EMPIRICISM BEYOND DOGMAS: AN EXISTENTIAL ANALYSIS OF QUINE'S PRAGMATIC EPISTEMOLOGY

Abstract

One of the driving forces and preoccupation of empiricism is the nature, structure and theory of meanings. The attempt to provide and explain this has led the various traditions in philosophy to posit and argue for diverse perspectives. This was exactly what the empiricist traditionally did with their postulation of the analytic and synthetic statements. The implication of this submission for philosophy in general drew the attention and irk of Quine. So, influenced by the analytic and pragmatic tradition, Quine attacked this traditional distinction between analytic and synthetic statements as espoused by the empiricists, which he christened the 'two dogmas of empiricism'. He argued that this position is not just untenable but irrational and preclusive. And he called on the empiricist to strive towards integral and complete truth, as he also employed the proponents of this standpoint to interface with other disciplines, especially, those that have access to the level it cannot reach. Subsequently, this paper employing an existential-analytic approach, reasoned that the intention of Quine to dismantle the established demarcation between analytic and synthetic statements is a novel approach to further appreciation of noble marks of philosophy and its argument for an asymmetric and pragmatic approach to epistemology is likewise germane.