

**INTERPRETING EXTREMISTS' HATRED IN  
BOUBACAR BORIS DIOP'S *MURAMBI*:  
*LE LIVRE DES OSSEMENTS***

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**Abstract**

*In retrospect, Diop narrates the Rwandan genocide which serves as a corpus for the study of extremist's hatred. This effort examined extremist hatred in Murambi, with the aim of understanding the triggers and process. Having understood that the task cannot be accomplished with a single theory, the study adopted J. M. Berger's « Linkages and bundles » (8-9) to demonstrate the process of incitation and Daniel Kahneman « Automatic and deliberative thinking » to interpret extremist hatred. The article has demonstrated extremist hatred as an ideology which may begin in different ways, including incitation which triggers the automatic thinking through the exploitation of conspiracy theories, and force. The actors of this instigation will then be radicalised from suspicion, to the formation of and belief in linkages and bundles, then the construction of ideologies that kill the conscience and legitimizes hatred, until it metamorphoses into violent extremism.*

**Key words:** Extremist ideology, Hatred, Automatic thinking, Deliberate hinking, Radicalisation.

**Introduction**

African francophone writers have in modern times, adopted a narrative that is characterised by extreme conduct which are, according to Emmanuel Ahimana: “fiction surpolitisée, discours misérabilisé, discours rebelle, forme monstrueuse, écritures de la violence” (6). Scholars and authors of African Francophone novels have demonstrated violence of different degrees and expression, which have been studied as “Des formes variées du discours rebelle” by Jacques Chevrier, “Langage et violence dans la littérature africaine écrite en français” by Mwatha Musanji Ngalasso, « Les Violences extrêmes dans le roman négro-africain francophone, Le cas du Rwanda : Étude de langue et de style » by Emmanuel Ahimana etc. who attest through their research, the presence and probably dominance of violence in the African francophone texts. There is no doubt that the different types of violence exhibited are driven by a force. The force that propels one into such violence is hatred. This study explains how hatred goes beyond limits to become an extremist ideology, demonstrating the strategy and process of building extremist hatred.

In Boubacar Boris Diop's *Murambi Le livre des ossements*, Cornelius returns to Rwanda for the first time after a long exile in Djibouti to reunite with his only surviving relative Simeon Hibaneza, four years after the genocide. He returns to unpleasant detail about the genocide: Jessica who adopts duty with seriousness and doubles as a spy for her people; Faustin Cabana an Interahamwe militant commander with a strong resolve never to live with the Tutsi again; his father Dr Joseph Karekazi, an elite Hutu, once moderate ends up organising the killing of thousands of Tutsi in Murambi; Colonel Perin, an officer of the French army and his engagements in the genocide; Gerald a Tutsi survivor who narrates disturbing events that characterized the war. Cornelius' reflection as one who discovers, serves as a revelation for the reader about the Rwandan genocide.

#### **Exploiting the extremes of hatred**

Hatred, as seen in *Murambi*, adopts the “extremists” vision. Following the reflections of one of the characters, Cornelius, he appears to be giving his judgments of the level of hatred displayed in *Murambi*: “Cette orgie de haine allait très loin au-delà de la lutte pour le pouvoir dans un petit pays” (214). Founding this argument on the duplex theory of hate will place the hate in question under burning hate, which Robert Sternberg itemise as need for annihilation, (disgust of negation of intimacy + anger/fear of passion + devaluation/diminution of decision/commitment.) However, *Murambi*'s depiction of Anger/fear of passion is very minimal. The author tries in vain, to describe what could have informed that level of hatred but decided: “il ne voyait rien qui pût justifier une haine aussi féroce” (204). Pursuing hatred with such ferocity is an undertaking that requires a huge effort. This is obvious, given the fact that these killings were executed with machetes, requiring physical strength. It is therefore, important to reflect on what fueled the thoughts of the militants to return to their scene of carnage with renewed resolve to continue killing everyday.

Haroro Ingram considers ideology as “a tool that is used selectively by violent extremists to construct their 'system of meaning' in response to psychosocial and strategic factors” (5). In the case of *Murambi*, the factors are more strategic than psychosocial. There seems to be a blatant display of disdain and resentment that appears to be too extreme to be considered reactionary radicalism. According to J.M Berger, extremist ideology is “a set of justifications that legitimizes an in-group, which is primarily expressed through texts, including both written and spoken word” (7). Beyond the struggle for power as Cornelius suggests, there appears to be the search for legitimacy. The demonization of the Tutsi would have been a necessary evil for the taking of power. It is a strategy. However, exploiting the limits of hatred and pushing the boundaries in the manner Diop adopts leaves more questions to be answered.

In our corpus, the in-group can be seen as the Interahamwe militants and other Hutu fighters who found a set of justification to legitimize their existence but also their enemy and their aggression towards the enemy. Diop presents Gerald, a character that survived the carnage with a lot of memory, who brings us to reflect on the nature of hatred: “j'avais vu des choses absolument insupportable. Je ne pouvais plus croire à la bonté des hommes” (193). To buttress Gerald's assertion, Diop paints a scene through the same character: Gerard in page 210-211 recounting how an interahamwe was having sexual intercourse with one of the Tutsi

victims under a tree in broad day light. This display is outrageously humiliating for the woman in question, but that is hardly extreme. A high ranking militant then hails him in the act and encourages him to wrap up as quickly as possible: “Depeche-toi de finir tes pompes, on a promis à papa de bien faire le travail” (210), making it more inappropriate. Note also that “Le travail” here is the extermination of human lives.

This symbolism alone makes the act ideological. This ideologisation becomes the basic indicator of the strategies adopted by the extremist for the legitimisation of their hostility. The high ranking militant then returns and smashes the woman's head with a stone while the militant pursue his pleasure undisturbed. According to Gerard, “ Cela n'a pas interrompu l'Interahamwe qui a continué à besogner le corps agité de légers soubresauts. Il avait les yeux hors de la tête, tournés vers le ciel, et je crois même qu'il était encore plus excité qu'avant” (210-211). This cruelty represents an illustration of extremist's hatred. How the victim's pain excites and satisfies the aggressors. Realities in our corpus show that extreme hatred occupied the minds of these extremists leading to what would be an invention of human pain. “De rue où errant des enfants- cadavres aux yeux vifs et afférés. Il ne suffit plus de tuer, Il faut aussi trapper les esprits. Alors, voici les rebelles qui savent si bien inventer de la douleur humaine” (213). Humans go to extremes to demonstrate through gruesome executions, their level of hatred towards defenceless victims including children. Where does extreme hatred emerge from? Why does man explore abominable means to express his lack of affection for a fellow human? Why the detailed and thorough strategy for evil? This question seems to be a response to Aloys Ndasigwa's account of how they invaded and killed people who went to seek refuge at the parish. These victims begged for their lives, begged for a moment of prayers before dying:

Mes enfants, laissez-moi prier une dernière fois”. Une petite vieille toute ratatinée. C'est fou, le nombre de personnes qui demandent depuis hier à prier avant de mourir. Notre chef a répondu à la vieille, d'un air faussement étonné : « Ah ! Maman, ne le savais-tu donc pas ? Nous avons passé la nuit au ciel et là-bas nous nous sommes battus jusqu'à l'aube contre le Dieu des Tutsi ! Nous l'avons tué et maintenant c'est votre tour » d'un seul coup de machette, il lui a envoyé la tête au diable (100).

The number of people, the various forms of supplication and persuasion to be left alive did not deter the extremists. If it were to be a reaction to something they have done wrong, the victims would have persuaded long enough for a negotiation. The society was already polarized, but the instigation for the killings lies in their 'system of meaning which would have been defined during the preparation phase because according to Berger: “In addition to defining general practices, ideology usually defines acceptable tactics for maintaining or increasing the in-group's legitimacy (such as isolation, proselytization, or violence against an out-group)” (7). Berger's assertion further confirms that the hatred that sustained the killings was an ideology. The author caps up this confirmation in what he considers an authentication of the death of the Tutsis by the Prefect who orders a meticulous verification:

D'un geste, il a ordonné à deux de ses hommes de procéder à la vérification. Ceux-ci nous ont fait signe de nous éloigner puis ont jeté des grenades lacrymogènes sur les cadavres entassés sous nos yeux. Les Iyenzis qui s'étaient

dissimulés sous les corps avaient déjà bien du mal à respirer. Avec les lacrymos, ils éternuaient très fort et on n'avait qu'à leur mettre la main dessus. (101).

If one were to still be in doubt, the effort put into strategizing the massacre in page 34 will further serve as a convincing factor. But what offence merits such hatred. Cornelius recounts how hatred pushes people to kill even animals belonging to their object of hatred (52). Stanley expresses the level of shock expressed by foreigners: "Alors pourquoi tant de cruauté?" (58). These suggest that the expression of hatred goes beyond logical limits. Cornelius recalls briefly the display of hatred in other countries. "Et sais-tu qu'en Sierra Leone, ils se contentent de mutiler leurs victimes? C'est pire que tout. Je ne sais pas où ils trouvent la force de couper les jambes et les bras d'une fillette avant de la laisser repartir" (78-79).

To put this manifestation of extremist hatred in perspective, it is worthy of note that the author used the term extremist "les extrémistes du Hutu power" (83), on the same page he also recognises the word "Fanatique" (83) But what is responsible for the construction of these extremists and fanatics like Ndimbati whose love for Lucienne switch into hatred within a short time (84), or Extremists like Dr Karekezi who organized the massacre of millions of people including his wife and children (93)? Whereas once a moderate Hutu who spare headed a movement against impunity, he later became different "par la suite, il a changé. Le Docteur Joseph Karekezi n'était plus le même depuis longtemps, mais personne ne le savait. Lui seul peut dire ce qui s'est passé dans sa tête. Il ne supportait plus par exemple, d'être marié avec une Tutsi" (94). What really happened in his head ?

### Suspicion

The author takes to 1959 when it all started with suspicion « Depuis 1959, chaque jeune Rwandais doit, à un moment ou à un autre de sa vie, répondre à la même question: faut-il attendre les tueurs les bras croisés ou tenter de faire quelque chose pour que notre pays redevienne normal? » (40). In reality, who is the killer? This expected killer was preached in both Hutu and Tutsi camps based on suspicion. In other words, suspicion prepared both camps for a war; a factless and baseless construction was on course. This suspicion created and fuelled hatred. Each member of the community looked behind his shoulder as he lived. The author demonstrates this in the innocence of the victims of the genocide: "Après ceux qu'ils appellent des *Ibyitso*, des complices, ce sera au tour des Tutsi. Eux, ils sont coupable d'être eux-mêmes, donc interdits d'innocence de toute éternité" (38). Considering a Tutsi guilty of whatever was considered the wrong doing just because they are Tutsi, comes from an ideology. The extremists system of meaning must have named the Tutsi as the out-group and thus considered the enemy.

This is the only way one can explain the killing of men, women, children, and even old people. Suspicion created a polarized society. Manipulation or coincidence, the very event that was going to complicate the already tensed situation occurs: "Le Falcon 50 du président Juvénal Habyarimana avait été abattu... en pleine vol. Cyprien Ntaryamira, le chef de l'Etat burundais, se trouvait aussi dans l'avion. Il n'y avait aucun survivant et on accusait tout le monde d'avoir fait le coup : les Belges, les Français, le FPR et les extrémistes du Hutu Power » (83). Suspicion made everything worse. The president is dead, everyone is being accused and

the tensions became even higher. Dr Joseph Karekezi predicted that “Les voyous et les fanatiques vont en profiter pour attaquer des innocents” (83).

There lies the problem. Diop seems to point his readers in the direction of what will follow. First we deduced that the mind of everyone, Hutu and Tutsi was preconditioned to expect a war, it is not clear who declared the war. Just as everyone was suspicious of the other, Cornelius wonders “c’était peut-être absurde de la part des victimes de continuer à clamer si obstinément leur innocence. Et si ce châtement radical -le génocide- était la réponse a un crime très ancien dont personne ne voulait entendre parler? (81). Diop deliberately or unconsciously leaves out the details of this suspicion. Probably because there were various conspiracy theories that hinged on suspicion. Cornelius acknowledges that he tried to verify from history, how and why the suspicion existed and declared “pourtant, je n'y ai trouvé aucune réponse. Les documents prouvent que les Hutu et les Twa ont été opprimés jadis par les Tutsi. Je suis Hutu mais je ne peux pas vivre avec cet héritage. Je refuse de demander au passé plus de sens qu'il n'en peut donner au présent » (81). Cornelius' analysis shows that the history books would have been exploited to form the high level constructs. One will also ask: if it was the Hutu and Twa that was oppressed, why is it only the Hutu that is executing the Tutsi? What is the crime? Who commits this crime? Against who was this crime committed?

It is easy to deduce that Diop leaves this gap as resonance into the reader's mind that it is simple suspicion. What remains unclear however is the instigator of these suspicion, insecurities, victimism, or selfish inventions. The possibility of pure invention cannot be ruled out as shown in a previous study that extremist's ideologies can be born out of victimism. “Comme nous l'avons vu, la construction d'idéologies extrémistes telles que le chauvinisme, le défaitisme, l'ethnocentrisme, la xénophobie, et la vengeance ; est issu du victimisme et de la radicalisation”(Odeh 188).

#### **Linkages, bundles and high level constructs**

These come after suspicion is established. According to Berger, extremist ideologies begin with “linking concepts” (7). Extremist's ideologies thrive through these linkages to facts. For the Hutus, they linked this suspicion to history “Les documents prouvent que les Hutus et les Twa ont été opprimés jadis par les Tutsis” (81).

#### **Linking their suspicion to historical records**

According to Berger, these linked concepts are then “bundled into high-level constructs, in which several concepts are connected to one another and then conflated into a single idea” (8). The author shows a presumed level of tension between the Tutsi and the Hutu. This tension came from suspicion. It is however, not clear if the fears and apprehension have tangible links and sources. We have shown in previous studies that “Il se peut qu'ils le présument réellement, en raison d'un décalage palpable, ou simplement un exercice d'invention (171). Invention of perceived enemies is the fourth stage in Borum's process of radicalization. Dr Karekezi raised the same concerns to his son that after the death of President Juvenal Habyarimana, fanatics were going leverage on his death to attack innocent people. (83) Diop validates our view by demonstrating clearly in the following declaration. “Pour certains d'entre eux, la situation est simple: ils ont tué les Tutsi que, pour une raison ou une autre, ils détestaient et, sans oser le dire ouvertement, ils aimeraient rentrer chez eux”(124). Through this illustration, it can be deduced that the genocide is based on linkages that differ for different individuals.

The theory of hate as a story applies in various categories based on the Hutu-Tutsi relationship. It proposes that hate emerges from different kinds of stories. In the case of *Murambi*, the stories vary according to the different linkages. We also find Cornelius reflections on Rwanda a clear pointer : “Au fond, le Rwanda est un pays imaginaire. S'il est si difficile d'en parler de manière rationnelle, C'est peut être parce qu'il n'existe pas pour de vrai. Chacun à son Rwanda dans la tête et ça n'a rien à voir avec celui des autres” (82). For Cornelius, on the one part, the different perceptions of Rwanda by the Rwandans must have created different expectations and of course diverse feelings of entitlement. There lies a problem. On the other part, by the contemplation of an imaginary Rwanda, he probably makes allusion to the assumption of enmity along tribal lines.

The linkages that fanned the tension created by suspicion were diverse. It is thus right to conclude that the organisers of these heinous crimes like Kakerezi took hold of the people's automatic thinking. People made their linkages individually, to take positions in history : “dans cette histoire, beaucoup ont tue par avidité, par sottises, par crainte de l'autorité ou je ne sais quoi encore” (184). The tragic event of “mercredi 6 avril 1994” (13) already had suspects, due to linkages. The linkages are bundled up to more complex concepts, where people go to history to make a resolution. We find a very good example in Faustin Gasana who says: « J'ai étudié l'histoire de mon pays et je sais que les Tutsi et nous, nous ne pourrions jamais vivre ensemble. Jamais. Des tas de fumistes prétendent le contraire, mais moi je ne le crois pas » (26).

This is a deadly resolution. It probably represents other perceptions such as portrayed in Colonel Musoni's conversation with Dr Karekezi: “Demain, il pourrait dire: au moment ou tout le monde ne pensait qu'a sauver sa peau, j'étais au coté du président Karekezi, nous étions au milieu de la tempête, nous avons fait face aux ennemis de la nation rwandaise, c'est nous deux et personne d'autre qui avons sauvé le pays » (128). Certainly, the Tutsi, old and young, were considered enemies of the nation. Let us not dwell on the lack of logic in that bundle and consider how extreme that is. This was a bundle that every Hutu needed to accept before extremist hatred is established. This bundle is an important part of the ideological construction that is going to ensure the extermination of every Tutsi alive.

During the propaganda that reinforced this hatred, a story was told that demonstrates deliberative thinking on the part of the organizers to provoke automatic thinking and also thoroughness in execution: It is about the head of the FPR being a Tutsi child whose parents were executed in his presence during one of the previous conflicts. The narrator claimed that he was not killed because he was a child. The story sought to provoke regret on the actions of those who spared the boy, but to also ensure that no Tutsi is spared. This bundle is a propaganda that constructs an extremist ideology that defies any form of decency and human value. It is a bundle that would have encouraged the destruction of even a Tutsi fetus.

#### **High level Constructs -ideology**

The conceptual linkages and bundles in *Murambi* were further bundled into high level constructs. These constructs served as a tool for brain-wash, and for incitation. The organizers of the genocide needed people to execute a well calculated (deliberately thought out) decision. Their aim is to usher themselves into the corridors of power as this was obvious to Michel

Serumundo who declares: “Il y a longtemps que ce pays est devenu complètement fou. De toute façon, cette fois-ci, les assassins avaient un prétexte en or: la mort du président. Je n'osais pas espérer qu'ils se contenteraient juste d'un peu de sang» (18)

This high level constructs were ideological like in page 25 Gasana's father links the genocide they were preparing for, to the Hitler's genocide against the Jews “tu a surement entendu parler de ce français qui a voulu tuer tous les Iyenzi blancs pendant leur grande guerre là-bas”(25). Faustin Gasana's high level construct was based on history : « J'ai étudié l'histoire de mon pays et je sais que les Tutsi et nous, nous ne pourrions jamais vivre ensemble. Jamais (26). This assertion is a product of many linkages leading to the consideration of the Tutsi enemies of the Rwandan state. Nous avons fait face aux ennemis de la nation Rwandaise' (128). This consideration legitimizes the killing of the Tutsi.

According to Berger, high level construct involves developed thinking such as “elements of in-group and out-group identity (perceived beliefs, practices, expectations, etc.) are linked to source knowledge (news, history, folklore, scripture, myth, conspiracy theories, etc.)” (8). Diop seems to adopt a predilection that does not only narrate the crimes; he went as far as adopting a narrative that makes the ideologies glaring of extremism. The taking of power did not seem to have been the only aim of the genocide. There appears to be a quest for legitimacy. This legitimacy is not unconnected with the power. It is possibly a means of retaining power after taking it. Berger asserts that “In-group demands more and more recognition of its claimed legitimacy and treats lack of adequate recognition as a threat” (4). The need for power would have started the spouts of killings as recognised by Simeon Habineza, but the demand for that recognition (legitimacy) seems to be the real framework for the extremist hatred. Peter Neuman puts this category of extremism this way: “In the context of liberal democracies, this could be applied to any ideology that advocates racial or religious supremacy and/or opposes the core principles of democracy and universal human rights” (cited by Borum *Radicalization 10*)

For Dr Karekazi “C'est juste l'histoire qui veut du sang” (129). We find this aligning with the belief, whose real source is unknown to us, that “L'arbre de la liberté ne s'arrose que par le sang”. That is the high level construct that the Dr Karekazi adopts to legitimize the killing of his own family. It is only possible after achieving Borums's last step of ideological development: demonization of the victim. This is no doubt a manifestation of extremism, as the *Macmillian Dictionary of Political Thought* considers extremism methods through which political actors attempt to realise their interests and aims, “Adoption of means to political ends which disregard accepted standards of conduct, in particular which show disregard for life, liberty, and human rights of others”. The methods adopted by Karekezi and his likes are aimed at realizing their aims through undemocratic means. However, to sell the idea to the Hutu they needed a construct that will trigger anger and stimulate automatic thinking, as demonstrated by Borum:

This ascription has three effects that facilitate violence. First, aggression becomes more justifiable when aimed against 'bad' people, particularly those who intentionally cause harm to others. Second, extremists describe the responsible party as 'evil'; dehumanizing a target in this regard, further facilitates aggression. Third, those suffering adverse conditions in the hands of others do not see themselves as 'bad' or 'evil'; this further identifies the

responsible person or group as different from those affected and, thus, makes justifying aggression even easier (“Understanding the terrorist mind-set” 8).

These legitimise extremist hatred. In the case of Rwanda, it was imperative for the organisers of the genocide to broadcast the image of the Tutsi as enemies of the state. We remark in *Murambi*, that Diop presents high level constructs as a product of deliberative thinking. He however, demonstrates through the Interahamwe militants, how the deliberative thinkers leveraged on automotive thinking to incite the Hutus.

Propaganda is a vital tool for initiation. Diop presents this assertion through Dr Karekezi. He considers the whole cruelty a duty. He presents the same ideology to the Interahamwe, this ideology considers his actions as duty “Quoi qu'il arrive, j'aurais fait mon devoir. Le devoir. Un mot simple et que j'aime bien. La journée n'a pas été facile. Pour réunir les hommes nécessaires au travail, il m'a fallu aller jusqu'à Butare et de là remonter vers Muciro et Rusenge un peu plus au nord” (121). As if to confirm what he considers work, he says “Je suis toujours sur le terrain depuis le début de la guerre et ils savent aussi que je ne plaisante pas avec le travail. Et, naturellement, quand je suis dans les parages, ils font du zèle” (123). “ils” as he employs here refers to the Interahamwe. Diop finds a subtle and interesting way to introduce the brains behind the genocide when he gives an account of Dr Karekezi reflections:

Je n'ai jamais été aussi inquiet depuis le début de ces événements. La vérité toute nue est celle-ci: nos hommes sont fatigués. Cela se lisait nettement sur les visages de ceux que j'ai vus. La fatigue et la lassitude. Nos Interahamwe ont certes reçu un bon entraînement mais nous avons peut-être sous-estimé l'effort physique que cela représente de tuer tant de gens avec des armes blanches” (124).

Here Dr Karekezi appears to take responsibility for deliberately organizing the genocide, inciting the Interahamwe, equipping them with logistics for the genocide. What follows in page 125 will be Dr Karekezi's admittance to deliberate thinking, manipulation, enforcing further our conclusion of exploiting automotive thinking by these extremists: “ils savent que si toute cela se termine bien ils retourneront dans leurs taudis et que nous ne viendrons pas boire la bière de banane avec eux. Les tapes amicales, la fraternité entre les pauvres et les puissants, tout ça sera vite oublié. Un drôle de cercle vicieux”(125). These are clear indications that the organizers of this rare cruelty were manipulators. Colonel Etienne Perrin's description of Dr Karekazi shows a disguise “rien ne laissait soupçonner chez lui un individu basement haineux et fanatique” (140). He disguises his extreme hatred, trained and transmitted it into the Interahamwe militants who manifested his form of extremism. We acknowledge manipulation.

According to Borum, “ideology and action are sometimes connected, but not always. Most people who harbor radical ideas and violent justifications do not engage in terrorism” (*Radicalization into violent extremism* 30). That describes Dr Karekazi. He propagates his extremism and camouflages himself into the elder states man everyone perceived him to be. While in reality he is : “basement haineux et fanatique” (140). He indoctrinates this hatred into the militants and thus they resolved: “nous ne pouvons pas les éliminer tous, mais que les survivants soient au moins morts de douleur pendant le reste de leur vie” (136). The hatred



here is pushed to unimaginable extremes. They conceive a mutation and a long term effect on the survivors. Their only crime is going to be surviving the genocide.

The extremist hatred is targeted to trigger both immediate pain and slow violence, described by Rob Nixon as: “the long dyings –the staggered and staggeringly discounted casualties, both human and ecological- ...often not just incremental but exponential, operating as major threat multipliers” (www.chronicle.com/article/slow-Violence/127968). This kind of incitation was carefully calculated according to the Ingram's assertion that: “the potential appeal of extremist propaganda is largely dependent on how such messaging is strategically designed to leverage psychological forces and strategic factors that are pertinent to its targeted audiences”(4). The extreme hatred was spread through propaganda of high level constructs that triggered extreme hatred as an automated effect on the Hutu youth.

### Conclusion

*Murambi* traces the way ambition and emotional disposition escalates into full extremist hatred. This we have followed from baseless suspicion to linkages and bundles into high level constructs which formed the fabric of propaganda by the real extremist: organizers of the genocide. We have also pointed to the fact that these organizers employed deliberative thinking to incite and manipulate a large number of people into extreme hatred while they themselves maintained their images as law abiding statesmen. The people's automatic thinking was exploited to commit some of the wildest display of cruelty while in reality, they stand to gain nothing. The study attests to the manipulation and disguise adopted by the propagandists of extremist hatred. It is also drawn from our corpus that the real extremists are calm and collected. They are strategic and tactful and leave no room for suspicion on their true nature such as Dr Karekezi, Faustin etc. While the mediocre incited members do the dirty job without any deliberate thinking. This category commits the crimes but in reality is made up of misinformed over-zealous peasants. The level of lunacy they exhibited in carrying out their duties attests to their emptiness and lack of ideology.

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