An Analysis of Husserlian Foundationalism and Its Implication to Epistemology

Abstract

The history of philosophy reveals that philosophers are not in agreement regarding the method of acquiring epistemic certainty. While the rationalists elevate and argue for the primacy of reason, the empiricists on the other hand argue for the infallibility of sense experience. As opposed to the rationalist and the empiricist is the position of the skeptics who questioned and doubted the possibility of knowledge. This controversy stands at the background of the thoughts of Edmund Husserl and agitated his philosophising about knowledge. He attempted to purge philosophy of all uncertainties and sought to ground philosophy on a foundation that is indubitable. Against this backdrop, he developed the Phenomenological method as the means to epistemic certitude. For him, our first outlook is that of natural human beings from the natural standpoint where we assume that the world exists outside our mind. What is given from the natural standpoint is characterized by Husserl as prejudice. He contended that a radical alternation of this natural standpoint is brought about by the method of phenomenology. Essentially, phenomenology is a philosophical strand that lays claim to foundationalism which maintains that other beliefs can be inferred from basic, self-evident beliefs. He argued that with transcendental reduction and epoche one’s ego can become transcendental and this transcendental ego, pure consciousness, becomes the agent of indubitable foundation of knowledge. Since, consciousness is always conscious of something, then other secondary beliefs can be apprehended through the intentionality link. This paper attempts to analyse Husserl’s foundationalism and bring to fore its epistemological implication.