LAW’S LEGITIMACY: A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE HART – FULLER, HART – DEVLIN, AND HART – DWORKIN DEBATES ON THE NATURE OF LAW AND ITS MORAL JUSTIFICATION

Abstract

This article critically evaluates the Hart-Fuller, Hart-Devlin, and Hart Dworkin debates on the nature of law and its moral justification, examining how each debate addresses the central question of law’s legitimacy. The debate’s significance lies in their enduring influence on legal philosophy and theory, with each side offering distinct perspectives on law’s moral foundation. This article aims to comparatively analyse the debates, assessing the strengths and weaknesses of each position and to determine which offers the most convincing account of laws legitimacy. Employing a doctrinal methodology, the article scrutinizes the key arguments and concepts presented in the debates. The findings reveal that while each debate contributes valuable insights, a balanced approach combining elements from each debate provides the most compelling account of law’s legitimacy. The article concludes by summarizing recommendations for a more comprehensive understanding of law’s moral Justification.