NIGERIA'S TRADE RELATIONS WITH HER WEST AFRICAN NEIGHBOURS, 1960 - 1990

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Abstract
The trade relations that existed among the various communities in West Africa region since pre-colonial period were to a large extent complementary. But the advent of colonialism and the imperial control of African States after independence ensured the gradual and structural incorporation of West African economies into the Western capitalist system which was detrimental to trade relations in West Africa or among ECOWAS states. This study attempts a trajectory of Nigeria's trade relations with West African States on one hand and its neighbouring Sahelian and Coastal countries since the 1960s up to 1990. It articulates the view that Nigeria's trade relations with other West African States were characterised by its low volume and the transactions were more on an informal platform which was in contradistinction with her foreign trade with non-African countries. The events of the 1970s precipitated by the vicissitudes of oil boom, the devaluation of the Naira among other factors were observed to be defining instruments that influenced the pattern of flow of commodities between Nigeria and her Francophone neighbours. It also identifies the aspect of food security as a strategic instrument of intra-ECOWAS relations and conclude that Nigeria and other West African States need to undertake internal reforms within individual states, put in place basic structures for economic growth as well as harmonise their political and economic policies to encourage regional integration in the region. The study adopts a historical and analytical approach through the gleaning of available primary and secondary sources.
Keywords: Nigeria, ECOWAS, neighbours, trade, relation

Introduction
The colonial demarcation of African boundaries at the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 did not take into consideration the local peculiarities of the African people. Rather, the balkanization was based on the lines of their economic interest to the detriment of the affinity shared by Africans. The structure of these artificial boundaries were designed in a manner that relate more to European metropolitan economic interest and which eventually encourage vertical ties between the colony and the metropole. The economic activities that existed between each of the African colonies and the colonial officials were at the dictates of the metropolitan imperialist. The colonial advent in Africa undermined the existing pre-colonial trade relations among African communities leading to a new economic paradigm in which trade relations was lopsided in favour of the Western economies who dictates the terms of trade. Even

before the shift to oil economy, the economy of Nigeria which depended largely on the peasant agricultural sector for revenue and which was tied to the volume and pace of domestic productivity served the interest of the colonialist.[1] Other Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone African countries share similar fate with Nigeria. Thus at independence, African countries still had strong economic ties with their respective erstwhile colonialist. This was followed by the gradual integration of the African economies in varying degrees into the international capitalist system. As a consequence, African economies were made to supply primary products – agricultural produce and mineral resources to the metropoles or the Western dominated market system.

The post-colonial era saw Nigeria making a shift from a traditionally trading partner - Britain to that of embracing a multilateral trade.[2] In spite of this shift, the prevailing economic order still indicated that Nigeria was exporting primary products to the capitalist market dominated by Western Europe and North America and her imports were essentially manufactured goods from these same countries. Francophone West African countries were essentially trading partners with France and did not embrace multilateralism; the French hold on them was obvious to the extent that the Franc zone was established. Against this backdrop, the trade relations between Nigeria and her Francophone neighbours was somewhat a small proportion of their total foreign trade. Thus, within the context of the overall trade relations among West African States (ECOWAS), there were reported cases of internal contradictions. It could be arguably said that while Member-States trade relations with others outside the sub-region have witnessed an increase, that is, in terms of the value of trade among Member-States, intra-ECOWAS trade witnessed a decline.[3]

Although it has been revealed that a lot of unrecorded or informal trade took place across the borders of Nigeria and her immediate neighbours, to the extent of supplanting the low level formal trade between and among them. However, these informal trading activities constitute a small proportion of the total trade that took place in the sub-region.[4] To corroborate this position, Lange asserts thus:

> Nigeria has certainly been a major exporter in both intra and extra-ECOWAS trade. Both Cote d'Ivoire and Benin Republic with large ports are next in that order. In terms of intra-ECOWAS trade, Benin Republic, Senegal and Togo are considered important exporters in the region known for the supply of products to other West Africa States. Burkina Faso and Mali import more of agricultural and food supplies from other West African States while Sierra Leone depend largely not on agricultural and food, but on other supplies from other West African States.[5]

The bulk of these formal intra-states trade shows that approximately 70% were trade in minerals – mainly oil trade. According to official statistics, the manufacturing sector accounted for about 20% and the agricultural products, whether edible or non-edible, constitute about 10%. Incidentally West African countries continues to show a high degree of bias for foreign trade, that is to say, preference was given towards satisfying the demands of markets outside Africa. This economic behavior attracted the policymakers, researchers, government official among others who felt that it was an unhealthy trend that ought to be reversed for a robust economic partnership among African countries and to further the African regional economic integration through the pooling of the resources of individual states including Nigeria.[6]

Contextualising Nigeria's Trade Relations with Neighbouring West African Countries

As indicated earlier, the volume of trade between Nigeria and its West African neighbours and others within the region was insignificant in relation to Nigeria's trade transactions with the western and oriental world. However, as the wind of globalization began to blow and countries were getting drifted in the face of the upsurge of some continental or regional economic integration blocs like North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA), Association of South Eastern Asia Nations (ASEAN), European Economic Area (EEA), European Community (EC) among others. Thus, Nigerian technocrats saw the need to take pragmatic measures against the challenge of economic marginalization. To protect the nation's economic interest in the long run, they thought of a strategic economic integration involving Nigeria and other economies. The order of the economic integration initiated entails: integrating the economies of Nigeria's neighbours as the immediate approach; integrating that of the West African countries as a follow up and then Africa as a whole. In this context, the integration process and expansion of trade relations was presumed as a mutually beneficial interaction between Nigeria and her neighbours based on the principles of comparative cost advantage, the complementarities of markets and the need to recognise that the most viable option for survival and development in the emerging world lies in regional economic integration.[7]

The nature of the trade relations amongst West African countries was described as that circumscribed by a host of historical, political, attitudinal and social factors. The implication was that the volume of trade between Nigeria and her neighbours flowed at a very low level. Thus, in an attempt to stem the tide of this ugly development and make her market attractive to her Francophone neighbours, Nigeria devalued her currency at 1000 percent; as a consequence the CFA flooded the Nigerian market. As a follow up to that there was increased trade transaction both legal and illegal across the borders of Nigeria. The devaluation of the Naira predisposed Nigeria to more exportation. Nigerian business actors were forced to export so as to earn CFA Francs. This situation also made imports from the Francophone countries to decline in response to the depreciation of the Naira which had made such import extremely dear. While Nigeria consistently exported cheap agricultural and manufactured goods to these countries, the Francophone agricultural and industrial production were negatively affected because of the devaluation of the Naira which had made the prices of their production less attractive in the market.

As a coincidence, the factors that stimulated the massive flow of commodities from the Nigerian market to its neighbouring countries equally affected adversely Nigeria's local industries and market. To make this vivid, it was observed that the drastic devaluation of the Naira from the initial near parity with the dollar to ₦22 to one dollar on the official rate and to ₦42 to one dollar on the unofficial rate as of the end of September, 1993 severely affected Nigeria's import-dependent industries and factories because of the huge cost of financing their raw materials and capital goods needs. This situation got worse as a result of the non-stabilization of the Naira in relation to other currencies due to its depreciation since 1982. Thus, industrial output became significantly reduced, there were yet unsold stocks and investment became very risky because the banking lending rate rose from 40 to 60 percent.[8]

Part of the problem of this development was that the increased illegal trade or activities of the informal trading sector characterized by illegal monetary transfer, the smuggling of refined petroleum products and subsidized goods such as farm inputs (Fertilizer) to Francophone countries through informal channels led to Nigeria's loss of revenue amounting to billions of Naira annually. In addition, the CFA Francs was seen as the most easily available currency in Nigeria than other convertible currencies like the United States Dollars (USD), Pound Sterling or Deutsche Mark (DM) which flow into Nigeria was just through the oil receipts domiciled in Central Bank of Nigeria and made accessible to the business community through foreign exchange auction. The inability of the West African Clearing House (WACH) to facilitate and regulate the cross-border monetary transfer contributed a lot to the problem of illegal transfer out of West Africa sub-region. The declaration in August 1, 1993 to suspend repurchase of CFA Francs rates exported outside the West African Franc zone was unable to mitigate the situation as the productive structures of the zone had greatly weakened.[9]

Some analysts have attributed the low level of West Africa intra-states trade relations to the nature of its economic structure. It was indicated that at independence, most of these States adopted the strategy of import-substitution where the industries of the afore-mentioned States imported semi-processed raw materials or components from the developed countries to feed their local subsidiaries of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) or States Companies for final processing and assembly through the use of cheap labour. Again, the lack of complementarity in goods produced and marketed affected their trade relations in terms of the volume and exchanges. The West African States virtually produced the same agricultural product – cash crops and similar commodities which essentially were exported to the world market for foreign exchange and based on the terms and dictates of the developed economies. This has remained the legacy of the vertical structure of their relations and integration into global economy relations.

The trade liberalisation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank through the instrumentality of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) focused on the opening up of the economies of the region, with the aim of exporting their goods (manufactured or semi-products) did not help in promoting intra-regional trade between Nigeria and her neighbours. Although SAP was considered a panacea to the deteriorating socio-economic situation in Africa in the 1970s, African States had designed their economic recovery programme within the context of the Lagos Plan of Action which was seen as "African alternative strategy", that is, Africans providing an alternative to what has been offered from outside the continent. The perceived lack of diligent implementation of the goals of this Plan by African leaders may have thwarted it. Thus, the IMF and World Bank through the Bergs Report took advantage of this situation by introducing their conditionalities for adjustments for which many West African States embraced.[10] These rolling back policies which forced off State intervention in the critical economic sectors did not encourage trade relations between

African States, but further tie the latter economy in a subservient role to the Western States with the so-called bailout fund.

Nigeria's trade relations with the Francophone neighbours suffered some political repercussions as a result of the strategic position of Nigeria in the sub-region. These neighbouring former French colonies were apprehensive of the perceived domineering role of Nigeria. This perception greatly impinged on both their political and economic relations in the sense that it narrowed and compromised the scope of the mutually beneficial cooperation. Many of these Francophone countries preferred to trade with extra-African powers instead of Nigeria. The lack of faith manifested in the role some of them played against Nigeria during the Nigeria - Biafra War as well as their disposition to the good neighbourliness policy of Nigeria after the war. The development constituted a clog in the wheel of progress to achieving regional economic integration. Nwokedi rightly pointed out that the Nigerian policy of good neighbourliness was misconstrued for an imperialist agenda and it has led to a mix of cooperation, competition and conflict.[11]

The inextricable trade link between the West African States and their former colonial powers whose interests were overriding has been earlier mentioned in this study, but there is need to portray the statistics in order to indicate the far reaching effect the domination of the market of the region by these extra-African powers. For instance, Nigeria's import and export was dominated by the countries of Western Europe (United Kingdom, the United States and Japan)[12]. For some period in the fourth quarter of 1989, Western Europe was said to have accounted for ₦3,149 million worth of exports and ₦6,130.3 million worth of exports to regional groupings, ECOWAS accounted for a mere ₦57.7 million worth of imports and ₦1,072.2 million worth of exports for the same period.[13] This statistics show that Nigeria and her neighbours traded at a very low level or percentage over time. A trend which require West African States pursue regional integration agendum in order to reverse it. In a twist of fate, the SAP's trade liberalisation policy which opened up the economies of West African States served to jeopardize the integration efforts. Whereas, SAP (rolling back State intervention in economic activities) was to allow multi-nationals or foreign investment in national economies, at the same time, the regional economic integration efforts require the active participation of the State machineries.

This contradistinction of interests between the West African States and the neo-colonial tendencies of the advanced capitalist market attracted the attention of the African elites who reasoned that since the economic realities of the dispensation were inclined to the formation of regional trading blocs, African must not be left out in the pursuit of that goal. It is instructive to note that it was the developed economies that initiated the idea of the regional integration movement and have instituted substantial number of blocs and at the same time preferring to deal with individual African States. West African elites saw the need to overcome their differences and harmonise their economic policies so as to forge an economic bloc through expanded market in the overall interest of their region. It is expected that in the face of the challenges pulled by global capitalist market, the West African States would be ready to mitigate the entrenched economic marginalization due to the lopsided international economic relations.

The debt crisis and its management by West African States weighed heavily on the volume of trade relations between them. The attempt to service these debts undermined national productivity because many industries struggled to survive as output was lower than installed capacity, consumer purchasing power dropped significantly, while government has at the expense of meeting social and economic needs spent huge part of its resources on debt services. As these national economies could not meet up with production, the relatively cheaper competitive commodities from countries outside Africa gradually displaced the markets for local products.

The state of trade relations between Nigeria and West Africa as a bloc and other Countries and Regional Groupings have been captured in Table 1 below:

International Trade (Nigeria)

Imports by Regional Grouping
(₦ Million)

Year and Quarter	Common wealth Countries	Eastern Europe	Japan	United Kingdom	U.S.A	ECOWAS	Western Europe	Others	Total
1985	304.1	238.7	408.3	1,098.7	741.7	29.3	2,110.7	3281.1	5.536.9
1986	312.4	411.9	309.9	1,075.0	712.0	47.5	2,704.3	605.4	5,971.9
1987	628.2	1,000.0	11,417.5	2,641.3	11,004.9	215.5	7,068.4	1,428.1	15,969.9
1988									
1^{st} Quarter		355.6	135.6	723.5	415.9	70.2	1,228.9	1,153.8	4.539.3
2^{nd} Quarter	253.3	185.3	355.5	611.2	313.3	47.9	2,291.0	249.6	3,860.4
3^{rd} Quarter	305.8	136.8	289.5	605.3	325.5	19.1	1,747.4	619.6	4,058.8
4^{th} Quarter	315.6	259.1	331.3	853.5	797.8	12.6	2,446.8	120.9	5,184.1
1989									
1^{st} Quarter	362.3	114.3	339.8	843.7	1,120.2	29.3	2,239.3	641.2	5,654.1
2^{nd} Quarter	347.3	99.1	398.5	990.2	645.4	26.1	2,347.2	616.3	5,470.1
3^{rd} Quarter	134.2	224.8	381.6	1,023.0	643.7	17.2	2,688.5	1,396.5	6,509.5
4^{th} Quarter	387.3	147.1	587.1	1,238.4	684.6	57.7	3,149.2	1,290.1	7,541.6
1990	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1^{st} Quarter									

n.a. (not available)

Source: *Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial Review, Volume 28, No. 4., December 1990. p.142*

Exports and Re-export by Regional Grouping
(₦ Million)

Year and Quarter	Common wealth Countries	Eastern Europe	Japan	United Kingdom	U.S.A	ECOWAS	Western Europe	Others	Total
1984	577.8	37.9	6.1	422.7	1,212.9	300.0	6,116.1	465.3	9,138.8
1985	702.3	33.0	7.6	538.6	2,116.3	387.9	7,217.4	717.7	11,720.8
1986	387.8	20.6	13.8	512.6	3,163.3	345.7	4,305.1	379.3	9,128.8
1987	854.3	8.2	22.9	530.3	13,897.8	1,635.5	11,851.8	777.3	29,578.8
1988									
1st Quarter	277.0	37.9	2.9	186.6	3,113.2	373.9	2,247.5	808.7	7,047.7
2nd Quarter	173.9	1.6	27.6	77.1	4,051.7	439.7	2,677.3	108.7	7,340.2
3rd Quarter	122.7	7.6	5.1	102.2	3,436.7	505.7	3,009.3	493.7	7,683.0
4th Quarter	364.0	13.5	1.7	225.1	3,736.0	416.7	4,108.7	256.2	9,121.9
1989									
1st Quarter	81.5	14.9	8.3	289.2	5,262.2	855.0	5,024.1	325.0	11,860.2
2nd Quarter	191.7	1.2	2.9	83.6	8,481.5	1,231.3	4,819.0	223.2	15,034.4
3rd Quarter	52.9	10.2	112.8	234.0	8,228.5	153.9	4,638.6	1,181.9	14,612.8
4th Quarter	182.0	34.6	9.7	442.1	10,012.7	1,072.2	6,130.3	594.5	18,478.1
1990	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1st Quarter									

n.a (not available)

Source: *Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial Review, Volume 28, No. 4., December 1990. p.142*

From the Table, it is vividly seen that West African international trade – export and import trade was heavily dominated by extra-African influential countries like Western Europe, United Kingdom and Japan. Take for example, in the Second quarter of 1989, the worth imports of Western Europe stood at ₦3,149.2 million and ₦6,130.3 million of exports to regional groupings. This compared to ECOWAS worth imports which accounted for ₦57.7 million and exports to regional groupings at ₦1,072.2. This presents a graphic indication of the small volume of the West African intra-states trade between them relative to the domination by the advanced capitalist countries.

Cross–Border Trade between Nigeria, Niger Republic, Benin Republic and Cameroon

Towards the end of the 1970s there emerged a critical issue on the cross border trade with respect to food supply between Nigeria and some of her Sahelian neighbouring countries especially Niger Republic and Chad which experienced acute food shortage. This was as a result of drought and internal conflict that was experienced in the zone. The polemics of whether or not cross border trade contributed to the emergent food security issue was brought to the fore. The Francophone elites in France were of the opinion that the trade has been beneficial to food security in the zone, but the Nigerian elites seem to differ with that opinion which they considered detrimental to Nigerian food security issue.[14] The fear of an eventual food scarcity and the backlash of the devaluation of the Naira on the Nigerian market vis-à-vis the CFA Franc cannot be divorced from the fear expressed by Nigerian Civil societies. But on the part of Francophone countries, the ability of their citizen to maintain purchasing power to be able to access food and other basic supplies from Nigeria was a welcome development. In all these contradictions, it was evident that the need to overcome the lack of productive structures, complementary commodities, and sustained policy disparities, unfavourable monetary policies were required to promote economic integration.

With particular reference to Niger Republic, it should be understood that since pre-colonial times, Nigeria and this Sahelian country have been involved in regional food security matter especially on food crops and livestock. The complementary pattern of the ecology of the Northern Nigeria and Niger Republic made it possible for millet in northern Nigeria to be traded with animals and salt in return within their circuit in the savannah and desert edge.[15] There had also been inflow of grains from Niger into Nigeria from colonial times up to the early 1970s. Certain noticeable changes began to set in following the 1906 Niger-Nigeria border definition coupled with increased urbanization in northern Nigeria and the pressure on groundnut productions to satisfy the demand of the colonial administration which impacted on grains production level.

However, there was a reversal in the direction of grains flow in the second half of the 1970s. According to Meagher, the main cause of this reversal were as a result of the severance or delinking of Nigeria's Pound which became known as Naira from the Pound Sterling and this precipitated the collapse in the parallel exchange rate of the Naira against the Republic of Niger's CFA Franc.[16] The downward review of grain prices adduced to Nigeria food policy and in connection to the massive importation of cheap foreign grains have all in one way or the other brought about this trend.[17] The Nigerien government was able to institute her Grain Purchasing Parastatal which provided an incentive for massive importation of grains from Nigeria in varying tonnes, between 100,000 and 200,000 annually.[18] In between this period, we cannot shy away from acknowledging that Nigeria also experienced food shortage resulting in skyrocketing of food prices as a result of the neglect of agriculture due to oil boom and the increase in urban incomes. Food producers who were able to access the market made a lot of profits because the prices of food commodities (grains) rose up to 400 percent between 1975 and 1985.[19] The cross border trade pattern was noted to have continued up to the 1980s.

The cross border trade on livestock between the countries since pre-colonial time has more often than not been on the southward supply direction, that is, from Niger to Nigeria. This essentially was hinged on the economic principle of comparative production advantage Niger has in livestock and the increasing demand from Nigeria considering her population and the fact that the southern part also relied more on the north for meat supply. More so, the fall in the production of groundnut in Nigeria in the 1970s made Niger to export cowpeas alongside livestock. It was only later that this pattern of complementary commodity was threatened in view of the devaluation of the Naira and the collapse of Nigerian consumer demand.[20]

The trade relations between Nigeria and its coastal neighbours became pronounced as a result of the impact of the oil boom in the mid-1970s which had it toll on the agricultural sector. Owing to the ecological similarities between Nigeria, Benin Republic and Cameroon, there seems to be less inter-states trade especially on food supplies. According to Igue *et.al*,[21] the emergence of policy disparity under the colonial control provided little stimulus to cross-border food flow between the two countries and Nigeria. He notes further that with respect to Benin Republic, the fiscal and monetary policies on exports of cash crops like cocoa, coffee, and oil palm products, offered more attraction to the Nigerian markets than food crops. In the case of Cameroon, the interposition of British Cameroon between Nigeria and French Cameroon border limited the attractive influence of economic disparities along the Nigeria – Cameroon border. Although at some period cocoa trade between Nigeria and Benin was such that it flowed from the former to the latter. The oil boom in Nigeria reversed the flow of trade again in which case there was significant food flow from Benin and Cameroon into Nigeria. In these case, re-exported grains especially wheat and rice ranged from 7,000 to 25,000 tones supplied from Benin. Also, on annual basis, about 5,000 tones of locally cultivated maize, garri and root crops were imported into Nigeria from Benin.

At this same period as well, Cameroon supplied local coarse grains and irrigated rice in addition to traditional exports of livestock from northern Cameroon which shared ecological features with northern Nigeria and Niger. It was observed that on the general outlook, the food importation from these two countries though triggered increased food productivity and enhanced the food farmers, but nonetheless, the citizen of the countries had to grapple with some reeling effect as a result. For instance, exports of food from Benin were alleged to have deprived its own citizens from the consumption of their local food and at the same time increased urban consumption of imported rice. Niger Republic too had to join in the food supply to Nigeria at the onset of the food shortage in Nigeria so that by 1985 re-exported grains (rice) supplies alone from these three countries were said to amount to 400,000 tonnes. This steady food supply which was considered a short term palliative measure for food security was in the long run to constitute a hitch to our agricultural productivity in the sense that it blindfolded government to the realities of revamping the agricultural sector throughout the period of the oil boom and till date. Like similar precedence, the dynamism in the reversal of food supply in the cross–border trade was experienced since the late 1980s as re-exportation of grains dwindled forcing Benin, Cameroon and Nigeria's Sahelian neighbours to become recipients of large quantities of local produce from Nigeria.[22]

The agricultural objectives of Nigeria's SAP were the promotion of self –sufficiency in food production, provision of agricultural materials for industries, the diversification of her export base and an increase in the living standard of rural dwellers. Ban was placed on importation of maize and rice in 1985, wheat in 1987 and barley in 1988. It is sometimes contended that the exports of agricultural commodities and agricultural inputs to Nigeria's less populous neighbours represent too small a percentage of the country's annual supply level to pose any serious threat on prices or its availability. But when the realities of the distribution are compared to the aggregate supply, it becomes a matter of grave concern. For instance, estimated grains supplied to Niger Republic annually was between 100,000 and 250,000 tones, while this was less than 2 percent of Nigeria's annual grain production, it is about 10 percent of marketed surplus.[23] This trend can be seen as a serious demand pressure from industry and urban consumer and which has added stress to Nigerian grain prices.

The cross–border trade in agricultural inputs such as fertilizer is significant. It is estimated that about 19,000 tones of fertilizer were exported to Niger Republic since the mid-1980s. These constitutes less than 2 percent of Nigeria's declared supply for 1992.[24] However, this quantity is approximate to 13 percent of the fertilizer actually dispatched on time for the 1992 planting season. When you add those quantities exported to Benin and Cameroon, the effects of these cross-border massive outflows can be better imagined.[25]

Conclusion

It is generally acknowledged that Africa is one of the most traumatized continents in the world. Though possessing great economic potentials, but has been made to occupy a peripheral position in the world economic system due to the lopsided economic relations. However, it is vivid from the study that trade relations between and amongst African countries in the focus area was on a low scale compared to their trade relations with western countries, a situation that has further impeded their capacity and efficiency in productivity and marketability in agricultural commodities for which they have comparative advantage. The inability to fully complement each other in their agricultural outputs and economic relations and to check the activities of illegal border trade brought strains to their regional economic integration project

It is within this context that Nigeria and her West African (neighbouring) States should individually endeavour to diligently reform and reposition their existing internal mechanisms in order to realise these potentials. The ability of the authorities of African states to use collective bargain in the world order is dependent on the harmonization of their political, economic and monetary policies to have a strong and viable regional bloc. The different sectors where each has the cost advantage should be technically and efficiently improved upon for the complementary exchange of goods and services. While all sectors of the economy are very critical to the development of the continent, prioritising the agricultural sector which embodies primary produce needed for industrialisation is key. Once this can be achieved, there is bound to be significant change in international trade relations within the continent of Africa.

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