations from the indigenes the settlers were very high (Interview: Oche, 2013).

In 2008 crisis rioting resumed in November in connection with local government elections in Jos. This time destruction within the city was massive. At least 700 people died in just two days of violence. Entire neighbourhoods were razed to the ground. The psychological impact of the 2008 riot went deep. It resulted in a breakdown of trust, communication and exchange between the communities that has never been fully restored. Residents referred to the violence as 'a fight to finish'. It was one violence too many and observers say it can never be forgotten in the history of Plateau State. Ostien sums up the situation when he states that when the Plateau State local government elections took place, 'the stage was set as a show- down between Jang and the Jasawa' in Jos North LGA (Ostien, 2009).

According to Adebusayo Ojo, who is a resident in Dogo Nahauwa; the Jasawa elite had been in negotiations about broader political inclusion and offices for their community with Governor Jonah Jang over several years. Jang refused to cooperate with the Jasawa and planned to campaign without Muslim support (Interview: Ojo, 2013). The crisis

again was as a result of the age long tussle for the soul of Jos North local government on who controlled the council area between the natives and the Hausa/Fulani settlers (Ibid). The later alleged massive rigging in the election results announced by Plateau State Electoral Commission (PLASIEC) in favour of Timothy Buba, the incumbent chairman of the local government. The protest led to unimaginable carnage that nearly consumed the state capital and the suburbs. Therefore, Jasawa inclusive in the state politics inclined them not to have trust in Jang conflicts resolution and governing. Jang (2012) said it was mischievous for anybody or group to say he was the cause of the crisis rocking the state, saying that the upheavals predated his administration.

According to him, since 1999 there had been grand plots to destabilize Plateau State and the Middle Belt as a whole, antagonists of the zone craftily imposed a state of emergency in the state during former Governor Joshua Dariye's administration to achieve their aim. The governor said his administration started intimating the Federal Government of the presence of terrorists in the state from 2008 adding that some of them were arrested but the government did not believe the state. He stated that: "Right from 2008, we started seeing the hand of terrorists in the state, we notified the federal government and arrested some of them but they said we are lying. The events of last week clearly show that we have highly sophisticated terrorist organizations in our midst. The firepower from their rifle is greater than that of our security agencies. Eastern part of Plateau is occupied by terrorists for the past two years, efforts to get the federal government to push them out failed. In as much as every Nigerian has the right to reside anywhere within the country, not every foreigner has the right to occupy any territory within the country. What happened last week was beyond resident Fulani because of the weapon they used," Jang, (2012). The year 2009 was one of easy calm like that of year 2007.

On Sunday 17 January, 2010, a misunderstanding over a deserted building undergoing renovation in a densely populated area of Dutse Uku in Fraka district of Jarawa snowballed into a physical face-off between the natives and the Hausa/Fulani. This soon led to an attack on Christians worshipping at ECWA Church Nasarawa, Jos. To Akanji who resided in Nasarawa Gwong said in an interview that ‘Christians mobilized, blowing a whistle and asking people to “come out and fight for Jesus”. Ever since; the region has plummeted into a deadly cycle of reprisal and revenge attacks. Numerous small-scale attacks, ‘silent killings’ of individuals discovered in the ‘wrong’ neighbourhood, and two major massacres in villages close to the city mark 2010 as the worst for Jos: at least 1,000 people were killed and more than 18,000 displaced (Interview: Akanji, 2013). The series of violent events culminated in the detonation of several bombs on Christmas Eve. Bomb explosions were a novelty to Jos (HRW, 2011). Within the twinkle of an eye, the minor incident had become a big problem which soon engulfed the entire state capital and people took sides along religious lines. Still reeling from this unfortunate incident, the Fulani, alleged to be on revenge mission over their kin killed in another part of the state in March of the same year stormed Dogo Nahauwa and other surrounding villages in Jos South local government area of the state.

The Fulani herdsmen, in their hundreds, armed with sophisticated guns and other dangerous weapons descended in the inhabitants, mostly children and women, and snuffed lives out of them. The unfortunate incident exasperated other natives, thus leading to reprisal attacks and further violence in other parts of the state. The level of callousness exhibited by the marauders, especially the killing of under aged children who were between the ages of three to 15, was a great shock to people. From the incident alone, no fewer than 150 people were butchered by the Fulani attackers. The Fulani attack on Dogona Hauwa signaled another episode of violence in the history of the state. Since then, the Fulani and the natives, especially the Berom, have been on each other’s





throats advancing various spurious reasons to justify such attacks on one another.

Some of such reasons are cattle rustling on both sides and cattle encroachment into farmlands among others. However, from all indications, the dimension the crisis has taken in recent times has shown that the stated reasons are mere excuses for mindless carnage. However, at least 857 people died in the January 2010 Jos riot, the Kuru Karama and Dogo Nahauwa massacres, and the 2010 Christmas bombings. While it is difficult to estimate how many people died in the ‘silent killings’, the total death toll for 2010 certainly exceeds 1,000 victims. Human Rights Watch also estimates more than 1,000 victims for 2010 (HRW, 2011), while both Muslim and Christian representatives claim higher victim numbers for the January and March 2010 violence. The actual number of victims may therefore reach well beyond 1,000. Due to the level of conflicts in 2010, the conflictual parties refused to put an end to their grievances rather to escalate the killings in the state. Small-scale violent incidents continued into 2011. Another attack was carried out on 27 Thursday 2011, in Barking Ladi Local Government Area of Plateau State, no fewer than 10 people were killed while 29 attackers, suspected to be Fulani, among whom is a mobile Policeman, Corporal Uba Ahmed, from Abuja Police Command, were arrested. (Shobayo and Michael, 2011). Smaller bomb blasts and a number of attempted bombings followed during the first months of 2011 (Interview: Bola, 2013). However, Nigerian newspapers report cases of public buses being stopped and passengers being selected and killed according to religious identity, simple market transactions sparking violent clashes, and private vehicles being attacked after taking a wrong turn into settlements dominated by the other religious group. The Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria stated that Fulani herders in Plateau State had about 219 members killed and 7,000 cows stolen in January 2011; it should be noted that these numbers appear very high (Weekly Trust, 2011).



In 2012, the state recorded regular deadly hostilities between the Fulani and the natives, especially the Berom. In the northern part of the state, especially Barakin-Ladi and Riyom local government areas have experienced unprecedented attacks from the Fulanis, leading to the death of innocent people and loss of property worth billions of naira destroyed. As a result of these attacks, many villages have been deserted while farming which is the basic occupation of the people has been abandoned for fear of attacks. According to Adonmadon Helen, the unfortunate scenario reached its peak recently with the deadly invasion of close to ten villages in both Barakin-Ladi and Riyom local governments by gunmen suspected to be Fulani herdsmen alleged to be mercenaries from neighbouring Chad and Niger Republic on the invitation of the local Fulani on ground. The attacks on the villages of Kakuruk, Kuzen, Ngyo, kogoduk, Ruk, Dogo, Kufang, Kpapkpiduk, and Kai in Gashishi District of Barakin-Ladi Local Government area of the state were so deadly and beyond imagination. The well-coordinated attacks which lasted for several hours simultaneously in all the villages left no fewer than 140 people dead (Interview: Adonmadon, 2013). As to the crisis in Jos, government-induced poverty is a handy explanation, but it is not the most cogent. Nigeria has become a country in which the cutthroat competitive spirit has permeated every aspect of life. Bloodshed like that of Jos is rooted in this reality. It manifests in communal relations and politics no less than in family affairs (Ibelema, 2010).

### **Causes of the Crisis**

The recurrent violence in Jos is attributable to a number of immediate and remote, direct and indirect causes. The commissions and committees discussed above identified the following factors as being primarily responsible for the incessant crisis in Jos and its environs.

### **Ownership of Jos**



Ownership of Jos and dispute over land ownership is one of the root causes of the crisis. The findings of all the commissions and committees established revealed that the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere groups are the true founders and indigenes of Jos.<sup>62</sup> The problem of ownership of Jos was generated by dispute over ownership of scarce land which is much needed since the indigenes are mostly farmers and the Fulanis are cattle rearers.

Indigenship claims are linked to the ownership claim discussed above. Plateau Resolve defined an indigene as: those people whose ancestors were the first to have settled permanently in a particular area and who are often considered as natives and have rights to their lands, traditions and culture.<sup>6</sup> Hence, a finding that the Hausa/Fulani ethnic groups are not the original settlers or founders of Jos imply that they are not indigenes since their ancestors did not originate from Jos.

### **Creation of Jos North Local Government/Delineation of Electoral Wards**

The division of Jos local government into Jos North and South local governments by the then Federal Military Government of Nigeria, headed by General Ibrahim Babangida, in 1991 created enmity between the indigenes and the Hausa/Fulanis. The indigenes claimed it put them in Jos South while the Hausa-Fulani communities were carved into Jos North LGA where Jos metropolis is located<sup>6</sup>. They saw it as a ploy by the Hausa/Fulani community to seize Jos town from them. The Hausa/Fulani in Jos had enjoyed political advantage over appointments during most of the Hausa/Fulani-led military era in Nigeria which lasted from 1966 to 1978 and 1983 to 1999. The delineation of the electoral wards in Jos North was also done in an inequitable manner which gives the larger indigene population fewer electoral wards compared to the Hausa/Fulani dominated areas which have a much smaller population.

### **Ethnicity and Religious Conflict**

Ethnic difference is an apparent cause of the crisis in Jos. Nigeria is a country of diverse people that is highly polarized along ethnic and religious lines. Ethnicity and religious affiliation is placed before state or national allegiance. That a purely religious motive is present in the crisis is evident in attacks carried out by perpetrators against members of their own ethnic group, making religion, not ethnicity, the primary reason for such brutal attacks.

### **Political Factors**

Political motive is manifested in the problems of indigenship and creation of Jos North LGA. Indeed, immediate causes of the crisis in 1994, 2001 and 2008 were appointments into political posts and elections respectively. Some politicians in Plateau State and the North have capitalized on the crisis to pursue their own agendas by sponsoring and inciting indigene youths to execute the attacks. Competition between the indigenes and the Hausa/Fulanis for political and economic control of Jos are the root causes of conflict in Jos with each contributing to fuel the crisis.

### **Fulanis Trespassing on Farmlands in Plateau State**

Another cause of the recurrent Jos crisis which has led to violent attacks on a number of occasions including, 1999, 2001, 2004 and 2010, is Fulanis trespassing on farmlands in Plateau State. The 2010 Solomon Lar Committee, however, found that conflict between herdsmen and farmers is attributable to encroachment on grazing reserves by farmers as well.

### **Economic Factors**

Factors such as youth unemployment and poverty, the quest for economic dominance of Jos North, as well as the absence of private sector participation in economic activities in Plateau State were identified by the various commissions as some of the causes of the crisis. Human Rights Watch is of the opinion that the Jos crisis is caused by purely economic factors. It states that religious, political and



ethnic disputes often serve as mere proxies for the severe economic pressures that lie beneath the surface'. The Commission corroborates this by stating that if there is the need to struggle, even violently, to gain control and dominate Jos North, it is for the purpose of gaining the economic upper-hand'.

### **Failure to Implement Commission Reports**

The failure of government to implement the reports of the Commissions of Inquiry has contributed significantly to the persistence of the crisis.


### **Theoretical Framework**

The paper adopts the synergy of systems theory and resource curse theory as a theoretical guide. The notion of system was originally developed by a biologist Ludwig von Bertalanfy, but was developed into a systematic framework and first applied to the study of political phenomena by David Easton in 1953(Olaniyi, 2001). David Easton published "The Political System" in 1953 with a claim that he was attempting to construct a theory to embrace all the social sciences. Easton thus selected the political system as the basic unit of analysis. By definition, the political system is the system of interactions in any society through which binding and authoritative allocations are made (cited in Varma, 1982). The political system receives inputs (demands and supports) from the society and converts them into outputs (authoritative policies and decisions). There is also a feedback mechanism, which returns some outputs back into the political system as inputs, thereby completing a complex cyclical operation.

Olaniyi (2001) disclosed that the political system is made up of various regulatory mechanisms to control demands and minimize over loading. Firstly, there is the structural mechanism and the gate-keepers. Secondly, there are cultural mechanisms. Thirdly, there are communication channels. And lastly, the conversion process itself also controls demands.



Figure 1



Source: Olaniyi, 2001

Applied to the purpose of this paper, the theory shows that the Nigerian federation does not exist in a vacuum, but in an environment saturated by diverse ethnic groups with different and sometimes conflicting interests to be achieved. The minority question as well as the key recurrent issue that form the crux of this paper are inputs from the society which the political system is bound to respond to, but failed to effectively and holistically respond to. This has long –run implications for the survival and sustenance of the practice of federalism in Nigeria.

The reason why every ethnic group looks up to the institutions of the political system is not farfetched. The political system has the sole authority to allocate values in the society. The decision as to who gets



what, when, and how are taken by the authority, which is ordinarily supposed to be fairly representative of all ethnic nationalities in the country. This is however, far from being the case in Nigeria where corruption and all forms of sharp practices reign supreme.

The Hausa-Fulani, the Yoruba, and the Ibo as well as the numerous smaller ethnic groups compete for the limited available economic resources that the county is blessed with to the point of violent confrontations leading to loss of innocent lives and valuable properties. The availability of these natural resources seems to be more of a curse than a blessing to Nigeria hence the application of Resource Curse Theory. The idea behind the ‘Resource Curse’ is that the abundance of mineral resources in Less Developed Countries (LDCs) tends to generate negative developmental outcomes, including poor performance, growth collapse, high-level of corruption, ineffective governance, and greater political violence. Natural resources, for most poor countries, are deemed to be more of a “curse” than a “blessing” (Anthony, 2016). The term resources curse was first used by Richard Auty in 1993 to describe how countries rich in mineral resources were unable to use that wealth to boost their economies and how these countries had lower economic growth than countries without an abundance of such natural resources.

Like elsewhere in Nigeria, this diverse population is seen as bearing two identities; indigenes and settlers. There are also two major religions Christianity and Islam. In its contemporary situation, most of the so-called settlers are Muslims, while the supposed indigenes are mostly Christians. Based on past experiences, particularly in Jos, conflict which begin as politically based frequently assume ethnic and religious dimensions (as in 2001 and 2008), in a telling conflation of religion and ethnicity (Alubo, 2009; Cesey, 2007). Identity conflicts in Jos are mostly between indigenes (Berom, Anaguta and Afrisarte) and Settlers (Hausa/Fulani). In his research on communal violence in Plateau State, Bagudu (2004:314 – 316) reveals a count of “over 62 identity driven



conflicts within a decade, with 22 recorded in 2004 alone”. Also while indigenes have different identities, these are neatly folded into a common umbrella (Best, 2007) for the purpose of uniting against a perceived common enemy. Thus, the recurring Jos conflict illustrates how identity is used as the basis to access opportunities and ultimately, inclusive citizenship.

### **Research Design**

The survey method is to be applied in carrying out this research work. The goal of survey research is to measure accurately people attitudes, knowledge, opinion beliefs and behaviors by asking them questions. Therefore survey research involves gathering information about a large number of people by interviewing a sample of them.

### **Population of the Study**

Within the context of the study, population comprised residents of Jos North, Jos South, and Jos East Local Governments with the population of 1,096,300. Kamil (1995) defines study population as the bigger group or residents of a community about whom the study is concerned while the sample as a subgroup of the population which is the focus of the enquiry and is selected carefully to represent the study population.

### **Research Setting**

The setting for this study is in Jos North Jos South, and Jos East Local Governments of Plateau State, Nigeria. The LGA. Area 291 km<sup>2</sup> with Density; 51.86/km<sup>2</sup>. A total of 24 communities were involved in this study: Gwong, Rigiza, Rusau, Tudu-Wada, Targwon, Zakaliyo, Zangam, Zangan, Babale, Dong and Fudawa, Du, Gyel, Kuru, Vwang, Bakuanwei, Rankyeng, Ranta and Rasot, Federe, Forbur, Fursur, Shere and Maigemu

### **Sample Size and Sampling Technique**

The researchers will used simple random sampling technique to select the sample from the population of 1,096,300 which is the 2006 Census





figures of the three local governments of Jos, the researcher adopted a sample size of 380. The sample was drawn bearing the fact that all the items in the population possess almost the same features or characteristic; hence conclusions drawn on one will surely suffice the others. The sampling technique adopted for this study is simple random sampling, which gives each element of the population an equal chance of being selected. The technique was chosen because randomness is fundamental to generalization of findings (Barter and Jack, 2008), and it allow selection of items without bias as it guarantees equal chance of being included.

The sample size for each cluster was obtained using the simple percentage formula as follows;

Sample per Cluster =

$$\frac{\text{Population per cluster}}{\text{Total Number of Population of the Study}} \times \frac{(\text{Total Number of the sampled Population})}{1}$$

$$\text{Plateau North} = \frac{17,209}{34,656} \times \frac{(380)}{1} = 189$$

$$\text{Plateau Central} = \frac{5,558}{34,656} \times \frac{(380)}{1} = 61$$

$$\text{Plateau South} = \frac{11,889}{34,656} \times \frac{(380)}{1} = 130$$

### **Instrument of Data Collection**

Data will be obtained through a variety of technique which includes observation, interview, questionnaire and objective test. Each type of data gathering device has its own merit and demerit. The instrument used here include questionnaires and interview.

Questionnaires are of two types; open ended and close ended. In the case of close ended questions respondents are asked to select their answer from among the list of answers provided by the researcher. While open ended question is one in which the respondents is asked to

provide his answers on the space provided. However, in the course of the research both open-ended and close-ended questions were used by the researcher. The researcher will also make use of interview in data collection. According to Ayodele (2002) “Interview is a data collection technique which involves a face to face interaction, situation in which one person (interviewer) questions respondents orally”. In other words it is an oral question and answer session regarding the research issue under investigation. Situation during the interview dictate which question to be asked. Hence the interviewer has to be sensitive to issues arising from the interviewed session in order to enable him formulate new questions on the spot.

### **Method of Data Collection**

A total number of 380 questionnaires will be administered randomly by the researcher in Jos North L.G.A. Jos South, Jos East Local Government of Plateau State, Nigeria. The questionnaires will be supplemented by the interview but much emphasis will be placed on the questionnaires. In a nutshell the researcher will use primary and secondary data.

The primary data shall be collected through interview and questionnaire as earlier highlighted. The secondary data were obtained from different sources which include government publications and documents, works from the review of existing literature on these tiers of industries were collected.

### **3.8 Administration of the Instrument**

The researcher will personally distribute the questionnaires to the respondents. Copies of questionnaires were given out to them to fill in for at least 40minutes and at most, 24hours. The respondents were contacted on one-on-one basis to ascertain information on Ethno Religious Crisis in Nigeria, a case Study of Jos Metropolis. It became necessary in some cases to seek official’s assistance in getting an offer



to complete questionnaires. The official approval had to be sought to assure respondents that the study was for academic purpose and that information provided will be treated as confidential.

### **Instrument Validity and Reliability**

Instrument Validity pertains to the ability to accurately measure what it intends to measure based on objectives of the study. Due to this, the questionnaires that were sent out will be discussed by the researcher with the respondents. The researcher shall give explanation to the respondents before they answer the questionnaires. This was purposely done to achieve the meaning of data reliability.

### **Method of Data Analysis**

Data and information collected will be analyzed using different statistical techniques such as percentages, tables, and graphs etc. Research question will be answered on Ethno Religious Crisis in Nigeria, a case Study of Jos Metropolis.

### **Data Presentation and Analysis**

#### **Presentation and Discussion of Result**

In carrying out the research, a total of three hundred and eighty 380 questionnaires were sent out to the respondents. Three hundred and Eighty (380) questionnaires that were answered are found useful and relevant in the study and this constitutes 100% return of the entire questionnaires presented.

After a thorough and carefully reading, doing a computerized statistical analysis of my finding, results are shown in a frequency table for the reader to understand also in line with this study therefore, data gathered and collected during the study shall be analyzed and interpreted using tabular form and percentages and frequencies. Hence the various questions asked and their respective responses are itemized below:



**Table 1: Respondents Bio-data**

<b>Age</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
18 – 25 Years	109	28.68
26 – 32 Years	103	27.12
33 – 39 Years	151	39.74
40– 46 Years	12	3.16
47– 53 Years	3	0.79
54- 60 Years	2	0.53
<b>Total</b>	<b>380</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Gender</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Male	198	52.11
Female	182	47.89
<b>Total</b>	<b>380</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Religious Affiliation</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Christianity	366	96.3
Islam	14	3.68
Traditional Religion	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>380</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Occupation</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Business	71	18.68
Farming	30	7.89
Teaching	72	18.9
Students	93	24.5
Civil Service	89	23.4
Others	25	6.57
<b>Total</b>	<b>380</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Tribe</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Afizare	91	23.9
Anaguta	49	12.9
Berom	89	23.4
Hausa-Fulani	131	34.5
Others	20	5.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>380</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source: Field Survey, 2023**

As shown in Table 1 above, the ages of respondents where 28.68% are between 18-25 years, 27.12% are between 26-32 years, 39.74% are



aged between 33-39 years, 40-46 years are 3.16% 47-53 years are 0.79% and the remaining 0.53% are 54-60 years and above. This shows that majority of the respondents are between the ages of 33 and 39 years. From the table, it can be concluded that the research received response from all adult categories in the study area. The sex distribution of the respondents on the other hand indicates that out of the 380 respondents, 366 representing 96.3% were males while 14 representing 3.68% were females. This therefore implies that majority of respondents are males, however, the view of females were not left out. The table also indicates that 366 of the respondents representing 96.3% were affiliated to Christian religion while 14 of them representing 3.68% were said to be affiliated to Islamic religion. None of the respondents claimed affiliation to traditional religion. This indicates that Christianity is the dominant religion in the study area. In respect of occupation, the table shows that 23.4% are civil servants, 18.68% are engage in various types of businesses, 7.89% are into farming, 18.9% are teachers at various level, 24.5% are students while, 18.68% are into different occupation such as artisan like, mechanics, tailoring, driving, barbers, etc. Majority of respondents therefore are business persons. The table also indicates that, out of three hundred and eighty (380) respondents, 91(23.9%) respondents are Afizare; 49 (12.9%) are Anaguta; 89 (23.4%) are Berom; 131 (34.5%) are Hausa-Fulani and 20 (5.3%) represents the other plateau tribes and Nigerian tribes residing in Jos North LGA.

**Table 2: Respondent’s Familiarity with the concept of “Indigeneship” in the Practice of Nigerian Federalism**

Are you familiar with the concept of “indigeneship”	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	334	87.9
No	31	8.2
I don’t know	15	3.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>380</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source: Field Survey, 2023**

Table 2 shows that 334 (87.9%) of the respondents are familiar with the concept of “indigeneship” 31 (8.2%) are not familiar with the concept of “indigeneship” 15 (3.9%) went for the ‘I don’t now’ option. This result indicates that, the issues of “indigeneship” in the practice of Nigerian federalism have become a general phenomenon to Nigerian citizens.

**Table 3: Respondent’s Perception of the Concept of “Indigeneship” in Nigerian Federal System**

What do you Understand by the concept of “indigeneship” Nigerian Federal System?	Frequency	Percentage
A means to differentiate between earliest occupiers of a particular location from strangers	91	23.9
A means for application and access to federal, state and local government benefits	106	27.9
A means for classifying the inhabitant of a particular location by virtue of their ethnic, language and cultural affiliation	101	26.6
All of the above	82	21.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>380</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source: Field Survey, 2023**

Table 3 shows that 91(23.9%) sees “indigeneship’ as a means for differentiating between the earliest occupiers of particular location from strangers; 106(27.9%) sees “indigeneship” as a means and a way to have access to federal, state and local benefits in Nigerian federal system 101(26.6%) sees ”indigeneship” as a means for classifying the inhabitant of a particular location by virtue of their language and cultural affiliation, and; 82 (21.5%) sees “indigeneship” as having all the above features in Nigerian federal system. This figure indicate that, respondents who perceived “indigeneship’ as a means to have access to

federal, state and local benefits in Nigerian federal system are having the highest frequency.

However, this result justified the fact that, “indigeneship” gets recognition in the practice of Nigerian federalism due to certain benefits in Nigeria federal system. Hence the issues behind who are the extant earliest occupiers or who are the real inhabitants of a particular location are meant to justified relative access to these benefits by a group.

**Table 4: Distribution of Respondent’s claiming “Indigeneship” of Jos North LGA**

Are you claiming “indigeneship” of Jos North	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	206	54.2
No	172	45.3
I don’t know	2	0.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>380</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source: Field Survey, 2023**

Table 4 shows that 206 (54.2%) of the respondents are claiming “indigeneship” of Jos North LGA, while 172 (45.3%) are not claiming “indigeneship” of Jos North LGA, 2 (0.5%) went for the ‘I don’t now’ option. The above figures indicate that, respondents claiming “indigeneship” of Jos North LGA are having high frequency. But the margin between those claiming and those who do not is not high. This however indicates that, there is one reason or the other by respondents who claim “indigeneship” of Jos North and those who do not.

**Table 5: Respondent’s View on why they Claim “Indigeneship” of Jos North LGA**

On which bases do you claim ‘indigeneship’ of Jos North LGA	Frequency	Percentage
As a member of ethnic group inhabitant to Jos North LGA	212	55.8
As a person who was born and bred up in Jos North LGA	74	19.5
As a person whose parents and		

grandparents lived for many tears in Jos North LGA	92	24.2
None of the above	2	0.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>380</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source: Field Survey, 2023**

Table 5 shows that 212(55.8%) are claiming Jos North LGA “indigeneship” because they are members of ethnic group inhabitant to Jos North LGA; 74(19.5%) are claiming “ indigeneship of Jos North LGA because they were born and bred up in Jos North LGA; 92(24.2%) are claiming “indigeneship” of Jos North LGA because their parents and grandparents have lived in Jos North LGA for many years, and 2(0.5%) are claiming Jos North LGA “Indigeneship” not because of any of the above reasons. These figures indicate that respondents claiming “indigeneship” of Jos North LGA on the bases of being a member of ethnic group inhabitant to Jos North LGA have the highest frequency. Base on this figures however, we may believe that, claiming of “indigeneship” of a particular local governed in Nigeria is motivated by ethnic factors.

**Table 6: Respondent’s view on what disqualified them from claiming “Indigeneship” of Jos North LGA?**

<b>What Disqualified you from claiming “Indigeneship” of Jos North LGA?</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
I was not born and bred up in Jos North LGA	44	11.6
I am not a member of the earliest ethnic group to inhabit Jos North LGA.	131	34.5
My parents and grandparents are categorized as settlers in Jos North LGA	202	53.2
None of the above	3	0.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>380</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source: Field Survey, 2023**



Table 6 shows that, 131 (34.5%) are not claiming “indigene” of Jos North LGA because they are not members of ethnic groups inhabitant to Jos North LGA; 202(53.2%) are not claiming “indigene” of Jos North LGA because their parents and grandparents are categorized as “settlers” in Jos North LGA, and; 3(0.8%) are not claiming “Indigeneship” of Jos North LGA not due to any of the reasons stated above.

Base on this figure, respondents who think they were disqualified from claiming “indigene” of Jos North LGA on the bases of being categorized as “settlers” are having the highest frequency. This signified the fact that, even if you are born and bred up in a particular locality. However, this is against the rights of Nigerian citizens, because most of the Nigerian citizens who cannot trace their Origin to particular locality are denied the rights and benefits enjoyed by Nigerian citizens- due to ‘Indigeneship’.

**Table 7: Respondent’s view on the Benefit of being an “Indigene” of a Particular Local Government in Nigerian Federal System**

What do you think is the Benefit of being an “Indigene” of a Particular Local Government in Nigerian Federal System?	Frequency	Percentage
Access to federal benefits in terms of appointment, higher education, scholarship etc	110	28.9
Access to state benefits	126	33.2
Access to control and management of the local government and benefits there from	114	30
All of the above	30	7.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>380</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source: Field Survey, 2023**

The above table shows that, out of three hundred and eighty (380) respondents, 110(28.9%) views the benefit of being an “Indigene” of a particular local government in Nigeria as having access to federal government and state governments benefits; 114 (30%) views the benefits of being an “ indigene” of a particular local government in Nigerian federation as-having access to the control and management of local government and the benefits there from, and 126(33.2%) views the benefits of being an “indigene” as-having access to both federal, state and local benefits are having the highest frequency. In this regards, we may say that; being an “indigene” of a particular local government in Nigeria is the only way to have access to both the federal, state and local benefits in Nigeria Viz-a-Viz the enjoyment of certain rights as a citizens of Nigeria.

**Table 8: Respondent’s view on the bases Ethnic Groups in Jos North LGA Compete over “Indigene” Benefits.**

In what ways do ethnic groups in Jos North LGA compete over “Indigene” benefits?	Frequency	Percentage
Election over the control of the local government.	120	31.6
Access to state benefits	43	11.3
Access to federal and state benefits	85	22.4
Economic and social activities within the local government	42	11.1
All of the above	90	23.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>380</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source: Field Survey, 2023**

Table 8 shows that 120 (31.6%) views the bases ethnic groups in Jos North LGA compete over “indigene” benefit in-election over the control of the local government; 85(22.4%) views the competition between ethnic groups in Jos North LGA over “indigene” benefits in-

access to federal and state government benefits; 42(11.1%) views the bases ethnic groups in Jos North LGA compete over “indigene” benefits in-economic and social activities within the local government and 90(23.7%) views the bases in which ethnic groups in Jos North LGA compete over “indigene” in-both election over the control of the local government, access to federal and state government benefit and, in economic and social activities within the local government. In Jos North LGA, competition over “indigene” benefits is not only between “indigenes” and “settlers”, but also between “indigenes” themselves. According to M.S Yusuf (2009, 68):

In Jos North the fact that the major source of livelihood for the Beroms, Afizeres and the Anagutas is the civil service, this has made the local government council more stringent in the employment of Hausa/Fulani and other Nigerian citizens into its civil service. Even among the Beroms, Afizeres and the Anagutas, there is high competition in the sense that each group is trying to overtake the other when in power by employing mainly people from its ethnic group.

This signified the fact that ethnic groups in Jos North (both “indigenes” and “settlers”) compete over “indigene” benefit in both federal, state and the local level of government.

**Table 9: Respondent’s view on Competition over “Indigene” Benefits Contributory Factor to conflict in Jos North LGA**

Is the competition over “Indigene” benefit a major contributory factor to conflict in Jos North LGA?	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	246	64.7
No	29	7.6
I don’t know	5	1.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>380</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source: Field Survey, 2023**

Table 9 shows that 246 (64.7%) of the respondents believe that competition over “indigene” benefits between ethnic groups in Jos North LGA is a major contributory factor to conflict, while 29(7.6%) believe is not the major contributory factor to conflict. This shows that respondents with the view that-competition over “indigene” benefit is the major contributor factor to conflict between ethnic groups in Jos North LGA have the highest frequency.

**Table 10: Respondent’s view on the bases Ethnic Groups in Jos North LGA engage in conflict over “Indigene” Benefits.**

On which bases ethnic groups in Jos North LGA engage in conflict over “Indigene” Benefits?	Frequency	Percentage
Election in the local government	121	31.8
In appointment and jobs to the federal state and local positions in government	89	23.4
In economic and social activities in the local government	83	21.8
All of the above	87	22.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>380</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source: Field Survey, 2023**

Table 10 shows that 121 (31.8%) of the respondents sees the bases upon which ethnic groups in Jos North LGA fight over “indigene” benefits in –election over the control of the local government, 89(23.4%) sees the bases upon which ethnic groups in Jos North LGA fight over “indigene” benefits-in-application, appointment and job to the federal, state and local positions in government 83(21.8%) believes the bases upon which ethnic groups in Jos North LGA fight over “indigene” benefits-in-economic and social activities in the local government, and

87(22.9%) affirm the bases upon which ethnic groups in Jos North LGA fight over “indigene” benefits both in election, local benefits, economic and social activities.

**Table 11: Effect of the Crisis to the Life of Respondent’s in Jos North LGA**

Where you affected by the crisis in Jos North LGA?	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	287	75.5
No	93	24.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>380</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source: Field Survey, 2023**

Table 11 shows that 287 (75.5%) were affected by the crises in Jos North LGA, while 93(24.5%) says they were not affected by the recent crises in Jos North LGA. This figures shows that majority of the respondents were affected by the crises in Jos North LGA. It indicates how the crises have a devastating impact to the life of many people. A greater percentage of the respondents enumerated that, they lost one or two of their relatives, their properties destroyed and face economic and social imbalance among other factors. The respondent’s position however proves the fact to the devastating impact of the crises. According to Human Right Watch Report (2008, p.7):

Nigeria is a nation deeply divided along ethnic and religious lines: more than 12,000 people have died in inter-communal clashes since the end of the military rule in 1999. Plateau State has been particularly hard-hit by this violence: in September 2001, violence in Jos claimed as many as 1,000 lives, and in May 2004, more than 700 people were killed...in November 2008, the crisis in Jos North LGA claimed as many as 1,000 lives...the wide-spread destruction of properties in these crises worth billions of Naira.



**Table 12: Respondent’s Awareness of Federal and State Government Policies to Curb the Crises.**

Are you aware of government Policies to Curb the Crises in Jos North LGA?	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	163	42.9
No	217	57.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>380</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source: Field Survey, 2023**

Table 11 shows that 163(42.9%) are aware of government policies at both federal and state government level to curb the problem, while 217(57.1%) are not aware of government policies at both state and federal government level to curb the problem is having the highest frequency. This clearly shows how government at both federal and state government level are not providing genuine policies that will directly touch the life of the victims of ethno-religious crisis and that will enhance peaceful co-existence of ethics group living in the affected areas. Even the respondents who are aware of government policies in solving the problem, states policies as: setting up of commissions of inquiry, deployment of military and Para-military agencies to the street and imposition of state of emergency by the federal governed in some cases.

### **Summary of Major Findings**

The study revealed that the political elites that rule the country since independence manipulate the ethnic and primordial sentiments to achieve their goals within the practice of Nigerian federalism. They caused hatred in the minds of Nigerians and make them to see each other as enemies. Many Nigerians identified themselves in primordial terms, and their loyalties are likely to be first to their ethnic group before it is to the Nigerian state.

From this study, it was realized that, the “indigene”-“settler” conflict in Jos North LGA is directly linked to the problem of ethnicity and practice of Nigerian federalism. Issues and mechanism for the management of ethnic tension in Nigerian federal system overtime serve as the root to the causes of the crises in Plateau State and Jos North LGA in particular. “Federal character provision” and “indigene clause” in the constitution serve as the justifications for discrimination against citizens who live in a state other than their state of origin, especially when it relate to those citizens ability to participate in the political process. This exacerbated most of the conflicts that engulfed Jos North LGA for many years.

The study noted that, there are no proper guidelines for reconciling equal protection for Nigeria’s citizens with the need to maintain “federal character” and promote diverse ethnic representation in the government. This has led to what the Citizens Forum for Constitutional Reform has defined as “multi-layered system of citizenship”, where by citizens residing in a state in which they are not indigenes is discriminated against, and members of indigenous communities within any state are favored over settlers. Such a system contributed to ethnic conflict in Plateau State and Jos North LGA in particular where ethnic communities fight over scarce resources.

The recurrent conflict in Jos North LGA between Afizere, Anaguta and Berom and Hausa Fulani is as a result of lack of concerted effort by the government at both the federal and state level to resolve the problem. Hence violence has become a common thing to most people in Jos, where attack and reprisal attack were the issues of the day.

Finally, if we can adhere to the principles of democracy that preach tolerance to our differences, conflict will become issue of the past in Nigeria and Jos North LGA in particular. The Hausa-Fulani and the other tribes of Afizere, Anaguta and Berom should come together to understand their common differences through dialogue and compromise



for peaceful co-existence. This is because; the understanding of our common humanity is the best guarantee for peace and universal brotherhood.

### **Conclusion**

In conclusion therefore, the researcher believes that sincere governmental schemes and efforts must be established by government to achieve social and distributive justice for all people in the country. Merits, qualification and competence in or for a particular position must be respected. For where there is justice there will be peace and where is peace, there will be no ethno-religious conflicts. In fact, the control of ethno religious conflicts in Nigeria will among other social vices like corruption, litany of politically motivated killings, prostitution, examination malpractice, kidnapping, terrorism, rigging of elections etc. go far in moving the country forward. A complete and total implementation of the above recommendations would go a long way in the control of the incessant ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna and Plateau States and in most of the northern states of the country.

### **Recommendations**

Ethnic and Religious conflicts, undoubtedly, constitute a great impediment to the peace, stability and development of a nation like what has been going on in Nigeria. It also negates principles necessary for entrenching enduring democracy in the country. However, the knowledge of various factors which influence ethnic, religious and political conflicts and the requisite mitigating policies are vital to policy makers and stakeholders in place and conflict settlement. From the foregoing therefore, the following recommendations if properly handled would help in the control of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria. These include:

Nigerians should be guaranteed the freedom and liberty to reside, work and participate effectively in both the economic and the political space in any part of federation. The Nigerian Government should establish a system whereby constitutional rights are based on residency, not on





origin or indigene status. The government should codify a reasonable number of years that a person must live in a particular state in order to gain residency.

The government should encourage the traditional rulers and religious leaders both Muslims and Christians to preach peace and love for unity and not what will endanger peace and cause hatred among members of the various ethnic and religious groups in the country. Government should come up with genuine policies that will address the problem of poverty and unemployment.

Finally, a national conference should be organized during which all the stakeholders in the federation would be given opportunity to articulate grievances.

### **Contribution to Knowledge**

This research work is a good tool for religious teachers and leaders. It is good particularly to those who instruct others to embark on self-transformation. It is also a good source for character development. The research provides people with the relevant information about the root causes of ethno-religious crises in Plateau state. It serves as documented evidence that increases the awareness of religious leaders and their faithful and policy makers on the evil of ethno-religious conflicts in the country. The work therefore recommends for better policy formulations right from the local, state and national levels that would help in correcting issues relating to religious conflicts in Nigeria. The researcher strongly believes that this work will help in strengthening the analytical and operational work of stake holders in the area of research, conflicts resolution and sustainable socio-economic and political development. The work provides some kind of scientific ways of managing ethno-religious and other forms of conflicts in the country.



## Reference

- Ahuwa, B. (2001). Plateau. Another Communal Clash. New Nigeria, March 19, 2001, P. 5. Akowe, T. (2010). Jos Explosions. The Nation, December 26, p 5.
- Akpokpari, J. (2004). The African Union, NEPAD and The promotion of Good Governance in Africa. Helsinki: Nordic Association of African Studies.
- Aligwekwe, P.E. (2002). Culture & Religion in the Nigerian Socio-political system. Abia: Ark Publishers.
- Alisan, Y. (2000). Ethnicity and Religion: What Impact on Democracy? A Paper Presented at a Round Table Workshop on Ethnicity and Religious Rights in Nigeria Organized by Human Rights Monitor in Kaduna From 13 – 14, December 2000.
- Andrew, I. (2004). Plateau: Heard men attack Yamin Village. Tell, March 15, 2004. p 7-8. Anugwom, E.E. & Oji, P. (2004). Ethnics and Religious Crises in Nigeria. In M.I. Okwueze (Ed). Religion and Societal Development: Contemporary Nigerian Perspective. Isolo: Merit International Publications. 156
- Arago, U. (1995). Plateau: The Mwaghavuls – Rons Land Dispute. City Watch, September 4, 1995 p.9
- Asaju, D. (1988). The Christian position on the Development of Ethical Values in the Nigerian Context. Ilorin: Amora Press Ltd.
- Balogun, A. (1988). The place of Religion in the Development of Nigeria. Ilorin: Amora Press Ltd.
- Batoh, P. Y. (2004). Plateau: Crisis over Farm product. New Nigeria, February 10, 2004, p 2. Bola, A. (2010). Bola Ajiboha commission of inquiry into Jos crisis. The News, March 1, p 29.
- Bolowole, B. (2008). Jos Killings: Matters arising. Sunday Tribune, December, 2008.
- Datung, Z. (1997). Plateau. Panyam and changal communal clash. Tell, May 12, p. 3-4



- Egwu, S. (2009). The Jos crisis and the National Question. The Guardian, February 1, 2009.
- Elaigwu, J.I. (2004). The Management of Ethno-religious Conflict in “Northern Nigeria”: Towards a more peaceful and Harmonious Geopolity. A paper presented on December 1st – 2nd at the Northern Governors’ Peace Conference in Kaduna.
- Eliade, M. (1987). Patterns in comparative religion. London: Sheed and Ward.
- Elisha, D. (2003). Plateau: Bendits invaded village. News Watch, April 15, P. 14. 157
- Eneche, A.B. (2001). Plateau: The Tive and Asiko communal clash. New Nigeria, March 17, 2001. p. 4-6.
- Enwerem, M.I. (1995). The politicization of Religion in Nigeria. Ibadan: Institute Francaise de Recherche en Afrique.
- Fombuat, T. (2002). Wase communal clash. The source, July 8, p. 20-22.
- Funke, M. (2002). Jos North bloody clash over Reschedule Elections Dates. News Watch, May 20, 2002 p. 47.
- Hamaza, J.M. (1978). The I found it (Jesus Salvation) demonstration. Newswatch, may 30, 1978 P. 17.
- Ibrahim, A. (2001). Jos crisis sponsored. New Nigeria, September 30, p. 14.
- Idiris, U.K. (2001). Plateau: Crisis over Farm product. The source, April 18, 2001, p. 8-9.
- Igoh, D.S. (2002). Jos City: Fire Burns. City Watch April 12, 2002, p. 7
- Izang, P.Y. (1997). Plateau: Hausa Berom communal clash. Tell May 12, 1997 p. 3-4. 158
- Kayamo, F. (2010). The carnage in Jos: Sunday Sun, March 14, 2010.
- Kukah, (2002) Dangerous Dimensions of Ethnic and Religious Crises. Religion and society. January – April Volume 4, Number 6.
- Kukah, M.H. (2000). “Religion and State Failure in Nigeria: A Nigerian perspective” Guardian, June 13, 2000.
- Kukah, M.H. (1993). Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria: Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd.



- Kafanchan ethno-religion spill-over. *The News*, September 30, P. 16, 20. 159
- Mangul, P. (1996). Jos. Christian and Muslims clash. *New Nigeria*, March 24, p 13-14.
- Mbiti, J.S. (1986). *African Religion and Philosophy*. London: Heine Mann.
- Mohammed, A. (2009). Jos Crisis unjustifiable. *Daily Trust*, January 30, p2.
- Mohammed, A.S. (2005). *The Impact of Conflict on the Economy: The Case of Plateau State bicokasa of Nigeria*. Available at [www.odi.org.uk/events/nigeria\\_2004/as%20mohame%20web%20pap.er.pdf](http://www.odi.org.uk/events/nigeria_2004/as%20mohame%20web%20pap.er.pdf). Retrieved on 11th November, 2010
- Nache, A. D. (2001) *Christianity and the Quest for Moral Values: A Challenge for Contemporary Nigeria*, in *Religion and Social Ethics* (Ed). Gbola A. &Deji A. *Journal of National Association for the Study of Religion and Education*. Ijebu-Ode: Almsek Press Ltd.
- National Orientation Agency of Nigeria (NOA) (2002). "Special Report on Internal Conflicts in the North Central Zone". Federal Ministry of Information and National Orientation, Abuja, Nigeria.
- Okwuze, M. I. (2001). Religious problems and conflicts in Nigeria Revisited in J. C. O. Ozioko & J. I. Onuoha (eds.) *Contemporary Issues in Social Sciences*. Nsukka: Topmost publishers.
- Omar, A. (2010). Jos crisis, A failure of leadership. *The Nation*, March 22, 2010. p. 25.
- Pam, Y. (2008). "Jos Riots: Intelligence Reports Fooled me- Governor" *The Nation* 7, (December 2008). Plateau state ministry of information (September 15, 1980) *Religion and Society*. Volume 4, Number 6: Ikeja
- Sadau,. U. P. (1991). Plateau: The Attal and Attaka communal clash. *Newswatch*, October 28, 1991, P. 18.

