

## MANAGING HERDERS AND FARMERS CONFLICT IN NIGERIA: POLICIES, LEGISLATIONS AND CONVENTIONS

<sup>1</sup>Nurain Abayomi Mumuni

lordmumuni@gmail.com

&

<sup>2</sup>Abdulrasheed Abdulyakeen

abdulrasheedabdulyakeen90@gmail.com; 08033628063

<sup>1&2</sup>Department of Political Science,

Al-Qalam University, Katsina. Katsina State.

### Abstract

*This research explored the current Herders and Farmers conflict dynamics, the various actors, causes and its gender dimensions, as well as the effectiveness of conflict mitigation mechanisms used to date. The study adopted a qualitative data collection process using focus group discussions (FGDs) and key informant interviews (KIIs). Five states - Benue, Kaduna, Katsina, Zamfara and Nasarawa - that are among those adversely affected by the conflict were selected as case studies. In all, 48 FGD sessions and 46 KII interviews conducted to generate the data, and content analysis was applied to discuss the key findings from the study. It was realized that the major triggers of the conflict include biased responses of security agencies, corrupt disposition of traditional rulers, use of drugs and hard substances, existing ethnic/communal divides and mistrust, negative interpretation of religious differences and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The study concluded that in order to effectively tackle the conflict, the Nigerian Government has to demonstrate the political will and put in place measures to resolve the conflict in a mutually satisfactory way. The study recommends that Government should adopt a community-based approach that involves direct dialogue with the two parties and provide a proper platform for farmers and herders to interact frequently without bias or favor.*

**Key words:** Conflict, Convention, Farmers, Herders, Policies, Legislations

## Introduction

In the last two to three decades several African states have experienced a resurgence or intensification of herders and farmers conflicts. From the Sahel to the West and Horn stretching to Eastern and Southern Africa, pastoralists and sedentary farmer's burn, loot and kill for land, water, cow or crop. These conflagrations articulate with pre-existing ethnic and political conflicts, growing terrorist insurgencies, organized crimes and violence in ways that confound the task of managing the conflicts. Whereas extant studies of the conflicts appear fixated on establishing causalities, scholarly engagement with policies, legislations, conventions and protocols enacted and deployed by states and regional organizations, such as Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and similar organizations, to tackle the conflicts and build peace among the belligerent parties grow thinner. Even though existing discussions hint on instruments adopted by state and non-state actors to address the conflicts, scholarly investigation of the core conflict management policies, concrete conflict resolution legislations and specific protocols and conventions that promote peace building initiatives remain relatively scarce. While not depreciating the importance of unmasking causalities, a robust intellectual engagement with the laws, policies, protocols and conventions is, after all, not out of place.

Violent confrontations between farmers and herders are prevalent and pervasive in Central and West Africa. From Mali to South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo to Nigeria, climate variability, environmental degradation, and socio-political upheaval have shifted pastoralist migratory patterns and increased tensions between farmers and herders. These changes have increased confrontations between farmers and herders, leading to violent conflict, deaths, forced displacement and migration, erosion of inter-communal relationships, as well as the destruction of agricultural and livestock outputs. (Isola 2018). The increased competition for land and water resources further exacerbate everyday conflicts (unrelated to resources) when they occur.

For instance, when cattle destroy the crops of a subsistence farmer, it is a direct loss to the farmer's livelihood, and this may exacerbate pre-existing tensions between ethnic groups if the farmer and herder are of different ethnicities, sparking broader conflict and violence. Similar examples play out for herders when cattle are attacked and killed, often in retaliation to destruction of farmland, Abdulyakeen (2022). In Nigeria, the consequences have been severe. More than 6,000 people have been killed and over 62,000 people have been displaced in the Middle Belt states of Benue, Nasarawa, and Plateau alone (Idowu, 2017). Despite the escalating and expanding violence, there have been no systematic consolidations or assessments of what has been done to this point to address farmer-herder conflict in Nigeria.

In Nigeria, the frontiers of the farmer-herder conflict have expanded to include states like Benue, Plateau and Nasarawa in the north central and Kaduna, Zamfara and Katsina in the north west as well as Adamawa and Taraba in the north east. These states have recorded casualties (Gever and Essien, 2019) and there is no indication of an immediate resolution of the conflicts. Considering its current magnitude, the farmer-herder conflict, which has now taken a new crime-related dimension, it can be placed next to the Boko Haram insurgency in terms of its impact on Nigeria. In 2017, it was reported that Fulani herdsmen were the fourth deadliest group in the world (Global Terrorism Index, 2017). However, the attribution of the conflicts to Fulani herdsmen (ethnic profiling) has in fact engendered identity separation between farmers and herders, giving rise to misinterpretation by scholars, apparently owing to lack of depth of analysis. Today, the literature on farmer-herder conflict often depicts herders as Fulani and farmers as non-Fulani. Some analysts have even gone to the extent of framing the herders as Muslims and farmers as Christians (Ademola Adelehin, 2017; Thematic Report, 2017); a situation that has the potential to trigger religious uprisings. Worthy of note however, is that farmers and herders have lived a symbiotic life in the past (Bagu and Smith 2017: 9); both contributing significantly to the nation's economy.

Consequently, peace between the two parties is germane to the attainment of true national development. It must be added at this point that the trend of farmer-herder conflict is not uniform across the three study areas. It is convenient to attribute the unprecedented bloodshed in the middle belt (Benue and Nasarawa states), the north east (Adamawa and Taraba states) as well as parts of Kaduna state to farmer-herder conflicts. In Katsina State however, farmer-herder conflicts have never been proportionally sanguinary as is being witnessed in recent times. This study seeks to identify policies and legislations deployed to mitigate herders and farmers conflicts in Nigeria and the extent to which they have failed or succeeded in achieving the desired goal.

### **Statement of the Problem**

Conflicts between farmers and herders exist on a large scale, both within Nigeria and the greater Lake Chad Basin and Sudan-Sahel region; however, states within Nigeria's Middle Belt, North-east and North-west have witnessed an increase in casualties as consequences of these fractured relationships. Crop damage, attacks on cattle, and cattle theft/rustling are major conflict triggers that initiate violence between the two groups, which often leads to cycles of revenge attacks. The tense relationships and cycles of attacks have killed thousands of people and displaced more than 62,000 people in the Middle Belt. Mikailu (2016, May 5th); Isola (2018). The instability and displacement have resulted in extensive loss of crops and cattle in an area considered to be the "food basket" of Nigeria. The federal and state governments, civil society, religious groups, and communities have responded to the different manifestations of this conflict in a variety of ways, but key gaps and opportunities remain to better prevent violence and improve inter-communal relations. This policy brief examines existing responses by government and non-government actors at the community, state, and national levels to the protracted conflict between farmers and herders, and offers some recommendations for the management or resolution of this conflict

Security has suffered as a result of the violence in other parts of the country. Herders fleeing conflict in the three most afflicted states (Zamfara, Sokoto, and Katsina) are heading south, putting a strain on resources in the Middle Belt and southern parts of the country. While the inflow of Fulani livestock herders has been occurring in the southern regions for decades, tensions in the south-east, south-west, and Niger Delta appear to be increasing. In these areas, there has been an increase in herder-farmer conflict, which has often devolved into murderous violence. Several criminal gangs fleeing police operations in the North West have migrated to the central and southern states, posing new security challenges for the impacted communities and the government (UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 2019).

The insecurity has also negatively impacted the exploitation of environmental resources (e.g. gold mining) in the Northwest region, affecting the livelihoods and growth potential of affected states. Artisanal mining activities were attracted by the presence of lucrative gold deposits in the state of Zamfara as bandits and families depended on them for their livelihood. Given that agriculture is the backbone of the local economy, agricultural disturbances due to bandit attacks affect agricultural productivity, with significant implications for food security. Most farming communities were forced to abandon their farms, especially in areas near forested areas, as bandits took advantage of these locations to attack the communities. Few farmers left behind had to pay bandit taxes before gaining access to their farms. About 30% of the agricultural land in Kaduna state was abandoned by the affected communities, while in Zamfara and Katsina states farming activities were restricted to a few areas, resulting in a 60% increase in food production (Rufai, 2018). In Kebbi state, more than 350 rice farmers were affected by land abandonment as a result of bandit attacks. Declining incomes for local farmers and other vulnerable groups, especially women, are also affecting their ability to support children's education and household income. Violence in the northwest continues to spread and security

forces are already stretched. The military's protracted counterinsurgency operations against jihadists in the Northeast have dragged on in part due to insufficient manpower and equipment (Ahmadu, 2019, Rufai, 2018). More needed resources are consumed in the East due to continued military involvement in the fight against bandits and other activities in the Northwest. The propensity of state governments affected by the Northwest spillover to set up local paramilitaries or vigilante groups is another emerging threat. On January 9, 2020, the governors of the six states of Ekiti, Lagos, Ondo, Oyo, Ogun and Osun established the Western Nigeria Security Network, also known as Operation Amotekun, following widespread protests in the South West Geopolitical Zone following fatal incidents among Fulani herders and local farmers, along with kidnappings increasingly involving criminals from the Northwest. This development could set a precedent for the emergence of ethno-regional security arrangements in other parts of the country, which could also undermine national stability if they become a trend while enhancing security at the local level.

## **1.2 Objective of the Study**

The general objective is to look at Managing Herders and Farmers Conflict in Nigeria: Policies, Legislations and Convention. The specific objectives are to:

- What are these policies, legislations, conventions and protocols?
- To what extent have they been successful or unsuccessful in achieving the desired results?
- How do we account for the successes or failures?
- To assess the effectiveness of policies and intervention mechanisms being pursued to address the challenges.

## **Review of Related Literatures**

It is important to note that Herders in Nigeria are predominantly the Fulani ethnic group. Fulani as an ethnic group are mostly found in Nigeria and other West African countries. They are predominantly pastoralists occupationally wise. The Fulani are said to have originated

from Senegambia and then spread across some twenty (20) States in West Africa and the Sahel, up to Western Sudan and the Central African Republic (Blench, 1994; Shehu and Hassan, 1995; Blench 2010; and McGregor 2014 cited in Ibrahim, Abdulrahman and Umar, 2015). The people are found in large number in Nigeria but while some have moved into the cities, many are still living as semi-nomadic herders. However, these group who own and rear herds of animals like cattle for commercial purposes are called herdsmen. Fulani herdsmen or Fulani pastoralists are nomadic or semi nomadic herders whose primary occupation is raising livestock (Iro, 1994). They usually move their herds from one place to another in search of pasture and fresh water. It is predominantly the occupation of the Fulani ethnic group in Nigeria. They are often seen moving about with weapons (like daggers, machets, arrows etc) to protect their livestocks. The more disturbing issue about the herdsmen is that they also block the highways with their cattle, rob and kidnap people, keep them captives in the bush and demand for ransom. The herdsmen have also been involved in the rape of old and young women and burning of communities (The Vanguard, 2015). Due to their violent nature and associated killings, the group was recently described as the world's fourth deadliest militant group (Mikailu, 2016).

Farmers (are persons who engage in agriculture, raising living organisms for food or raw materials. The term therefore applies to people who do some combination of raising field crops, orchards, vineyards, poultry, or other livestock. Based on this broad definition, farmers are both the herdsmen who herd or keep livestock like cattle, goats and sheep, and crop farmers. However, for the purpose of this work, farmers are the crop farmers (those who raise field crops) also called peasant farmers/ subsistence cultivators only.

Bonga (2017:3) observed that the issue of Fulani herdsmen invading farmlands and destroying crops, most especially during the dry season has been a serious concern to many Nigerians because it is causing disunity in the country among the various ethnic groups. It has also

been observed that violence between Fulani herdsmen and farmers is one of Nigeria's most persistent security problems and has left thousands of people dead in recent decades (Beetseh, 2018).

This evolution was complemented with the provision of affordable trypanocides, which provided a coping means for the herders in the tsetse-infested humid regions of southern Nigeria. Thus, the period from May to September, during the rainy season, has been identified as the intense period of clashes between pastoralists and farmers over arable land, particularly when the Fulani return northwards with their cattle as the vegetation begin to appear. These clashes result from the invasion of the arable land by the cattle during this peak season of crop production (2010; Abbass, 2012) and thereby posing threat to national security and development.

The conflict between herders and farmers in North-Western Nigeria has social, economic and humanitarian disadvantages such as loss of lives and property and disunity among the various ethnic groups existing side by side in the country. It was reported that in 2016 there was an estimated death toll of about, 2,500 arising from herdsmen attacks (International Crisis Group, 2017). Other reports indicate that in March 25<sup>th</sup>, 2014, the Fulani herdsmen killed about sixty people in Gwer and Agatu local government areas of Benue (Isola (2018). Farmers-herders conflict has increased over the years (Olayoku, 2014) and according to the Global Terrorism Index 2015, the death toll of 63 associated to Fulani herdsmen killings skyrocketed to 1,229 by the end of 2014 (Bagu and Smith 2017).

It is quite disturbing that the conflict has led to economic depletion and worthy of note is that Nigeria is an agrarian society, farm products which should serve as the country's agricultural foreign products are been destroyed during the conflicts. Some of these farm products like cash crops usually add to Nigerians National Domestic Products (GDP) but when these crops are destroyed at the process of the conflict, it leads



to depletion of economic growth. Also, cattle rearing had contributed greatly to the Nigerian economic growth.

However, when farmers' farm products are destroyed by herdsmen's cows, there is always reprisal attacks on the cow by the farmers leading to killing and injuring of hundreds of cows. Fulani herdsmen in turn, resort to violence leading to wanton destruction of lives and property which has tremendous effect on the nation's peaceful co-existence and adversely affecting the economy. In March 2017, Benue state Governor Samuel Ortom was quoted to have stated that attacks by herders coming from mostly northern states and possibly also from Cameroon and Niger had cost his state N95 billion (about \$634 million as at that time) between 2012 and 2014 (International Crises Group, 2017).

It has also been revealed that among the major effects of farmers and Fulani herdsmen conflict in North-Western Nigeria are destruction of lives and property; theft of cattle and goats; destruction of crops; physical fight with machetes, (guns), and sticks; pollution of drinkable water; destruction of reservoirs and source of drinkable water; burning of rangelands, fadama land, houses; and damaging of irrigational facilities. The destruction has direct impact on the people's livelihood as their economic activities are tied to these environmental resources like water, land (soil), and vegetation (herbs and food crops) (Bello, 2013).

According to Gursoy (2020), the herdsmen-farmers conflict is as old as the existence of man. There has been earlier biblical allusion that opined that the conflict can be seen in the Bible to have started from the children (Cain and Abel) of the first man (Adam). Abel was a shepherd and Cain was a farmer according to Bible's account, however, Cain killed Abel in the field out of jealousy. Okoro (2018) averred that herdsmen-farmer or harder-farmer conflicts are conflicts occurring between peasant farmers or subsistence cultivators and nomadic or transhumant live-stock keepers.

According to Hagmann (2003), there exist differences between ‘herder-herder’ conflicts and ‘farmer-herder’ conflicts. He maintained that herder-herder conflicts are usually conflicts between nomadic or transhumant live-stock keepers that arise between receiving groups over their territory’s resources and incoming groups searching for water and pastures, and cattle raiding. Herder-herder conflict is a conflict that results from theft of cattle or other animals among the Fulani herdsmen. It is herdsmen rustling cattle of other herdsmen, or when un-experienced herders entrust their animals in the care of experienced herders under agreements, and when such agreements are breached conflict occasions within. The violent cattle raids among pastoralists in East Africa are examples of herder-herder conflicts. Hussein, Sumberg and Seddon (1999) see farmer-herder conflicts as comprising different types of conflicts, including ethnic conflicts, interest conflicts, resource disputes, political action, evictions, killings, cattle raiding and cattle rustling.

According to Gursoy (2020), the farmers-herdsmen conflict has been traced to the beginning of agriculture and either increased or decreased in intensity or frequency depending on economic, environmental and other factors. In his study, Idowu (2017) noted that the violence between herdsmen and farmers has displaced more than 100,000 people in Benue and Enugu States and left them under the care of relatives or in dilapidated internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps, while many are still struggling to rebuild their lives. The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) recently placed the Nigeria’s Fulani herdsmen as the world’s fourth deadliest militant group for having accounted for about 1,229 deaths in 2014. Amnesty International (as published in New Telegraph) on January 29<sup>th</sup> 2018 alone. According to Amnesty International, ‘The Nigerian authorities’ response to communal violence is totally inadequate, too slow and ineffective, and in some cases unlawful. Clashes between herdsmen and farmers in Adamawa, Benue, Taraba, Ondo and Kaduna have resulted in 168 deaths in January 2018 alone. Hundreds of people lost their lives in 2017, and the government is still

not doing enough to protect communities from these violent clashes. For instance, 549 deaths and thousand has occurred in Benue, Taraba, Zamfara, Kaduna, Plateau, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau, Cross Rivers, Adamawa, Katsina, Delta and Ekiti states between the period of 2017-2020 (Gursory, 2020).

In his own contribution, Taiwo (2010) averred that armed conflict between herdsmen and their host communities had been reported to have taken place in over 20 villages in Nigeria, including, Ago Kekere, Idi OpeKekere, Olukore, Olokuta, Apena, Jaramosan, Akeeran, Alaigogo, Aaaro, Temidire, Iya Ibadan, Ideto, Apapa, Akele, Agwo, Bodija, Olufayo, OkoTeku, Maniya, OkeOgun, Shaki, Egbedore, Ilobu, EfonAlaye, Alu, andIyamoye. Also, the study carried out by Sulaiman and Ja'afar to ascertain the economic effects of this type of conflict in Bauchi state from 2003 to 2007 discovered that: Livestock that were lost through the farmers-pastoralists conflict included 34 cattle and 11 sheep/goats, valued about 1.8 million Naira and N66, 000.00 for cattle and sheep/goats, respectively. Six persons lost their lives during the period with anticipated economic contribution valued at N2, 844, 000.00. The number of persons injured in the farmer-pastoralists conflict as revealed by the study was 45 among whom 15 persons were incapacitated that they could not perform their economic activities during the period of treatment. The cost implication due to the bodily injuries of those affected in this respect was about N2.64 million. In addition, a research carried out on the causes and effects of the perennial clashes between herdsmen and farmers in Nigeria by Mercy Corps between 2013 and 2016, funded by the British Department for International Development (DFID) revealed that the conflict uncurrred losses of about \$14 billion in potential revenues annually to Nigeria. Meanwhile, the usual resultant effects of the conflicts are loss of lives, crops, destruction of houses, displacement of persons, decline in income, distrust; as well as threat to food and national security (Gursoy, 2020).

Unfortunately, the compelling account of Fulani herdsmen killings and attacks on farming communities as discussed above did not in totality represent the true nature of the farmers-herders conflict in Nigeria. The statistics about the killings of Fulani and their cattle are hardly reported by the Nigeria media (Abubakar and Dano, 2018). For example, the media coverage of the December 2017 massacre where more than 800 Fulani herdsmen and their families were massacred with the destruction of their abodes in Taraba in comparison with the total media outburst on the killings of 73 non-Fulani in Benue state. This is a reflection that the media have been criminally biased in their coverage of the farmers-herders conflict in Nigeria (Abubakar, 2018). Also, on January 31, 2018, there was breaking news all over the media with a mass killing in Benue state with the headline “Bandits kill, burn seven travelers to ashes.” It will take on a whole effort to read the full story to discover that the victims were Fulani and the 21 native Tiv militia that carried out the killings were represented as Bandits (Higazi, 2016). Balogun maintained that if the killers were Fulani, the headline would have been different.

Besides, the predominant pattern of reporting attacks on Fulani herdsmen and their cattle have always hid the identity of the perpetrators and classified them as bandits. While the bias reporting against Fulani herdsmen did not in any way insulate the Fulani herdsmen from blame of escalating the conflicts, however, the repeated representation of killer herdsmen as ‘Fulani’ by the vast majority of media outlets in Nigeria was implicitly suggesting that the Fulani people are nothing but criminals (Premium Times, 2018). Apparently, “the frequent use of the term Fulani by the media to describe killer herdsmen is not only a stereotype” (Premium Times, 2018), the unbalanced reporting of the conflict between the Fulani herdsmen and farmers can also escalate the conflict (Mogekwu, 2011; Adisa and Adekunle, 2010). The media shaped public opinion, as suggested by many scholars (Abdulbaqi and Ariemu, 2017; Howard and Howard, 2003) that the moment the media allocate blame by identifying a

perpetrator without proper investigation, the public start to build the image of an enemy.

**Methodology**

The unit of analysis constitutes twenty (20) LGAs that were purposively selected from banditry prone communities of Kaduna, Katsina and Zamfara States in North Western Nigeria, and Benue and Nassarawa States in North Central over the inquiry period (2015-2021). Seven (7) LGAs each were selected from Kaduna, Katsina and six (6) from Zamfara State. The list of the selected LGAs from Kaduna, Katsina and Zamfara are presented in table 1 below:

**Table 1: Unit of Analysis**

<b>BenueKaduna</b>	<b>Katsina State</b>	<b>Zamfara Nassarawa State</b>
Guma Birnin-Gwari	Batsari	Anka Awe
LogoJema'a	Danmusa	Maradun Doma
Katsina-AlaChikun	Faskari	Maru
Gwer WestGiwa	Jibiya	Shinkafi
MakurdiKajuru	Kankara	Tsafe
AgatuIgabi	Sabuwa	Zurmi
Zaria	Safana	
<b>Total</b>	<b>7LGAs</b>	<b>6LGAs</b>

**Source: Field research, 2022.**

The study use qualitative methods of data collection. Key Informant Interviews (KII) and focus group discussions (FGDs) were used to obtain in-depth and personal accounts of stakeholders in the study area.

The interviews and FDGs were deemed suitable to collect quality data within short periods of time given the security/access of the study locations, which were only accessible during the day time. The qualitative approach provided a fair stakeholder perception on and generated multiple perspectives to the understanding and reduces bias responses.

To maximize the inclusion of a wide range of stakeholder perspectives in the study, the paper carefully drew participants for interviews and focus group discussion from security personnel, traditional leaders, youth and women associations.

**Table 2: Stakeholder groups and number of informants**

No.	Stakeholder Type	Methodological tool	Katsina	Zamfara	Kaduna	Benue	Nassa-rawa
1.	Security Agencies	KII	24	21	19	20	15
2.	Traditional Leaders	KII	7	6	6	8	7
3.	Leaders of Youth Associations	FGD	7	6	7	8	7
4.	Leaders-Religious Associations	FGD	7	6	6	7	6
5.	Women Association	FGD	7	6	6	6	7
	<b>Total</b>		<b>52</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>42</b>

**Source: Field research, 2022.**

The study carried out 97 qualitative interviews, from the seven stakeholder groups that participated in the research between January and August 2022. The breakdown of the total number of stakeholders that were interviewed is presented in table 2. All interviews and FDGs were conducted either in English or Hausa. Responses in Hausa were

later translated into English. The ethical parameters used in the conduct of the interview included voluntary participation, no harm to participants, informed consent, anonymity and confidentiality, incentives and goodwill for participants, honesty to participants, and ethical reporting.

### **Effects of Farmers and Herders Conflict in Nigeria: Limitations on the Legislations, Policies and Conventions**

**Loss of Life and Property:** The intensity and magnitude in which the farmer-herders conflict has escalated are no doubt worrying. The crises were previously located in the north and north-central geopolitical zone, but it had spread to the western and core southern part of the country (Aluko 2017). The widening conflict has affected the country's socio-political and economic stability. While there is no recent map available to represent the escalation in conflicts and fatalities in the conflict between 2016 and 2018, there are few documented reports that describe the continuous escalation of the conflict. According to the Global Terrorism Index of 2015, the death toll of 63 associated to Fulani herdsmen killings skyrocketed to 1,229 by the end of 2014 (GTI, 2015:22). The killings continue without any sign of slowing down with more than 350 death recorded in February and March 2016 (Mikailu, 2016), 15 casualties in May 2016 (Stein, 2016), and 80 fatalities in July 2016 (Akinwotu, 2016).

The farmers-herders conflict has increased over the years. Most villages in Benue state have experienced attacks from herders, villages 20 like Loggo, Katsina-Ala, Gwer West, Gunna, Makurdi, and Agatu. In the Shengev community, 200 people were killed by the Fulani herdsmen (Omoleye and Segun, 2018). Also, on the 25th of April 2016, nine villages in Uzo-Uwani local government area of Enugu state in the Southeast of Nigeria were attacked by Fulani herdsmen, and they left a carnage of destruction of over 11 lives and millions of naira worth of properties destroyed (Vanguard, 2016). The Agatu people in Benue state in north-central zone of Nigeria were not left out from the continuous attacks, killing and destruction of properties in 2017 that left

more than a hundred people killed by the herdsmen (Rasaq et al, 2018). No fewer than ten persons were killed in an attack on the 5th of March 2018 in Omosu Village in Ojigo ward Edumoga of Okpokwu local government of Benue State; when armed herdsmen opened fire on civilians (Godwin, 2018). In Ogun State, on the 5th of February suspected herdsmen attacked some local communities in Ketu Local Council Development Area destroying their farmlands and resulted in 30 primary schools being shut down (Oladele, 2018). On the 28 of February 2018, 20 people were killed in Adamawa states by armed Fulani herdsmen in Fulani herdsmen clashes in Gwamba village in Demsa Local government area of Adamawa state (This Day, 2018). The magnitude of farmer-herder conflict has claimed lives and properties, and this has made many people describe the Fulani herdsmen more dangerous than the Boko-Haram terrorist group terrorizing the northern part of Nigeria for years (GTI, 2015; Sulaiman and Ja'afar-Furo, 2010).

**Threat to national integration/ Inter-communal or ethnic hostility:** North-Western Nigeria is seriously threatened by the herdsmen and farmers conflict and this has great effect on the socio-economic activities of the region in particular, the nation in general and peaceful co-existence. The conflict is also affecting the national security of the country, causing unnecessary hatred between and among various ethnic groups. In a nutshell, the clashes between herdsmen and farmers in Nigeria had led to loss of many lives and wanton destruction of property worth millions of naira. The current wave of violence in Nigeria has been observed by Kasarachi (2016) when he stated that the conflict has disrupted socio-economic, religious and educational activities, political instability and threatened the national unity of Nigeria. National cohesion and bond have been threatened. When the unification among ethnic groups is distorted, the result manifests itself on other aspects in the country ranging from political, economic and social. Onyeoziri (2002, p. 17) noted that;



Loyalty to the Nigerian state remains at best reluctant, while stability has continued to elude the system. Inter-communal or ethnic hostility and even open violence have increased, while the constant complaint of marginalization tells its own story of the declining sense of belonging that exists in the land. These are eloquent symptoms that the policy of federal character is not producing the desired effect, and it is easy to think of many reasons why.

There is no gainsaying that the conflict has brought about division and enmity among various ethnic groups most especially in North-Western Nigeria. This division also threatens national integration. The effect of the farmers and herders conflict in Nigeria has transmuted to various sectors of the country. It also sprouted the evolution of ethnic militia in the country. This ethnic militia exists with the sole aim of protecting its values and people and also projecting their interest by threatening the government of the country.

As noted by Ogunjenite (1987), national integration relates to the building of nation-states out of disparate socio-economic, religious, ethnic and geographical elements. With the current dispensation of the farmers and herders conflict in Nigeria, the desperation of the socio-economic, religious, ethnic etc, have been waved and debunked by the conflict. The spirit of nationalism is killed and that of ethnic sentiment is adopted.

The narrative emerging from identity framers in the media and popular discourse further ignites the conflict. The protagonists in this saga are often presented as being nomadic Fulani cattle herders, who are mostly Muslims, against sedentary farming communities of several other ethnic extractions, who are often, but not always non-Muslims. This ethno-religious interpretation of the conflict is gradually gaining ground and making an indelible dent on the existing fragile Muslim-Christian relations in the country. Support for this claim comes from the recent attacks on northern Muslims resident in the southern part of the country as a reaction to the activities of “Fulani herdsmen” in those areas,

(Bagu, C. & Smith, K; 2017). Ethnicity and ethnic chauvinism have permeated the fabrics of Nigerians to the extent that genuine attempts to solve the problems of national security and development are ethnically or religiously interpreted and misinterpreted

**Climate change** is one of the greatest challenges to global peace and security in the 21st century. Climate change is caused by both natural activities such as ocean currents, volcanic eruptions, erosion and drought, human activities such as industrial activities, greenhouse gases, deforestation and slow burning of fossil fuels. This has subsequently led to desertification with the adverse effects of water and land scarcity, poor crop yields and the extinction of animal and plant species, particularly in the least developed countries of Africa. This is consistent with the Sahara and Sahel Observatory's (2007) account that climate change is leading to low rainfall in the African region, which is reflected in a deterioration in vegetation cover for feeding livestock, which forced people north, mostly ' Shepherds' to face the negative effects of desertification and move south, where it is relatively healthy to protect themselves from environmental problems, in search of greener pastures for their livestock. Conflict between pastoralists and sedentary farmers arose as a result of this battle, because both groups are struggling to endure the effects of environmental problems at the same time. The former is fighting for more green pasture to feed their animals, while the latter is fighting for more acreage to enhance food output.

Consistent with the above ecological challenges, Shettima and Tar (2008) argue that in the West African sub region, a conflict between sedentary farmers and mobile pastoralists occur due to the scarcity of agricultural land and pastures due to scarce resources has become ingrained. In the ecology and political economy of the region (Shettima and Tar, 2008). In the West African sub region, livestock farming is the main source of income for more than 12 million people (Nura, 1996 cited in Shetima and Tar, 2008). Throughout the region,

pastoralists move within and between countries, mainly in search of greener pastures and water for their animals, along the line the confrontation between pastoralists and farmers becomes inevitable (Shettima and Tar, 2008). The focus of the conflict is therefore the "resource scarcity" induced by climate change. This is consistent with the findings of Ibrahim and (Dalugat 2015) that in northern Nigeria there is extreme competition between sedentary farmers and Fulani herders for farmland and limited water resources, often leading to conflict (Ibrahim and Dalugat, 2015). This conflict has intensified crisis between the herders and farmers in Nigeria today. The inherent properties of climate, manifested as weather changes over a period of time, significantly affect food security in unpredictable ways due to their detrimental effects on pests, crop diseases, agricultural production, animal husbandry and humans. Changing climatic conditions affect both the physical and economic availability of certain preferred foods. Its impact on income opportunities can affect: the ability to purchase food, the availability of certain food products, and the price in turn; changes in seasonal demand for agricultural labor resulting from changes in production practices affect income-generating capacity.

The far north of Nigeria which is an arid and semi-arid region experiences lesser rainfall compared to other regions in the country. Meanwhile, the National Meteorological Agency (NMA) reported in 2008 that the annual rainy season dropped from an average of 150 to 120 days over the course of the last 30 years. The report also noted that in the last six decades, over 350,000 km<sup>2</sup> of the almost arid region was gradually turning into a desert, a phenomenon notified to be at the rate of 0.6km per year progressing southward. The International Crisis Group Report (2017) alerted the public to the fact that states like Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Yobe and Zamfara, were gradually becoming deserts with 50-75 percent of the land area drying up progressively. These environmental changes according to the report have affected human livelihoods and also been a

factor contributing to pastoralist's southward migration, in search for pastures for their cattle. Initially, migration was seasonal, with herders spending December to May in the central zone before returning north (International Crisis Group, 2017).

With observations from the last two decades, available pastures kept dwindling in the far north; herders have been noticed to stay in the central zone longer from December to June or July. The report by the International Crisis Group (2017) alerted to the fact that more recently, some herders have chosen to graze their herds permanently in the Central and South zone of Nigeria. This forced migration has led to the massive influx of herders in the south, which has given rise to the increase in violent clashes between herdsman and residents of the community where they migrate to, especially the farmers (Isola 2018).

**Durbanization:** are also contributing to the conflict. Nigeria's population has increased from less than 50 million in the 1950s to more than 200 million in 2021. Considering Nigeria's surface area of 91.07 million hectares, a landmass of about 923, 768 km<sup>2</sup> and a coastland of about 850 km<sup>2</sup> (Amusan, Abegunde and Akinyemi, 2017), its estimated 206 million people (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020) have overstretched the available land for expansion and production. Farming activities have expanded thereby making it imperative for the farmers to encroach into lands that were earlier earmarked as grazing routes and reserves.

Moreover, water points and Durbanization are also contributing to the conflict. Nigeria's population has increased from less than 50 million in the 1950s to more than 200 million in 2021.

According to Morrison (1982), the Fulbe began their southward expansion by settling in the plains around the Emirate of Bauchi and further into the grassland of the Jos plateau. Also, the movement towards the south was favored by the Fulani herdsman because the increase in population in the south acted as an eliminator of the wild

animals preying on cattle as human activities which include hunting reduced their numbers drastically. Furthermore, the clearing of land for agricultural purposes acted as a significant factor that eliminated the tsetse fly scourge. As a result of these factors, Blench (1994) concluded that the herders began to permanently pitch their tent in the southern savannah, and even began to line the banks of the Niger-Benue system.

However, the movement towards the south is not without negative consequences as Reenberg *et al.*, (1998) argued that the increase in population has, in turn, had drastic effects, like shortage in food, land conflict and the expansion of agriculture that give rise to competition for natural resources. Using hindsight during the decades of 1960-1990, Blench (1994) points out that new force came into play, the expansion of cultivation in the semi-arid zone. This zone no doubt has always been more populous than the middle belt as the most critical locations for the towns central to the Hausa Emirates. This expansion of cultivation threatened the nomads who traditionally saw uncultivated bush as a shared resource. These made pastoralists seek new pastures, either going further south or to neighboring countries and the quest for pasture bring the herders into contact with sedentary farmers (Obioha, 2008 and Blench 1993).

The migrations of Fulbe during the colonial era were seasonal between the semi-arid north and the dry season pastures along the Niger-Benue system. Blench (1994) further opined that as the rains gathered momentum, the tsetse fly populations expand, and herders were forced to migrate back to the north. However, the continuous exploration of southern pastures led to discovering new methods of staying and grazing livestock in these regions all year round. Also, with the growing population of sedentary crop farmers, the permanent stay of herders in the south has triggered disputes over land and water.

**Economic Impact:** A 2017 report indicated that in Benue and Kaduna States an estimated \$2.3 million or 47% of their internally generated

revenue (IGR) in 2015 was lost to the conflict (Thematic Report, 2017). IGR is heavily reliant on rural agricultural production and considerable parts of the rural areas are marred by insecurity. Farming activities in those places are restricted to nearby farmlands due to the increasing spate of insecurity. The same applies to the numerous bustling rural, regional and international markets located in the states. Market attendance, patronage and transaction, has significantly reduced as a result of the conflicts. All these have direct bearing on the IGR of the affected areas.

Nigeria in general, is said to be losing an average of \$13.7 billion annually to the farmer–herder conflict (Mercy Corps, 2015). The crisis has exacerbated unemployment and economic hardship, putting rural dwellers into chronic penury. It also limits market development and economic growth by 'destroying valuable property, preventing trade, deterring investment and eroding trust between market actors' (Thematic Report, 2017). As reported by Amaza (2018), the conflict equally has a consequential effect on food (in) security.

### **Federal and State Governments Policies, Legislations and Convention on Managing Farmer-Herder Violence**

#### **Responses by Federal and State Governments Creation of Grazing Reserves**

In 1965, the northern regional government of Nigeria initiated one of the first attempts to respond to the crisis of pastoralism that was linked to emerging conflicts between farmers and herders in the country. The Northern Region Grazing Reserves Law of 1965 created corridors for the passage of migrating livestock and 415 grazing reserves throughout the country, Idowu (2017). The reserves were envisioned to section off large swathes of land to be exclusively used by herders to graze their livestock. While initially considered a legislative solution, population growth, urbanization, and migration encroached on these designated areas, reducing herders' access and usage of the reserves. In addition, herders were often unable to find sufficient pasture and water within the

confines of the reserves due to climate changes and poor maintenance. Keeping livestock in one place increases the animals' vulnerability to disease and banditry, which incentivized herders to keep their herds moving outside the boundaries of the reserves. The federal and state governments have been derelict in the upkeep of these reserves to meet these concerns of farmers and herders. Amidst the absence of a concrete response plan to label and enforce the law on cattle routes by governments at all levels, existing reserves are being distorted. Amusan, Abegunde, and Akinyemi(2017).

### **Establishment of the National Commission for Nomadic Education**

The federal government established the National Commission for Nomadic Education (NCNE) in 1989 through Decree 41. It is presently known as Nomadic Education Act, Cap No. 20 Laws of the Federation. The main goal of the program was to economically and socially integrate nomadic pastoralists into the national life, through the provision of relevant, functional, and mobile basic education and livelihoods skills provision. It was also designed to help the pastoralists modernize their techniques of rearing cattle to maximize their economic potential, including dairy processing and marketing, animal vaccinations, and modern herding techniques. The program on nomadic education currently suffers from dilapidated infrastructure and human resource deficits, primarily due to a lack of adequate funding from the federal government. Okoli, and Atelhe(2014).

### **Deployment of Security**

The deployment of security agencies has been a dominant feature of the federal government's response to farmer-herder conflict. In Plateau state, a Special Task Force – Operation Safe Haven (STF-OSH) – has been deployed since 2001 to restore law and order. This Task Force is composed of officers and infantry of the armed forces, including the police, with the mandate to restore order and stability. Recently, the federal government expanded its mandate to include Kaduna state,

thereby replacing Operation Harbin Kunama II, (Scorpion Sting), Nngxin, (2018).The justification for the replacement was anchored on the fact that the security situation faced by Plateau and Kaduna states was similar. There are reports that security agencies who are part of STF-OSH and were sent to protect at-risk farmer and herder communities have committed crimes and human rights violations, such as physical torture, extortion, and other forms of gender-based violence against the communities they were deployed to protect. In fact, the deployment of security agencies has often had the unintended consequence of breeding local resentment and further increasing divides, as many communities perceive them to be biased with one side. This perceived or actual bias risks alienating the communities and people they are meant to protect.

### **The National Grazing Reserve (Establishment) Bill 2016**

In 2016, the National Assembly attempted to pass legislation to address conflicts between farmers and herders through the controversial National Grazing Reserve (Establishment) Bill 2016, which ultimately was not passed. This is largely due to the fact that the Land Use Act of 1978 vests all powers related to the regulation of ownership, alienation, acquisition, administration, and management of Nigerian land with the state governors. This attempt and others by the National Assembly to legislate on grazing reserves were in violation of the Land Use Act of 1978 and perceived as a move to usurp the powers of the governors. (Udemezue and Kanu 2019).

### **State-level Legislations Prohibiting Open Grazing:**

Benue State Government enacted the Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Law, 2017, on May 22, 2017, in response to the lingering conflict between farmers and herders in the state. Implementation of the law began on November 1, 2017. In the wake of the Benue State legislation, other states have considered similar legislation to respond to lingering conflicts between farmers and herders within their borders. For instance, the Taraba State Governor





also signed the Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Bill 2017 into law on July 24, 2017, to begin implementation on January 24, 2018. More analysis on the state level legislation in Benue and opportunities for violence prevention is contained in The Implications of the Open-Grazing Prohibition & Ranches Establishment Law on Farmer - Herder Relations in the Middle Belt of Nigeria. Kwaja and Ademola, Bukola(2018).

### **The Great Green Wall Initiative:**

In response to the economic, political, and security challenges posed by climate variability and environmental degradation, the African Union introduced the Great Green Wall Initiative (GGWI) in 2007. The GGWI set out to create an 8,000km (nearly 5,000 miles) of trees along the southern Sahel, accompanied by rural development and ecosystem management initiatives, to combat the encroaching desertification of the Sahara Desert. In 2013, the Nigerian government answered the call by establishing the Great Green Wall Agency (GGWA) to fight desertification, which has been responsible for the migration of herders from the northern part of the country to the Middle Belt region in search of water and pasture. Babatunde (2019).The purpose of the GGWA is to create a green shelter-belt (wind-breaking trees), in the front line states of Borno, Katsina, Kebbi, and Zamfara, to protect the northern part of the country against desert encroachment. The GGWA has established orchards and nurseries in northern Nigeria, as well as solar and wind-powered boreholes, but their activities have slowed down due to funding challenges from the federal government; Amusan, Abegunde, and Akinyemi (2017).

### **The Federal Government's Comprehensive Livestock Development Plan:**

In 2015, the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (FMARD) formulated what was referred to as a "comprehensive livestock development plan." The plan was to address lingering conflict between farmers and herders across the country and develop grazing

reserves as well as cattle routes, through a review of the existing program. Despite the fact that the Central Bank of Nigeria released the sum of N100 billion (nearly USD \$300 million) to the 36 states for this purpose, no state has been able to construct a ranch, reserve, or address the issue of stock route due to poor commitment to the issue. International Crisis Group (2017).

### **Responses by Civil Society, Communities, and Other Non-State Actors Community-Level Conflict Management and Resolution:**

Traditional and community leaders have been major influencers in conflict management and resolution for localized conflicts between farmers and herders. Many victims perceive formal courts to be corrupt or a waste of time, based on their low adjudication rate. In cases where there have been adjudications, such as in Barkin Ladi Local Government Area (LGA), some individuals have reported that the results further entrenched divisions between the two groups as they declared a winner and a loser. For this reason and in contexts where the state has not been able to effectively respond to localized conflicts, traditional and community leaders have been important bridges within this governance and security vacuum. These leaders are viewed as “the poor man’s high court” and have made significant contributions to peace building processes through the trust and credibility they have within the communities. Mikailu (2016). Farmers and herders have generally lived peacefully and in symbiosis for decades, and the desire for a sustained, mutually beneficial social relationship is a key consideration why farmers and herders prefer the traditional conflict management mechanisms. The participatory nature of traditional conflict resolution, where all the conflicting parties are involved in the process, makes it easy for parties to the conflict to abide or accept the decision; IGI Global. Abugu, & Onuba(2015).

### **The Use of Information, Communication, and Technology (ICT):**

The Middle Belt region is experiencing a “commercialization of cattle theft or rustling,” to meet the demand of an underground and informal



criminal economy that has taken advantage of the protracted conflicts between farmers and herders to steal cattle. The increasing price of cattle and the vast syndicate for stolen cattle has made migrating livestock particularly vulnerable to banditry and criminal attacks. This banditry and theft has become one of the features of the social conflict between farmers and pastoralists, with more sophisticated groups of rustlers, coordinating attacks to profit off cattle theft and trade. Mercy Corps (2017). Bandits profit from instability and often reinforce or ignite existing communal divisions. When cattle are stolen, herders also often respond through violence, creating a cycle of reprisal attacks. In response to cattle theft, the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association (MACBAN), in partnership with Zycom Surveillance Nigeria and Datamars of Switzerland, has developed and adopted a Radio Frequency Identification Device (RFID) system that is capable of tracking and monitoring the movement of cattle. The Cattle Rustling Information System (CATRIS), which was designed by the Centre for Information Technology and Development (CITAD) is able to provide real time information and alerts on cattle rustling in states within the North West region of the country. CITAD conducted a pilot test of the CATRIS in Kaduna, Kano, and Zamfara states. Ella-Ejeh (2017, September 7). Additional research is needed on the impact of these initiatives and whether they have led to the return of stolen cattle.

### **Conclusion**

This policy brief serves to consolidate the responses to farmer-herder conflict in Nigeria. Despite the protracted nature and character of the conflicts between farmers and herders in the study area, efforts have been made to address the rising tensions. Despite these efforts, challenges remain. In light of this review, there is a clear need to assess the effectiveness of these responses within the broader context of the state's responsibility to protect its citizens, as well as the ability of communities to build or strengthen their management of local conflicts. Farmers and herders have had relationships that were symbiotic and mutually beneficial for large periods of Nigeria's history. The current

breakdown of social, economic, and political relations between the two groups has not gone so far that it cannot be reversed. With clear and targeted engagement on the drivers of conflict in the Middle Belt North-West, North-east, South-West and South-East, with full support of state and non-state actors, violence between farmers and herders can be prevented.

### **Recommendations**

The over-politicization of the conflict should be addressed: Government should work with political actors towards the de-escalation of tensions caused by politicians who seek to gain cheap political points by emphasizing on the religious and ethnic coloration of the conflict. This has worsened the effect of the conflict and has caused the conflicting parties, to develop more hostile relationship between them. Politicians should be cautioned to desist from such acts and collaborate with government and affected communities towards finding lasting solutions to the problem.

The federal government should review the existing structure of cattle routes and reserves: In concert with the state and local governments, the federal government should conduct a comprehensive review on the existing structures providing for cattle routes and reserves to determine which aspects are working, which are not, and what challenges remain to be addressed. Since the Land Use Act vests the ownership and management powers of land with the State Governors, the reviews should be state-specific and recognize the dynamics of urbanization, population growth, and climate variability. Given that the challenges of farmer-herder conflict are often conflated with ethno-religious and political considerations, reviews of the current strategies and their effectiveness should be done in a transparent and consultative manner, with attention given to how monies appropriated for this purpose were utilized.

The federal government should move beyond the deployment of security agencies and exercise alternative community-based responses

to farmer-herder conflicts: Military deployment in response to conflicts between farmers and herders has become the popular choice of action by the federal government in many locations. Though the military can play a key role in stabilization, the military is currently deployed in nearly every state and tends to respond to local conflict issues that are better served by the police or community-based mechanisms. The federal government should collaborate with the state and local governments to build up alternative responses that utilize dialogue and mediation as de-escalation techniques with the conflicting parties. Security agents need clear rules of engagement over their conduct, management of internal security, and respect to human rights and international humanitarian law. Above all, their focus should be on guaranteeing the safety of the citizens they were deployed to protect, by not deepening the animosity of the herders and farmers through unprofessional or criminal behaviors

The federal government should provide adequate funding for the Great Green Wall Initiative: The federal government developed the Great Green Wall Initiative to address desertification and environmental challenges affecting the northern states. However, due to lack of funds their activities have been slow. In addition, the climate and environmental issues are increasingly affecting more areas of Nigeria that are not currently provided for under the GGWA's mandate. In order to make it more proactive, the federal government should fully fund the GGWA and partner with the state and local governments, the private sector, and communities to build local buy-in and implement the initiative. The GGWA should also expand their mandate to include desertification and climate-affected states such as Kaduna, Nasarawa, Benue and Plateau as part of the geographic scope for the implementation of the initiative.

## References

- Abdulyakeen, A. (2022). Conflict Continuum and Food Security in North-Western Nigeria: Reflections on Key Issues and Policy Recommendation. *Studia Securitatis*, Vol. 16 (2). Available at:<http://site.magazines.ulbsibiu.ro/studiasecuritatis/>
- Abbas, I. (2012). No retreat no surrender conflict for survival between Fulani pastoralists and farmers in Northern Nigeria. *European Scientific Journal*, 331-346.
- Abbass IM (2014), 'No retreat no surrender conflict for survival between Fulani pastoralists and farmers in Northern Nigeria', *European Scientific Journal*, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 331-346.
- Abdulbaqi, S. S., & Ariemu, O. (2017). Newspapers framing of herdsmen-farmers' conflicts in Nigeria and its implication on peace-oriented journalism. *Creative Artist: A Journal of Theatre and Media Studies*, 11(2), 77-105.
- Abubakar, I. R., & Dano, U. L. (2018). Socioeconomic challenges and opportunities of urbanization in Nigeria. In *Urbanization and Its Impact on Socio-Economic Growth in Developing Regions* (pp. 219-240).
- Adamu, M. (1978). *The Hausa Factor in West African History*. Oxford University Press.
- Adisa, R.S., & Adekunle, OA (2010). 'Farmer-herdsmen conflicts: A factor analysis of socioeconomic conflict variables among arable crop farmers', *Journal of Human Ecology*, vol. 30 no. 1.
- Agande, B. (2017, April 20). Army launches Operation Harbin Kunama II in Southern Kaduna. *Vanguard News*. Retrieved at <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/04/army-launches-operation-harbin-kunamaii-southern-kaduna/>
- Alabi, T.C. (2015). Nigeria: 'Poor Funding, Insecurity Challenge to Nomadic Education'. *All Africa*. Retrieved from [www.allafrica.com/stories/201507161190.html](http://www.allafrica.com/stories/201507161190.html)
- Aliyu, S. (2015). Causes and resolution of conflict between cattle herders and crop farmers in Katsina State. A Published MSc.



- Dissertation by the School of Postgraduate Studies. Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.Pp.1-7.
- Aluko, O.I (2017) "Urban Violence Dimension in Nigeria: Farmers and Herders Onslaught AGATHOS, Volume 8, Issue 1 (14): 187-206. [www.agathos-international-review.com](http://www.agathos-international-review.com) and Mambila Peoples. Cambridge Anthropology 9(2):42-57.and Surfeit:
- Bagu, C., Smith, K. (2017). Past is Prologue: Criminality and Reprisal Attacks in the Middle Belt of Nigeria. Search for Common Ground.
- Bassett, T. (1986). "Fulani Herd Movements", Geographical Review LXXVI (3): 233-249. Bassett, T. J. (1998). The political ecology of Peasant- Herder conflicts in the northern ivorycoast. Annals of the association of American geographers, 78(3), 453-472.
- Bello, AU (2013), 'Herdsman and farmers conflicts in North-Eastern Nigeria: Causes, Repercussions and Resolutions', Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, vol. 2, no. 5. 129-139.
- Gursoy, G. (2020). Farmers-herders conflict in Nigeria: An analysis of the root causes and the effects of the conflict. Philipps-Universitat Marburg Fachbereich 03: Gesellschaften und Philosophie.
- Blench R (1994), "The expansion and adaptation of Fulbe Pastoralism to sub-humid and humid Conditions in Nigeria. Cahier D Etudes Africaines, 34(1-3): 197-213.
- Blench, R. M. (1996). Pastoralists and national borders in Nigeria. African Boundaries: Barriers, conduits and opportunities. Edinburgh: Francis Pinter for Centre of African Studies, 111-128. Blench, R. M. (2010). Conflicts between Pastoralists and Cultivators in Nigeria, London Department for International Development
- Ella-Ejeh, J. (2017, September 7). Cattle Breeders Launches Digital Technology to Combat Cattle Rustling. Global Sentinel. Retrieved at <https://globalsentinelng.com/2017/09/07/cattle-breeders-launchesdigital-technology-combat-cattle-rusting/>
- Fulani, I. D. (2017, July 17). Poor funding affecting Nigeria's



- Great Green Wall Project. Premium Times. Retrieved at <http://www.premiumtimesng.com/regional/north-east/237217-poorfunding-affecting-nigerias-great-greenwall-project.html>
- Ibrahim, J. (2014, March 24). State crisis, pastoralist transhumance and rural banditry. Daily Trust. Retrieved at [www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/opinion/statecrisis-pastoralist-transhumance-and-ruralbanditry/41989.html](http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/opinion/statecrisis-pastoralist-transhumance-and-ruralbanditry/41989.html)
- Godwin, W. (2018). Enquiry concerning political justice. In *The Economics of Population* (pp.37-40). Routledge. Goulden, M, & Few, R 2011, 'Climate change, water and conflict in the Niger River basin', United States Agency
- Higazi, A. (2016) 'Farmer-Pastoralist Conflicts on the Jos Plateau, Central Nigeria: Security Responses of Local Vigilantes and the Nigerian State', *Conflict, Security & Development* 16(4): 365-385.
- Idowu, D. (2017). Causes, consequences and resolution of environmental conflict in Nigeria. *International Journal of Social Science and Economic Research*, 2(1), 2063-2076.
- IGI Global. Abugu, S. O., & Onuba, C. O. (2015). Climate change and pastoral conflicts in the Middle Belt and South-East Nigeria: Implication on human resource of the regions. *Global Journal of Human Resource Management*, 3(5), 44-51. *Across West Africa. Canadian Journal of African Studies* 40(1):1-40.
- International Crisis Group. (2017). Herders against farmers: Nigeria's Expanding Conflict. Africa Report No 252: 19 September 2017.
- International Crisis Group. (2017, September 19). Herders against Farmers: Nigeria's Expanding Deadly Conflict. International Crisis Group Africa Report (No. 252), <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/252-nigerias-spreading-herder-farmerconflict.pdf> Interview. (2017, September 6).
- Isola. O. (2018). Herdsmen and Farmers Conflict in Nigeria: A threat to Peace building and Human Security in West Africa. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Jones-Casey, K., &





- Knox, A. (2011). Farmer-Herder Conflicts in Mali. Focus on Land in Africa. World Resources Institute and Landesa Rural Development Institute. [www.focusonland.com/download/51dda6a62a68d/](http://www.focusonland.com/download/51dda6a62a68d/) [accessed 15 March 2015].
- Mercy Corps. (2017). CONCUR Impact Evaluation: Reducing Conflict and Increasing Local Economic Activities. MercyCorps. Retrieved at <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Conflict-Mitigation-Economic-GrowthNigeria-2017.pdf> Nigeria
- Mikailu, N. (2016). "Making sense of Nigeria's Fulani-farmer conflict". BBC News, Africa Section, 5 May.
- Mikailu, N. (2016, May 5th). Making sense of Nigeria's Fulani-farmer conflict. BBC News. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36139388>.
- Mogekwu, M. (2011). Conflict reporting and peace journalism. In search of a new model: Lessons from the Nigerian Niger Delta crisis. Expanding peace journalism: Comparative and critical approaches, 239-260.
- Morrison, J. H. (1982) "Plateau Societies' Resistance to Jihadist Penetration", in E. ISICHEI, ed., Studies in the History of Plateau State, Nigeria, London: Macmillan
- Obioha, E. E. (2008). Climate change, population drift and violent conflict over land resources in northeastern Nigeria. Journal of Human Ecology, 23(4), 311-324.
- Oladele, O. T. (2018). Knowledge and Utilisation Of Hiv/Aids Prevention Techniques among Semi-Settled Pastoralists in Southwestern Nigeria (Doctoral Dissertation).
- Olayoku, P. A. (2014). Trends and patterns of cattle grazing and rural violence in Nigeria (2006- 2014). Violence in Nigeria, 61.
- Ovuakporie and Agbakwuru. (2016). Herdsmen More Dangerous than Boko-Haram. The Vanguard, <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/04/herdsmen-dangerous-boko-haram-akpatason/>
- Oyama, S. (2014). Farmer-herd

- Shettima, A. G., & Tar, U. A. (2008). Farmer-pastoralist conflict in West Africa: exploring the causes and consequences. *Information, society and justice journal*, 1(2), 163-184.
- Sulaiman, A., & Ja'afar-Furo, M. R. (2010). Economic effects of farmer-grazier conflicts in Nigeria: A case study of Bauchi State. *Trends in Agricultural Economics*, 3(3), 147-157.
- Tamuno, T.N. (1972) *The Evolution of the Nigerian State: The southern Phase, 1898-1914* London: Longman.

