

THE NIGERIAN STATE AND AGRICULTURAL INTERVENTION: EXPERIENCES IN ANAMBRA STATE, 1976-1991

Ikenna Odife, Ph.D

Department of History and International Studies
Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka
Anambra State
E-mail: i.odife@unizik.edu.ng 08035499792

Abstract

The food problem in Nigeria prompted the federal government to create programmes that could buoy agricultural production and address the challenges it posed. This paper discusses these programmes in Anambra State, Nigeria, between 1976 and 1991, with a view to ascertain the extent they individually and collectively contributed to the growth of agriculture in the state. This is informed by the consideration that a thorough, in-depth and dispassionate assessment of these programmes could best be achieved by evaluating their performance in the states of the federation. There exists a plethora of studies on the federal government's programmes on agriculture. Such studies discuss the strengths, weaknesses, successes, failures and extent of goal attainment of these programmes without recourse to definite geo-political context or focus on a programme in a particular state of the federation, without a time perspective thereby presenting an incomplete, fractured and dim picture of the subject. The present study marks a departure from this trend. It attempts to present a complete and holistic assessment of these programmes by studying them from a time perspective and within a geopolitical/administrative context. Data for this paper are derived from primary and secondary sources. It combines qualitative and quantitative methods of research and is guided in its analysis and conclusion by the supremacy of facts over theories in historical discourses. Based on the available evidence, it is the contention of this paper that the programmes had varying degrees of goal attainment. On the whole, however, they did not significantly foster the growth of agriculture in Anambra State when viewed against the financial and human resources committed to them and the media hype they received.

Keywords: Agricultural Intervention, National Accelerated Food Production Programme, River Basin Development Authority, Operation Feed the Nation, Green Revolution Programme, Structural Adjustment Programme, Anambra State, Nigeria

Introduction

The place of agriculture in developing economies like Nigeria can hardly be overstated. Scholars and policymakers have identified the role of agriculture in the development process thus: provide food for the growing population thereby addressing food insecurity; to create exports and foreign exchange earnings, in this way contributing to the nation's Gross Domestic Product (GDP); to release labour for the industrial sector usable after training; to provide a source of capital formation for the development in other sectors; to provide raw materials for industries and markets for industrial goods.¹ Furthermore, agriculture could play a vital role in reducing urban-rural income differentials and distributing the gains from development more evenly within the community.²

Up to the attainment of political independence in 1960, the federal government took direct involvement in agricultural production for granted. It consigned to the regional

governments the responsibility to perform this task. The various regions embarked on agricultural programmes which tended to suit their purpose. The federal government's interest in agricultural production was principally focused on research on cash crops, food crops and livestock development. The reason is that food self-sufficiency seemed not to pose any problem worthy of public attention. This would appear to explain the establishment of such agricultural research institutes as the National Root Crops Research Institute, Umudike; National Institute for Oil Palm Research (NIFOR), Benin; International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA), Ibadan; National Veterinary Institute (NVI), Vom, among others.³

Problems in Nigeria's agricultural sector, however, began to emerge in the first decade (1960-1969) of independence. These were evident in increasing food shortage, rising food prices and decline in foreign exchange earnings from agricultural exports. Yet, the government did not show much concern for the problems because they were thought to be linked to the crises which eventually culminated in the Nigeria-Biafra War (1967-1970). The second decade of Nigerian Independence (1970-1979), witnessed a rapid deterioration in the country's agricultural situation. In addition to acute food shortage, rising food prices and increasing import bills on food items, there were also rapid declines in foreign exchange earnings and Gross Domestic Product from agriculture. This was further compounded by the fallouts of the Nigeria-Biafra War, severe droughts in parts of the country and most importantly, the "oil boom" which created serious distortions in the country's economy and accelerated the rate of migration from agriculture. In the effort to tackle these problems, the federal government initiated several agricultural programmes, largely within the framework of successive National Development Plans from 1970- 1974; 1975-1980; 1981-1985; The Structural Adjustment Programme and 1988-1992 National Development Plan.⁴ However, successive administrations introduced programmes outside this framework. The programmes were the National Accelerated Food Production Programme (NAFPP), the River Basin Development Authority (RBDA), and Agricultural Development Programme (ADP), etc. These programmes could be classified into two; statutory and non-statutory. The statutory programmes were those established by an enactment, for instance, the River Basin Development Authority Act; the Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure Act, etc, while the non-statutory programmes were established by administrative pronouncements or declarative statements, such as the Operation Feed the Nation, (OFN), Green Revolution Programme (GRP); collaborative projects with development partners like the Agricultural Development Programme (ADP), among others. A striking feature of these programmes is that they were executed in synergy with states' Ministries of agriculture and agriculture departments of the local governments. This necessitates the study of these programmes in the context of their activities in the states of the federation, hence this paper adopts Anambra State.

The federal government's programmes on agriculture, no doubt, have received substantial scholarly attention. The extant studies discuss various aspects of the subject. For instance, a specific programme without recourse to definite geo-political and administrative context,⁵ the entire programs without recourse to space and time;⁶ the entire programs with recourse to time and neglect of space,⁷ an aspect of a programme without recourse to time and space;⁸ the utility of measurement instruments in assessing agricultural programmes over time but neglect of space.⁹ These studies, certainly, provide useful insights on the subject of this paper and contain data invaluable to it, yet they provide incomplete and fractured pictures that do not permit an in-depth and dispassionate assessment of the extent of goal attainment of the programmes. In addition, they did not undertake an examination of the concrete and practical projects executed under the various programmes in time and space. In other words, they did not present empirical evidence for their assumptions. The present paper is set to fill these gaps in knowledge and provide the necessary benchmarks to appraise the extent to which the

programmes influenced the growth of agriculture in Anambra State, Nigeria, in the period, 1976 to 1991. The choice of the time frame of 1976-1991 is predicated on the period the 'old' Anambra State, our study area, existed.

To do justice to this task, this paper is organized into three sections, each providing an in-depth discussion and analysis of its theme. The first is the introduction. It provides background information on the paper and establishes the gaps in knowledge it will fill. The second section, based on empirical evidence, discusses the programmes intending to establish the extent of attainment of their stated goals in Anambra State. The third section provides the concluding remarks.

Federal Government Interventions in Agriculture

This section of the paper appraises each of the government interventions on agriculture to establish the extent to which they individually and collectively contributed to the growth of agriculture in Anambra State. These programmes are The National Accelerated Food Production Programme, The River Basin Development Authority, Operation Feed the Nation, The Green Revolution Programme, the World Bank Rice Project, the Agricultural Development Programme, the Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure, the Structural Adjustment Programme and the Agricultural Credit Scheme.

The National Accelerated Food Production Programme

The first federal government programme of note on agricultural improvement was the National Accelerated Food Production Programme (NAFPP). It was conceived under the Second National Development Plan and launched in 1972 by the Government of General Yakubu Gowon. The aspect of the programme that impacted directly on the rural farmers was that which "vastly raise[d] farmers' productivity and living standard via an innovative combination of research and agro-service delivery."¹⁰ Farmers in the state benefited from its specific crop development programme.

Other ways through which farmers benefited were the mini-kits produced under the programme, extension service, especially availing farmers the products of research on agronomy and the agro-service programme which made agricultural inputs available to farmers and providing them outlets for marketing their product. The Crops Development Department of the state's Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) in synergy with the Department of Agriculture in the local governments ensured the availability of the crops at the grassroots.¹¹ Furthermore, the NAFPP had provision for making loans available to farmers through the Nigerian Agricultural and Co-operative Bank (NACB)

An appraisal of the programme shows that it recorded notable achievements in some respects. Chief among these was food crop development. Improved varieties of rice, maize and cassava developed by the research component of the programme were made available to farmers. Not only did such varieties have excellent table quality and were resistant to diseases and weather conditions, they were quite prolific in yield and this meant more income for the farmers. Again, the mini-kits and farm implements produced in the programme tended to reduce the drudgery in crop cultivation and harvesting.

Furthermore, community oil palm and cashew plantations that had lain idle and neglected since the government of the defunct East Central State withdrew incentives to farmers and the wounding-up of the operations of donor agencies – Ford Foundation and Care from America Everywhere (CARE) from the 'State' in 1972, were revived under the programme. The marginal increase, (3%), in food and cash crop production between 1975/76 and 1976/77, could be attributed to the programme.¹²

On the other hand, financial loans to farmers left insignificant imprints on the rural farmers: virtually none could access the loan from the Bank (NACB). The details of the

activities of the bank will be discussed in a subsequent section of this paper that deals with the federal government's Agricultural Finance Scheme.

River Basin Development Authority

The River Basin Project has a historical backdrop that dates to 1973. However, the present concept in which the RBDA was extended nationwide was conceived in the country's Third National Development Plan, 1975-1980. With the enactment of Decree No. 25 of 1976, eleven RBDAs, one of which was the Anambra-Imo River Basin Development (AIRBDA), were established. The state came under the operational scope of the Anambra-Imo River Basin Development Authority (AIRBDA). The aspects of the Authority's mandate, over time, that are related to our subject matter include;

- large-scale mechanized clearing and cultivation of various landforms for agricultural purposes,
- construction, operation and maintenance of dams, dykes, polders, wells irrigation and drainage systems,
- establishment of agro-service centres, with tractor hire services,
- large-scale multiplication of improved seeds for distribution to farmers,
- large-scale rearing of improved livestock and distribution to farmers.¹³

The tasks undertaken by the AIRBDA were in the areas of irrigation, pilot farms and livestock production. The irrigation projects were of two types; large-scale irrigation and small-scale or minor irrigation. The former was the Lower Anambra Irrigation Project (LAIP), located at Omor in Uzo-Uwani LGA. The small-scale or minor irrigation project was located at Ikem in Isi-uzo LGA.

The small-scale or minor irrigation project covered between 100 and 500 acres of land. It was operated by the direct pumping of water from the Ebonyi River, using hydro-flow pumps to introduce water into the farms for the production of cassava, rice, maize, vegetables and cowpeas. 10 hectares of land was used for perennial vegetable production using sprinklers while more land was acquired for rain-fed rice production. This project helped to step up agricultural production, especially the crops earlier mentioned, and improve the earning capacity of the rural farmers in its catchment area. This was made possible through the effective mobilization of rural farmers by a timely and sufficient supply of inputs and agronomic advice. In addition, high-yielding planting materials – crops and seedlings obtained from research centers and institutions were distributed to farmers.¹⁴

The large-scale irrigation project was the Lower Anambra Irrigation Project (LAIP), Omor. Uzo-Uwani, LGA. This was the most ambitious and largest irrigation project undertaken by the Authority. It was devoted to rice cultivation. This project was executed with a loan of ¥16.9b (Japanese Yen) equivalent to ₦21.4billion which the federal government obtained from the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) of Japan. The project began in 1981 with an expectation to cover a 5000-hectare command area. However, due to problems encountered in the course of execution, the project was scaled down to 3850 hectares. The construction of the project was completed and commissioned by President Ibrahim Babangida in 1987.¹⁵

The project was designed to pump water from the Anambra River at Ifite Ogwari through a pumping station into a 16.5-kilometre headrace canal. This was to irrigate a command area of 3850 hectares for double cropping of paddy rice annually. At optimal production, the project had the potential to produce an average of 2,700 tonnes of paddy. An improved and palatable variety of rice 'IR416' was chiefly grown in the project. The LAIP had an additional 350 hectares of land for rain-fed cropping of staple food crops such as maize, yam, cassava, cowpea, vegetables etc. The project also had a 4-hectare demonstration farm plot for the conduct of trials on different rice varieties, seed multiplication and demonstration of new farming techniques, and a 3.3 tonnes per hour industrial modern mill capable of producing

grade ‘A’ polished rice. There were, in addition, basic infrastructures such as electricity, potable water, a staff medical clinic, a canteen, rest house for the welfare of the staff.¹⁶

Local farmers benefitted directly from the project package every cropping season. While the actual cultivation was carried out by the project farmers, the LAIP provided logistics or services such as irrigation technology and extension aids that facilitated production processes. Studies by Evaristus Emeghara reveal that the local farmers acknowledge the enabling role of the project package from the take-off of the project in 1987 till the later part of 1990. The project package resulted in optimal performance measured in terms of total acreage cropped, cropping intensity and crop yield per hectare. The farmers, his study further reveals, confirm that during the period, they were able to reach their production target. There was large scale production of rice by the project farmers. This helped to address food shortage in the state. It further encouraged rice production in the area as the indigenes and migrant farmers embraced rice cultivation.

However, by the middle of 1990, the overall output had begun to decline as the table below testifies.

Table 1: LAIP Omor Cropping Activities, 1987-1991

Year	Season	Area cropped Ha	No of Farmers involved	Average yield Per Ha	Total yield of paddy	Paddy worthy
1987	Rainy	3,200	3,200	4.0	12,800	20,000
	Dry	3,200	3,200	3.0	9,600	18,000
1988	Rainy	3,200	3,200	4.0	12,800	20,000
	Dry	3,200	3,200	3.2	10,240	18,000
1989	Rainy	3,350	3,350	4.1	13,735	36,000
	Dry	3,250	3,250	4.1	13,370	35,000
1990	Rainy	3,360	3,360	4.2	14,112	38,100
	Dry	3,320	3,320	3.9	12,948	21,750
1991	Rainy	2,900	2,900	1.75	5,075	16,493
	Dry	2,000	2,000	2.9	5,800	16,700

Source: Extracted from Table 4 ‘LAIP Yearly Cropping Activities’ Emeghara, “Anambra, 117

As it could be gleaned from the above table, all aspects of the cropping activities began to experience decline from the second half of 1990. The reason for this, Emeghara observes, was because the programme managers could no longer deliver the project package.¹⁷ However, the LAIP had profound influence on the host community and environs. It provided the rudiments for the urbanization of Omor and raised the standard of life of the people. It transformed Omor from a rustic, rural community to one bustling with economic and social activities.¹⁸ The LAIP provided opportunity for women in the area to engage in farming. It liberated them from the fetters and shackles of tradition which denied them access to land for farming: Ninety (90) per cent of the project farmers in the LAIP were women. Such women secured financial independence from their spouses. This offered them the opportunity to contribute meaningfully to family upkeep, sponsor the education of their children and initiate self-help and community development projects. The introduction of mechanization also changed the traditional labour condition in the area. The female farmers under the project package hired more male labour than female labour. This goes to show that women in the area were more responsive to the innovations introduced by the LAIP than the men were.¹⁹

Another project of the AIRBDA was the Pilot Food Crops and Livestock Production Centres. Their main function was to increase food crop and livestock production in order to ensure greater food security in the state, nay country and minimize the dependence on imported

food. Rural farmers obtained improved species and high-yielding seedlings from the centers. Livestock retailers and end-users also obtained their wares and needs there. Four of such centres were located in the state. These centres and their activities were as follows;

Aguleri Centre – Maize, cassava and rice production

Mgbakwu Centre – Maize, rice, cassava, cowpea and livestock

Odekpe Centre – Rice and maize

Abakaliki Centre – Rice and maize.²⁰

An assessment of the performance of AIRBDA in the state reveals that its overall impact was circumscribed by the fact that its effect was felt most in the catchment areas of the projects. The spread of its impact was limited and thus insignificantly felt throughout the state. Though, some of the food crops and vegetables planted at the centre may have been consumed outside its immediate environs and the irrigation project enhanced rice production, “these achievements pale into insignificance when related to the financial, technical and infrastructural resources invested in them.”²¹ Furthermore, the AIRBDA defied the ‘large-scale vision’ on the multiplication of improved seeds for distribution to farmers; the rearing of improved livestock and poultry for distribution to farmers. Also, the establishment of agro-service centres with tractor-hiring services had a very limited impact on the growth of agriculture. Beside the tractor-hiring services provided to participating farmers under the project package of the LAIP, the other outlets or project centres of the Authority had few tractors and these were rarely hired by the rural farmers. For instance, the Mgbakwu centre had one tractor and this was deployed to the cultivation of the Authority’s farm.

From the foregoing analysis, it could be stated that RBDA contributed only marginally to the growth of agriculture in the state and grossly failed to attain its goals. Special mention needs to be made here of the LAIP project which woefully crumbled, after an initial optimistic beginning, as our study revealed. A visit to the project site reminds one of the waste of the humongous amount of money invested in the project.

Operation Feed the Nation (OFN)

Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) was yet another programme of the federal government on agricultural production. It was launched in a nationally televised broadcast on May 21, 1978, by then Head of State (then) Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo. The launch was a reaction to an “alarming decline in food production, galloping food prices, increased food import bills and accelerating rural-urban flight of youths which was seriously compounding surging urban predicaments.”²² In his postmortem assessment of the programme, Obasanjo contends that,

OFN was to demonstrate the commitment to and the co-ordination at the highest political level, of the solution to the problem of agriculture and food production. Our concern was to dignify and popularise farming and to provide essential and critical input subsidies which had always been absent. In a nutshell, the OFN was meant to have demonstration effect by example.²³

The programme was, more or less, a propaganda machinery to encourage every Nigerian: the farmer and non-farmer – to put every available land into cultivation. Schools, churches and private residences heeded this call. Ifeyinwa Emejulu recalls with nostalgia how, in response to this call, the large expanse of land in her father’s official residence in the Government Reserved Area (GRA) of Enugu was cultivated with different food crops and a pen which held up to a hundred birds of different species was erected there.²⁴

Farm implements and agro-service materials were purportedly made available to farmers at subsidized rates. Task forces were set up at the national, state and local government levels as instruments for propagating the OFN gospel and the distribution of farm inputs and equipment. But it does seem that these materials were not provided as promised and timely too. The task force officials did not effectively discharge the task assigned to them. Two reasons account for that. First, it was difficult for them to access the remote villages across the state due to the poor condition of rural roads. Again, as most members of the task force were not trained extension officers, they lacked the expertise to impart the right knowledge and skills to farmers.²⁵

The impact of the programme on rural farmers and the growth of agriculture in the state is difficult to gauge. For, there were schemes already in place – the NAFPP and the RBDPs that discharged the same functions the OFN was engaged in. Examples of such were the distribution of farm implements, agronomic advice as well as provision of agro-service materials. The beauty of the OFN, however, lay in the fact that persons employed in non-farming and agricultural sectors developed an interest in farming. Urban dwellers, businessmen and civil servants began to engage in farming through proxies. Certainly, the products from such activities may have put food on people's tables, no matter how little. One could not but agree with Njoku's argument that "the claimed 'direct benefit to the farmers' that government chanted in praise of the programme remained, to all intents and purposes, mere populist sloganeering."²⁶ The programme petered out as the regime that initiated it left office.

Green Revolution Programme

The Green Revolution (GR) was the cardinal agricultural programme of President Shehu Shagari. Launched by the President in April 1980, six months after he assumed office, the goal of the programme related to our subject matter was to; improve and modernize small-scale farming in the country, open up the rural areas through sustained agricultural development and improve the productive capacity of the peasant farmer – the backbone of the country's agriculture.²⁷

The government sought to achieve these through increased annual budgetary allocations to the agricultural sector and importation of agricultural inputs such as machinery, vaccines and drugs for control of animal diseases and hundreds of tons of fertilizers. Existing agricultural projects such as the RBDA and agricultural Financing schemes- the NACB and Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund (ACGSF) received more funding. The Green Revolution Council, (GRC), chaired by the President oversaw the working of the programme, while a Green Revolution Committee served as an advisory body to the GRC. To advocate and popularize the programme, there were special advertisement slots on it in the National Radio and Television Network News. As Floyd confirms, the GR was "a politically-fetching slogan which is reiterated virtually daily in the press, on radio and television."²⁸

Despite the massive capital injected into the programme and the media hype it received, the programme could not stem the increasing import bills on food items nor did it bring self-reliance and self-sufficiency in food production. It also did not uplift the rural farmers, nor did it significantly contribute to the growth of agriculture. As Njoku argues "GR circumvented the small farmer, the *primus movens* of the country's agriculture."²⁹ The greatest beneficiaries were top-ranked civil servants, military officers and politicians who lined their pockets from the government's investments in the programmes. Most significantly, government expenditure on them far outstripped the output. The result was that the goals of the programme of ensuring food security, reducing the bill on food importation, stemming the rural-urban drift and most especially the growth of agriculture seemed illusory.

To further compound issues, the GRP in the state was adversely affected by the frosty relations that existed between the NPP-led state government and the NPN-led federal government. The Jim Nwobodo administration of the state made bold and frantic efforts to stifle the GRP in the state by restraining officials of the state Ministry of Agriculture from the execution of the GR projects. To further becloud the GRP, the state government established the Food for the People's Programme (FPP), which it generously funded, to serve as a counterpoise to the GRP. It does seem that the governor's attitude was based on the apprehension that the GRP would popularise the NPN in the state and blight his chances in the upcoming gubernatorial election.³⁰ This face-off made the GRP activities in the state inconspicuous when compared with what was obtained in other states of the federation.

The World Bank Rice Project

The World Bank Rice Project was a national project captured in the country's Third National Development Plan, (1975-1980). It was funded by the federal government, state government and loan from the World Bank on a determined formula. It was organized in phases. Each phase was to last for five years. The first phase began in 1976 (mobilization year) and ended in 1981. The second phase commenced in 1983.³¹ The first phase of the project was estimated to cost ₦14.1m in 1976. However, the amount was increased in 1979 to ₦28m because of the global inflationary trend. Up to 1981, the state had contributed ₦8.2m as part of her 37.5 per cent counterpart funding of the project. There were six locations of the project in its first phase. These locations and the number of participating farmers are presented hereunder.³²

Table 2: The number and location of the Anambra-World Bank Rice Project and number of participating farmers (Phase I)

S/N	Location	No. of Farmers
1	Uzo-Uwani	628
2	Ifite-Ogwari	476
3	Ogboji	476
4	Enugu Abo	448
5	Ikem-Nando	31
6	Item-Ikwo	408
	Total	2467

Source: ANS, *3RD Twelve Months*, 21

To appreciate the impact of the first phase of the project on agriculture and the output of the programme, a comparison of performance between 1976 (mobilization year) and 1981 (terminal year) is made:

Table 3: Performance of the First Phase of the Anambra World Bank Rice Project, 1976 – 1981

S/N	Project	1976	1981
A	Swamp and upland rice cultivated	324ha	2003ha
B	No. of participating farmers	545	2467
C	Average yield	1.5tons	3.68 tons
D	No. of locations	3	6
E	Paddy rice produced	486 tons	7371 tons

Source: ANS, *3RD Twelve Months*, 21

From the figures above, one could observe that there was a quantum increase in output from all facets of the project. Most importantly, paddy production rose from 486 tons in 1976 to 7371 tons in 1981.

A sizeable quantity of paddy purchased from the project farmers was milled and sold by the FPP under the brand name, "ANIMO RICE" all over the country. The construction of a one-ton-per-hour capacity integrated Rice Mill was initiated at Enugu-Abo to assist the reactivated one-ton-per-hour capacity rice mill already in operation at Uzo-Uwani (the Uzo-Uwani mill was established by the government of ECS under the ADA Rice Project).³³

The second phase formally took off by 1983, under the Fourth National Development Plan, and was still funded like the first phase. The goals of the Second Phase were to complete and deepen the programmes of the First Phase. It deserves to be stated that only a modicum of achievement, when compared with the expected result, was made. The major reason was a dearth of funds. Some of these achievements are discussed hereunder.

In the first place, there was an expansion in the small-holder scheme. The number of farmers engaged in this scheme rose from 2467 in 1981 to 3148 in 1989. Beyond this, rice cultivation grew in popularity in the catchment area of each location. Most of the rice belts in the state emerged as a result of the radiating effects of the various locations, for instance, Orumba Rice belt from the Enugu-Abo and Oboji locations and the Uzo Uwani Rice belt from the Adani location. Related to this was the establishment of the Odekpe location. This brought to seven the number of its project locations in the state. Again, there was an increase in the number of active cooperative societies operating in the seven locations. It increased to 25 from the 19 functional cooperative societies that participated in the project during the first phase.³⁴

Thus, the World Bank rice project contributed significantly to the growth of agriculture and popularised rice cultivation in the state. The number of locations of the project, the number of people engaged at the locations, and their output coupled with the radiating effects of the projects on the host communities and environs, bear eloquent testimony to this.

Agricultural Development Programme (ADP)

The ADP was inaugurated in the state on 5th August 1985 and commenced operations in the 1986 farming season. Its establishment came under the First Phase Multi-state ADP (MSADP-1) which included six other states in the country. The MSADP-1 was jointly financed by the World Bank, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the federal government and the state government at the following proportions; 61.8 per cent, 6.8 per cent 15.5 per cent and 15.9 per cent respectively.³⁵ Its activities were concentrated on extension work, on-farm adaptive research, seed and fertilizer distribution, feeder road construction, provision of potable water, surveys and manpower development. The World Bank and IFAD contributions came piecemeal and in tranches and the form of funds and capital goods. The major of these donor agencies' contributions to the state ADP came in 1990, during which most of its project vehicles, motorcycles and tractors were delivered and the ADP recruited most of its field officers.³⁶ No sooner were these items delivered than the state was, on 27th August 1991, split into Enugu and Anambra States, which marked the terminus of this paper. Therefore, its overall impact on the old Anambra State, our study area, would appear slender.



The ADP (Agro-service centre) Warehouse, Onueke. Each of these was constructed in the then 23 LGA Headquarters in the state

Source: Author's Fieldwork, 16th April, 2012.

The role of ADP in the growth of the agricultural sector in the state was through the revitalized Extension Service, input distribution and technology development, transfer and adoption. In 1988, the ADP built agro-service centres in the then 23 local government areas of the state for storage and easy distribution of agro-service materials across the communities. The ADP made tremendous progress in improving extension services. As the Unified Agricultural Extension System vested the ADP with the sole responsibility for extension services nationwide, agricultural extension services increased in intensity and became better coordinated. The National Extension Agent-Farmer ratio improved from the pre-ADP level of 1:3000 to an average of 1:800. The Extension Agents became better trained, motivated and remunerated. The Agents were provided motorcycles and Supervisory staff with vehicles.³⁷

The ADP fostered a nexus between research and extension. This linkage was facilitated by the Farming System Research Approach offered by the MTRM procedures, among others, provided to rural farmers. The ADP also made some progress in incorporating a gender perspective in research and extension through its Women-In-Agriculture Programme. This Programme attended to the specific needs of rural women and those factors that inhibited women's active participation in agricultural production.

Some of the factors that hindered the ADP from the achievement of its set objectives were:

- undue political interference by the state government who, too frequently, changed the ADP management and the recruitment of unqualified personnel;
- cash-flow instability due to the failure on the part of governments to provide counterpart funding as required by the loan agreement;
- low morale and motivation on the part of staff due to the contract nature of most ADP appointments which are not pensionable and
- the forcible take-over of the ADP project vehicles by state government officials.³⁸

A perceptive examination of the ADP in the state within the period of this study would reveal that the programmes helped to popularise the use of fertilizers, and herbicides and improved seed varieties by getting them to the reach of rural farmers. Most of these items were retailed in miniscule quantities which the rural farmers could afford. But it is instructive to note that more of these, especially fertilizers, could have been made available to farmers had the government not politicised its distribution by using it to reward surrogates and allowing it to fall in the hands of those Uma Eleazu describes as "Fertilizer Mafia"³⁹ Again, a cost-benefit analysis of the ADP shows that the programme "proved too hugely expensive for the return."⁴⁰

The Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructures (DFRRI)

Following the poor results from the previous rural development agencies which had placed great emphasis on agricultural development and transformation, the federal government conceived an innovative and comprehensive scheme to improve the life of the rural dwellers and uplift the living conditions in the rural areas. Consequently, the federal government, on 6th February 1986, commenced the operations of the Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructures. The Directorate got its legal backing from the Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructures Act, Decree No. 4 of 1987.⁴¹

The activities of the DFRRI could be grouped into the following broad areas; provision of economic and social infrastructures, production of agricultural input, development and dissemination of improved technology to enhance agriculture and rural housing; and mobilization for mass participation in rural development. However, the DFRRI identified the development of agriculture, local industries and provision of rural infrastructures as critical areas of concentration for the fulfilment of its objectives. Its programmes were organised in phases and through the state governments. A state government could only key into a new phase of a project on the successful and satisfactory completion of an ongoing one. The Directorate did not embark on direct execution of its projects. Rather, it used appropriate ministries, government departments and parastatals as well as the three tiers of government for this purpose. A few examples could suffice. The State Water Corporation and the Government Task Force on Rural Water Supply executed the rural water projects and the specific departments of the Ministry of Agriculture executed the relevant agricultural projects, the Local Government Councils galvanized the town Union Organisations for community development projects, among others. It also worked in synergy with the ADP.

The functions of the Directorate are spelt out in section 5 of the Act, while the participation by states and local government councils in the Directorate's activities and special functions of the Directorate are entrenched in sections 6 and 7 of the Act, respectively. Nonetheless, the focus of this paper is the agriculture component of the DFRRI programme.

Fisheries and Fishing

A popular system of fish farming, the homestead concrete fish pond, was introduced in the state by the Ministry of Agriculture. By 1987, the Fisheries Division of the Ministry had assisted fish farmers in the state in setting up over 200 such ponds and in the provision of fish fingerlings. Table Fish Production Project commenced with the installation of two floating platforms of 100 fish larges, two spawning ponds temporary shed and fencing at the Iyi Oji Lake of Nike, in Enugu LGA, ten ponds were set up at Ufuma for massive production of fish fry and fingerlings. Also, two ponds were established at Umuekete, Aguleri fish culture farm.⁴²

The involvement of DFRRI gave fish farming in the state a great boost. The DFRRI instituted an Aquaculture Development Programme to achieve fish self-sufficiency in the country. A six-man committee on Aquaculture was inaugurated as the DFRRI Aquaculture Implementation Agency. Some of the achievements of the Agency with respect to hatcheries and homestead fish ponds are highlighted. As regards hatcheries, the DFRRI allocated the sum of ₦283,500 (Two-hundred and eighty-three thousand, five hundred naira) to the state for setting up two hatcheries at the cost of Two hundred and eight thousand, five hundred naira (₦208,500), purchase of two vehicles (₦60,000) and purchase of fish pond chemical for sale to fish farmers (₦15,000). By 1988, the DFRRI had released the whole sum to the Aquaculture Implementation Agency. The two hatcheries approved for the state were sited at Ufuma in Aguata LGA and Adani, in Uzo Uwani LGA. Recall that the state fish farms were already located at these places. The state Aquaculture Development Agency rehabilitated and expanded these projects. With respect to the Ufuma Hatchery, the Agency successfully rehabilitated 8 out of 10 existing ponds earlier constructed with state funds at the site. These ponds were used

partly as nursery or rearing ponds for the fry as well as grow-out ponds for some of the fingerlings produced at the hatchery. Also, water was successfully headed into these ponds from a small earthen dam constructed with state funds. For the hatchery proper, a total of seven hatchery tanks of eighteen compartments were constructed and a covering shed was provided for each. The hatchery produced fingerlings which were sold to fish farmers.⁴³

For the Adani site, roofing of the covering shed for the hatchery tanks as well as the perimeter wall of the shed were done. A set of two galvanized iron water tanks were mounted to supply sedimented water to the hatchery tanks. With the completion of the hatchery complex in 1989, fingerling production commenced at the site. Furthermore, the state Committee on Aquaculture conducted a survey, aimed at obtaining records of water bodies in the state for possible stocking with excess fingerlings produced from the Hatcheries.⁴⁴

DFRRI initiatives through the activities of the Committee on Aquaculture inspired private sector participation in fish farming. The homestead fish pond programme attracted wide public sector participation. Such ponds were established by schools, hospitals, churches, companies, local government councils and private individuals. By the end of 1989, about one thousand homestead fish ponds were spread over the state, and many more were still springing up. Construction of the two DFRRI hatcheries in the state inspired fish farmers to copy the DFRRI experience and establish their private fish hatcheries. Some of such private hatcheries were; Chief Ogbo Fish Hatchery, Achina in Aguata LGA; Ulasi Fish Hatchery, Isiagu, Awka LGA, among others. Similarly, there was a growing interest in public sector participation in fish feed production. Two of these PACYMA FISH FEEDS, Enugu and PETRINNO FISH FEEDS, Enugu, stood out.⁴⁵

Livestock and Poultry

Before the establishment of DFRRI, the government had established livestock farms in the state. These were located at Achi, Adada, Ezillo, Mgbakwu, Nkwelle-Ezunaka and Oghe. A hatchery was located at Abakaliki. Like most government agricultural programmes, these had become derelict due to neglect by the past government (civilian) administration. Within the present period, the state government with assistance from the federal government and the World Bank reactivated them. The most significant was the Nkwelle-Ezunaka livestock project which was managed by a Joint Venture between the state government and International Geneeries (Nig) Ltd under the management of Anambra Integrated Livestock Company. Poultry farming became popular in the state. A good number of retirees from the state public service, which had grown in number in the recent past, invested in poultry farming. The most popular breed of fowl grown was the broiler species which has prolific growth and excellent table quality.⁴⁶

A major boost to livestock farming came from DFRRI. Its Committee for the Implementation of Livestock and Veterinary Programme, focused its activities on the following four schemes:

- (i) Sheep/Goats Breeding/multiplication centre located at Achi and Mgbakwu livestock farms
- (ii) Rabbit Breeding/Multiplication centre located at both Mgbakwu and Ezillo
- (iii) Feeder-seed multiplication centre located at Ezillo and Mgbakwu and
- (iv) Livestock extension and veterinary programme.⁴⁷

As of the middle of 1989, 210 breeder stock of sheep/goats were bred at Achi, Ezillo and Mgbakwu farms. 200 Rabbits were bred at Ezillo farm while 238 Rabbits were bred at Mgbakwu. Concerning fodder for the ruminants, five hectares of land were planted with pasture (white and black-seeded type) known as the lab-lab bean, *Stylo scanthon*, *humilin/grecilin* and cowpea. Water was provided to the tanks through the digging of wells and procurement of fibreglass tanks.⁴⁸

On the Livestock and Veterinary Extension Services Programme, fridges and coolers were purchased and distributed to the 23 LGAs of the state and stocked with chemicals, equipment and drugs. Only two 404 Peugeot pick-up vans could be purchased for servicing the livestock programme of DFRRI due to the escalating cost of procuring vehicles.⁴⁹

Food Processing, Preservation and Storage

The state government realized that its effort to increase food production would be an illusion if there were no effective methods for the processing, preservation and storage of the harvests. It, therefore, made a fervent effort to improve food processing, preservation and storage. The DFRRI made a significant contribution to this effort. It established a task force for this purpose. It fabricated and installed equipment for food processing in the following communities: - Ngbo-Ishielu LGA, Mgbakwu, Awka LGA and Ibite-Olo, Ezeagu LGA. This food processing equipment was mostly for processing cassava into *garri* and rice milling. It promoted small-scale agro-processing activities in the rural areas; demonstrated the effectiveness of equipment in processing cassava into *garri*; reduced post-harvest food loss by converting a perishable commodity, cassava into a more stable form; reduced the drudgery in food processing by the introduction of small-scale mechanized equipment e.g. rice miller/polisher, cassava graters, grains grindings mills, and many others. This programme brought about increased food production, economic activities and employment opportunities. It also increased financial returns to farmers and stimulated agricultural production.⁵⁰ There is no statistical data, for instance, to demonstrate the exact quantity of *garri* produced from these centres/communities. But suffice it to say that a large quantity of *garri* was produced in these communities. Respondents agree that so many pick-up vans and lorry loads of *garri* were exported to the urban centres on the market days of such communities.⁵¹

From the foregoing analysis, one could argue that DFRRI agricultural programme contributed to the growth of aspects of agriculture in the state through the task force for the implementation of the various schemes. However, the collapse of such schemes at the wounding-up of DFRRI operations showed that they were simply ephemeral, unsustainable and of no enduring effect.

The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)

Solutions to the lingering economic crises which became acute in the early 1980's had engaged the attention of past administrations and economic planners in the country. One of the recurring options was the acceptance of loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the implementation of the Institution's Structural Adjustment Programme. The Shagari administration and Mohamadu Buhari/Idiagbon regime had rejected the loan on account of the adverse socio-economic consequences the IMF conditionalities would have on the citizenry and the reactions they were bound to provoke. But General Ibrahim Babangida revisited the issue when he assumed power at the overthrow of the Buhari/Idiagbon regime in August, 1985.⁵²

As part of the regime's ploy to respect public opinion –'glasnost' of a sort and, as against the apparent autocratic posture of its predecessor, it initiated a nationwide public debate on the loan. Nigerians roundly rejected it. But contrary to public opinion, the government implemented the IMF/World Bank conditions through the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme in July 1986. The programme was initially meant to last for a period of two years, that is, up to 1988. But owing to further adjustments, it stretched up to 1992. The aims of SAP were; to restructure and diversify the country's productive base to increase efficiency and reduce dependence on the oil sector; to improve the viability of public sector investments; and to create an enabling environment for growth in the private sector. The strategies for the achievement of these aims were; the adoption of market determined exchange

rate for the naira (revaluation of the naira), external debt management strategies, removal of subsidies on petroleum products; interest rates deregulation; privatization and commercialization of public corporations and parastatals; (abolition of Marketing Boards for agricultural products) and reduction of government expenditure and budgetary allocation on social services such as health, education and others.⁵³ These programmes had a profound adverse impact on the society. According to Njoku;

SAP brought telling economic and socio-political consequences to Nigerians including severe downsizing, increased unemployment and gross capacity underutilization, staggering capital flights from Nigeria and general impoverishment of the masses.⁵⁴

Although the SAP had an excruciating effect on the masses, it tended to spur the growth of agriculture. In the first place, the monumental downsizing, worker layoffs and closure of industries affected the urban workforce the more. The labour market responded with a rapid inflow of such workers back to the rural areas. Ironically, the productive base and structure of the rural economy had expanded with the disbandment of the Marketing Boards and the incentive regime in major export crop production, which in the state were palm produce and cashew nuts, made their production attractive and lucrative. The re-valuation of the naira produced a similar effect. Again, due to the increase in the prices of imported food items, demand for local food crops-yam, cassava, rice, maize and others, soared. The need to meet this demand, in no small measure, buoyed agricultural production⁵⁵

Similarly, a good number of the urban returnees engaged in food crop production, livestock rearing and poultry farming while others aggregated capital to establish agro-based industries like hand press oil machines, palm-nut cracking/shelling machines and rice mills in the rural areas. This was in realization of the fact that the SAP emphasized the need for increased investment in industries that utilize local raw materials and locally fabricated capital goods. Available data tend to indicate a substantial increase in the number of these industries and an increase in their output: the number of hand press oil machines in the state, for instance, rose from 1287 in 1986 to 2579 by 1989.⁵⁶ Much as no official records on the number of cashew nuts sold from the state-owned cashew plantations and the major cashew belts of the state exist, local dealers acknowledge a thrive in business in the period.⁵⁷

The SAP tended to halt the trend in which Secondary School leavers and University Graduates streamed to the cities to seek employment and livelihood and re-directed their focus on agriculture and agro-allied activities which had become very profitable.⁵⁸ The federal government assisted in generating rural-based employment through the loan scheme provided under the National Directorate of Employment (NDE), to finance agriculture and entrepreneurship amongst School Leavers and University Graduates. This helped to boost agricultural production. Although the SAP had a component on subsidy removal, the federal government deliberately stood down the reduction of subsidy on fertilizers which accounted for half of total recurrent and capital expenditures budgeted by the state government for agricultural production.⁵⁹ These went a long way in increasing agricultural production during the SAP period.

From the foregoing analysis it could be seen that the Structural Adjustment Programme seemed to spur agricultural production. The profitability of agriculture, growth in rural industry and economy as well as the injection of workforce into the rural economy by those retrenched and laid-off from the urban sector of the economy, which had increased reasonably with the introduction of the SAP, served this purpose.

Agricultural Credit Schemes

The federal government made bold steps to finance agriculture. This was in realization of the fact that finance was central to the development and transformation of agriculture. Lack of finance appears to be the most profound of all impediments to rural farmers' participation in agricultural production. What would have been the easiest way to ensure its adequate and timely availability to farmers is credit obtained from formal financial institutions- the commercial banks. This was against the backdrop that traditional credit systems were inadequate to meet the capital needs for increased and expanded agricultural production by the farmers. Also, the credit terms of the commercial banks do not seem to favour investments in agriculture. On the other hand, rural farmers rarely maintained deposits in the bank and virtually none had the necessary collaterals for accessing credit. To mitigate these deficiencies, governments at the federal and state levels initiated special credit facilities to provide funds, capital goods and agro-service materials to rural farmers.⁶⁰

An assessment of the attempts by the federal government to avail farmers of these facilities is our subject of discourse. Two credit institutions – the Nigerian Agricultural Bank (NAB), later renamed Nigerian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank (NACB) and the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund (ACGSF), were established for this purpose.

The Nigerian Agricultural Bank was the nation's foremost post-Civil War agricultural finance institution. It was incorporated on November 4, 1972, and commenced full operation on March 6, 1973. In 1977, the name was changed to Nigerian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank (NACB). This change was to reflect more vividly its commitment to agricultural development through the promotion and financing of co-operatives. The bank's mandates relevant to this paper are; capacity development for the promotion of cooperatives and agricultural information systems as well as boosting of opportunities for self-employment in the rural areas to stem rural-urban migration. Several schemes were instituted by the bank to achieve these goals.

Nevertheless, financial loans to farmers left insignificant imprints on the rural farmers. Some reasons account for this. First, the bank was located in the state capital, without branches or outlets at the zones or local governments. The distance to the state capital and the long bureaucratic processes involved in processing the applications that required repeated visits to the bank discouraged many a farmer from accessing the loan. Again, banking culture was virtually non-existent among the rural farmers: most had never operated bank accounts and were skeptical of the re-payment terms of such loans.⁶²

But there was a caveat to this. In 1981, the bank advanced a loan of ₦2.6m to Anambra State Supervised Agricultural Credit Loan Scheme (SACS) for on-lending to the farmers in the state. Again, the Anambra Cooperative Finance Agency (ACFA) operated its loan scheme chiefly from the ₦5.8m it obtained from the on-lending loan scheme of NACB.⁶³ A good number of these cooperative societies engaged in food production, agro-based industries and agro-marketing. Rural farmers benefitted from these schemes through their various cooperative societies. A source recounts that his father obtained a loan of Three thousand, five hundred naira (₦3,500) in 1982 through the Obidinma Farmers' Multipurpose Cooperative Society, Achalla, which the father invested on his farm.⁶⁴ Several similar instances abound in the state.

But beneath the veneer of such disbursement is the fact that the greater proportion of the fund voted for the operation of the bank was accessed by high-ranked civil servants, the political class and retired army officers, most of whom, it would seem, diverted the money to other purposes. One cannot but acquiesce to Njoku's argument that "the loans hardly trickled down to the real farmers – the small farmers; and whenever they did trickle down, they were grossly insufficient and rarely arrived at the right time."⁶⁵ Thus, its contribution towards the growth of agriculture in the state was quite infinitesimal.

Another Agricultural Credit Scheme of the federal government was the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund (ACGSF). The Scheme was established by Decree 20 of 1977.⁶⁶ It started formal operation in April 1978. The ACGSF initially provided for a fund of ₦100m serviced by the Federal Government by 60 per cent and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), by 40 per cent. The essence of the Scheme was to encourage financial institutions to lend money to those engaged in agricultural production, by guaranteeing loans granted by banks for the said purpose. It provides a 75 per cent guarantee cover for lending banks on outstanding loan balances in the event of a default. This, it was expected, would solve the problem of low recovery rate which discouraged commercial banks from granting credit to finance the sector.

To encourage participation by the rural farmers, a special scheme in which ₦500 could be loaned to a rural farmer without collateral was instituted. Earlier in July 1977, the Federal Military Government had through the Central Bank Nigeria (CBN), launched the Rural Banking Programme (RBP). This programme encouraged Commercial Banks to establish branches in the rural areas. The basic philosophy of the programme was to mobilize rural savings for the issuance of credits to farmers and small-scale businessmen to stimulate economic activities that could create employment and economic growth in rural areas.⁶⁷ It was envisaged that such banks would serve as a platform for disbursement of loans guaranteed by ACGSF. It would appear from these requirements that the provision of credit to rural farmers and small-scale businessmen was of special consideration to the federal government. But the relevant question is: to what extent did it contribute to the growth of agriculture in the state?

An assessment of the operations of the scheme in this regard would reveal that it made no significant imprint. First, as it had been noted earlier, an overwhelming majority of the rural farmers were bereft of banking habits. Even the introduction of the Rural Banking Programme and the purported establishment of branches of the banks in the rural areas could not address the situation. This was further compounded by the fact that few branches of the Banks were so established. Observations from the field reveal that only nine such rural branches were established throughout the state at the terminus of this paper. Prominent amongst them were; The UBA in Nkpologwu, Uzo Uwani, LGA, Union Bank in Ajalli and Abagana and ACB at Ihiala, among others. Thus, the distance and the administrative protocol of processing bank loans dissuaded the rural farmers from applying for loans. The result was that the loans went to businessmen, top civil servants and the military brass diverted them to other purposes.⁶⁸ In sum, the Agricultural Credit and Loan Schemes of the federal government, could rightly be said, to were of little significance to the uplift of rural farmers and the growth of agriculture in the state.

Conclusion

This paper has exhaustively discussed the various federal government's agricultural programmes and ably demonstrated how they individually and collectively helped to buoy agricultural production in Anambra State, Nigeria, during the period, 1976 to 1991. It discovered that the various programmes had as their goals increasing food production to address the programmes recorded initial achievements and goal attainment, such were not sustained as the projects began to flounder shortly, The LAIP was a case in point. Similarly, the programmes were not sustained in the long run. In this regard, mention should be of the achievements of various DFRRI Task forces on aspects of agriculture. Their projects, today, lie in utter ruins. Conversely, the World Bank Rice Projects are still visible as rice belts in the state emerged from its activities.

On the whole, it could be argued that the federal government's agricultural programmes did not significantly attain the expected goals neither did they, in very obvious ways, contribute

to the growth of agriculture in Anambra State. This assertion is validated by the fact that the challenges which they were to address persist.

Endnotes

1. Bruce F. Johnson and Peter Kilby, *Agricultural and Structural Transformation* London; Oxford University Press 1975
2. J.C. Wells, *Agricultural Policy and Economic Growth in Nigeria, 1962-1968*, Ibadan; University Press, 1974
3. P.N.C Okigbo, *National Development Planning in Nigeria*, London; James Currey, 1988, 25.
4. Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN) "Agricultural Policy for Nigeria." Abuja; Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Water Resources and Rural Development (nd) 4-6
5. S.J. Auta and I.I. Defwang, "The Agricultural Development Projects (ADPs) in Nigeria: Status and Policy Implications." *Research Journal of Agriculture and Biological Sciences* Vol. 6, No. 2 2010, 138-143
6. J.C. Iwuchukwu and E.M Igbokwe, "Lessons from Agricultural Policies and Programme in Nigeria," *Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization* Vol. 5, 2012, 3-18
7. I.J. Yusuf and F.J. Torison "Agricultural Programme and Food Security in Nigeria (1960-2016). A Historical Overview" *Humanities: Jos Journal of General Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1 January, 2019, 143-157
8. R.O. Akinbamowo "A Review of Government Policy on Agricultural Mechanization in Nigeria" *Journal of Agricultural Extension and Rural Development* Vol. 5, No. 8 September, 2012, 146-153
9. O.I. Akinboyo "Five Decades in Agricultural Policies in Nigeria. What Roles has Statistics played?" *CBN Bullion* Vol. 33, No. 4, 2008, 35-44
10. O.N. Njoku, *Economics History of Nigeria 19th – 21st Centuries* (2nd Edition). Nsukka; Great AP Express, 2014, 313
11. Edwin Uyaemezina, 72 years, Rtd Civil Servant and Community Leader, interviewed in Awka on 13th June, 2017
12. See: Anambra State, (ANS) Annual Reports, Community self-help projects 1975/76 and 1976/77, compiled by the Research and Monitoring Unit, Community Development Division, Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Chieftaincy Matters, Enugu
13. See; FRN River Basin Development Authority Act, Decree No 25 of 1976; FRN River Basin Development Authority (Amendment) Act, Decree No. 37 of 1976 and FRN River Basin and Rural Development Authority Act, Decree No. 33 of 1987
14. E.E. Emeghara "Anambra-Imo River Basin and Rural Development Authority, (AIRBRDA) 1976, 2001, Ph.D Thesis, Department of History and International Studies, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, 2006, 114
15. Emeghara "Anambra –Imo, 115
16. Emeghara "Anambra-Imo, 116
17. Emeghara "Anambra-Imo, 117
18. Emeghara "Anambra-Imo, 118
19. See; Meenakshi Malhotra (ed) *Empowerment of Women; Women in Rural Development Vol. 3*, New Delhi; Isha Books, 2004, 16 and N.T. Meludu, "Impact of Lower Anambra Irrigation Project (LAIP) on Rural Women Rice Farmers in Anambra State," Ph.D Thesis, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development, University of Ibadan, 2006.

20. Emeghara, "Anambra-Imo, 131
21. Njoku, *Economic History*, 318
22. Njoku, *Economic History*, 321
23. Olusegun Obasanjo, *Not My Will*, Ibadan; University Press Ltd, 1990, 77
24. Ifeyinwa Emejulu, 55yrs, Professor of History, interviewed at Awka on 3rd November, 2022.
25. Uyaamezina, interviewed cited.
26. Njoku, *Economic History*, 322
27. Okion Ojigbo, *Shehu Shagari. The Biography of Nigeria First Executive President*" Quoted in Paul Obi-Ani, *The Shehu Shagari's Presidency: An Appraisal*. Makurdi, Aboki Publishers, 2007, 740.
28. B.N. Floyd "Agricultural Planning in Nigeria" *Geography* Vol. 67, No. 4 October, 1982, 346.
29. Njoku, *Economics History*, 325
30. Uyaamezina, interviewed cited; Kenneth Onwudiwe Rtd Civil Servant, interviewed at Awka on 10th June, 2012.
31. ANS, *3rd Twelve months of Civilian Administration of Anambra State*, Enugu; Information Division, Governor's Office, (nd), 21
32. ANS, *3rd Twelve months*, 22
33. ANS, *3rd Twelve months*, 23
34. ANS, *Focus on Rural Development in Anambra State Vol. II* Enugu; Directorate of Rural Development Government House, 1989, 108.
35. World Bank (WB) Report and Recommendation of the President of International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Loan in an amount of Equivalent to US\$ 162m to the Federal Republic of Nigeria for a Multi-state Agricultural Development project, Report No. 1 P-4339-UN, June, 1986
36. Ikenna Odife "An Appraisal of Rural Development in Anambra State, Nigeria, 1976-1991," Ph.D Dissertation, Department of History and International Studies UNN 2021, 215
37. Odife, "An Appraisal, 256
38. Odife, "An Appraisal 259
39. Uma Eleazu, quoted in Njoku, *Economic History*, 317
40. Njoku, *Economic History*, 334
41. FRN, The Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure Act, Decree No. 4 of 1987.
42. ANS, *Focus, Vol. II*, 32
43. ANS, *Focus, Vol. II*, 33
44. ANS, *Focus, Vol. II*, 33
45. ANS, *Focus, Vol. II*, 34
46. ANS, *Focus, Vol. II*, 35
47. ANS, *Focus, Vol. II*, 36
48. ANS, *Focus, Vol. II*, 37
49. ANS, *Focus, Vol. II*, 38
50. ANS, *Focus, Vol. II*, 39
51. Odife "An Appraisal, 234
52. Odife, "An Appraisal, 189
53. John C. Anyanwu, "President Babangida's Structure Adjustment Programme and Inflation in Nigeria," *Journal of Social Development in Africa*. Vol. 7, No. 1, 1992, 16
54. Njoku, *Economic History*, 351
55. Odife, "An Appraisal, 191
56. Odife, "An Appraisal, 190

57. Kingsley Agu, 62 years Farmer/ Community Leader interviewed at Ibenda Obollo-Eke on 13th May 2012; Nnaemeka Ikenegbu, 64 years, Community Leader, interviewed at Agbadala, Achi on 10th June, 2012.
58. ANS, Development Projects in Anambra State 1987, np, nd, 7
59. Anyanwu, "President Babangida's, 16
60. Odife, "An Appraisal, 195
61. Odife, "An Appraisal, 196
62. Odife, "An Appraisal, 197
63. Odife, "An Appraisal, 197-198
64. Basil Nwakasi, 46 years, Businessman; interviewed at Achalla, Awka North LGA on 15th May, 2012.
65. Njoku, *Economic History*, 361
66. FRN, Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund Act, Decree No. 20 of 1977
67. E.E. Umeabali "An Economic Analysis of the Rural Banking Programme in Nigeria," *African Review of Money, Finance and Banking* No. 1, 1989, 102
68. Odife, "An Appraisal, 192