EXCLUSIVE RATIONALISM AND EMPIRICISM: A DISSERVICE TO THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Stephen Timothy AKPAN, Michael BENEDICT

Abstract


Philosophy is specifically understood as speculative science. That is to say that it is a science that seeks the truth for the sake of the truth or knowledge for the sake of knowledge. There are two major and parallel poles in the theory of this knowledge the rationalism and empiricism. This study intends to show that the two traditional sources of knowledge can be used in strengthening each other rather than engage in mutual exclusivism. It is a fact that everything has a beginning but it is unfortunate to take the beginning as an end to itself. It is more unfortunate to take the continuation as the beginning and end. Empirical knowledge ought to be seen as the beginning of knowledge and rationalism as the continuation of knowledge. Both should constitute true and universal knowledge. In reality, it is often difficult to have a one- way satisfying or universal truth without assistance from other areas. There are various methods of interpretation of the bible but none is self-sufficient, it is always required that other methods be diligently applied as well for authentic interpretation. The paper using the analytic method posit that the position that one method is sufficient in giving us the absolute explanations to all the problems and acquisition of knowledge as the exponents of rationalism and empiricism want us to believe. The use of the two major themes to give us relatively sure source of knowledge is a conditio sine qua non. This title suggests other nomenclatures such as, absolute rationalism/empiricism and radical rationalism/empiricism. They designate the position that excludes the other, and tenaciously hold on to one without respect or reference to the other. This paper concludes that we need the senses and we need reason. The combination of these with proper interpretation and understanding, gives adequate and better knowledge, after all, two good heads are better than one!

Full Text:

PDF

Refbacks

  • There are currently no refbacks.