

# POLITICAL EXCLUSION AND DOMESTIC TERRORISM IN AFRICA

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## **Abstract**

Many scholars have noted the prevalence of domestic terrorism in Africa and elsewhere. Scholars argue that ethnically motivated terrorism is caused by problems of political exclusion, and many nation-states have alienated distinct ethnic groups, even under domestic constitutions and practices. This study examines whether the exclusion of ethnic groups from political power is an important contributing factor to domestic terrorism. If political exclusion causes ethnic terrorism, can reforms promoting greater ethnic inclusion and democracy reduce risks of terrorism? Global concern over terrorism and how to reduce the severity of terrorist attacks have been growing. Although much attention has been focused on transnational terrorist events, most recorded terrorist activities tend to be fully domestic, and often tied to groups with claims against their home government. Previous studies have shown that ethnic exclusion and restricted political access can motivate civil war, and evidence indicates that ethnic accommodation and political reform can reduce the risk of civil war. The same logic should apply to ethnic terrorism as well. This line of research is to examine whether political inclusion can reduce terrorism by lessening motivation and expanding opportunities for alternative actions. This goes beyond the question of whether ethnic groups that are excluded/included engage in more/fewer terrorist attacks, and examine whether resort to terrorism by the group decline after inclusion.

**Keywords:** Ethno-political, Exclusion, Inclusion, Terrorism, Africa.

## **1. Introduction**

Irrespective of the measure of terrorism and estimation method, ethno-political exclusion fuels domestic terrorism, and as Nwabunka (2004:23) rightly noted, many countries have alienated distinct ethnic groups, even under domestic constitutions and practices. Ethnic groups are not formally deprived of political rights or systematically discriminated against, but often have felt marginalized in a nation-state with a dominant group. Some groups have pursued national liberation from foreign domination through political violence, and terrorism. This is a plausible strategy for small groups with few opportunities to take on the state directly through conventional warfare.

Empirical studies deem the political exclusion of ethnic minority groups to be a significant cause of civil war, rebellions and mass political violence (Moore 1998; Regan and Norton 2005). However, the question of whether or not the political marginalization of ethnic groups motivates and sustains terrorist activity is largely unexplored. To the best of my knowledge, Piazza's (2012) and Choi (2010) as well as Choi and Piazza (2016) studies are

the only empirical researches that examine the effect of minority political discrimination on domestic terrorism, reporting no significant effect. Thus, with a special focus on domestic terrorism, I extend the existing researches on minority political exclusion and terrorism, contending that political exclusion creates frustration and political grievances among ethnic groups who in some instances resort to terrorist violence in an effort to address such grievances.

One may wonder why such ethnic groups would resort to terrorism rather than instigate civil war; this study argues that these groups turn to terrorism because ethnic ties enhance their collective security and because fewer material capabilities are necessary when limiting operations to a local area. When people resent a government that has failed to recognize their tribal, racial, religious or linguistic group, it is more common strategy to withdraw from government control through autonomy or semi-autonomy rather than to jump into an insurgency movement; the former requires fewer material capabilities and less sophistication while still allowing disgruntled people to address their grievances. Terrorism, then, is more cost effective than civil war and thus becomes a more viable option for some individuals in an ethnic group that intend to pursue their political rights through the use of force.

This paper is divided into eight sections. The first is introduction; the second contains fundamental statements while the third attempts an understanding of terrorism as a concept. Sections four and five contain a survey of the effects of political exclusion on terrorism and how this phenomenon is hostile to the African traditional heritage respectively. The sixth section suggests inclusion as a prospect for reducing domestic terrorism, the seventh attempts policy oriented advice through which the destructive effects of domestic terrorism can be minimized or eradicated, while section eight concludes the paper.

## **2. Hypothesis/Theses Statements**

Let us state our first thesis here as follows: countries with large numbers of people that are politically excluded due to their ethnic background will experience more domestic terrorist attacks. We reason that as the population size of politically excluded ethnic minorities increases, terrorist attacks become more severe and result in higher number of casualties.

There are two components to such reasoning. First, we regard numbers of casualties due to terrorism to be a reliable accompanying indicator to raw count of terrorist attacks; while the number of domestic terrorist attacks occurring in a year indicates the frequency of terrorist activity, the count of persons killed or injured in terrorist attacks indicates the scope and level of intensity of terrorist activity. Taken together, they provide a more complete picture of overall domestic terrorist activities in a country, thereby increasing our confidence in the findings of this study. Secondly, previous research suggests that

ethno-political exclusion will have a particularly strong effect on terrorist casualties. For example, Kaufman (1998:13) demonstrates that violent inter-ethnic conflicts result in higher casualty rates and more frequent atrocities committed against civilians by participants. These findings are not trivial given that recent studies have noted changes between the ‘old terrorism’ of the 1970s and 1980s, which was motivated by ideology, to the ‘new terrorism,’ which is motivated by religious and ethnic identity Choi & Piazza (2016:12).

This new trend indicates that while the number of incidents is declining, the lethality of incidents is rising, giving way to our second hypothesis, namely: countries with larger numbers of people that are politically excluded due to their ethnic background will experience higher casualties from domestic terrorism. The terrorist group is not necessarily of an ethnic origin fighting a course for an ethnic group, as is the case with *Boko Haram* in Nigeria, but much of the recruits will likely be constituted by members of the excluded group who have been nursing grievances against an unjust government.

In this study, therefore, we argue that ethno-political exclusion is a cause of domestic, as opposed to transnational, terrorism. Domestic terrorism is conventionally defined as terrorist attacks in which the perpetrator and the victim, or target, are of the same nationality and the attacks transpires within one country. Transnational terrorism is defined as attacks where the perpetrator and victim are of different nationalities and the attack is either cross-border, launched in a different country from that of the perpetrator, or lunched locally against foreign targets, such as embassies, tourists, or other foreign nationals Choi & Piazza (2016:13). Both the qualitative case studies alluded to above and the theoretical framework developed by Gurr (2000:24) and Crenshaw (1981:34) depict ethno-political exclusion as a precipitant of domestic political violence and terrorism.

In a similar vein, we assert that the experience of political exclusion leads to a rise in localized grievances against the State and sometimes, prompts the formation and maintenance of terrorist movements that select local targets. We do acknowledge the possibility that terrorist groups motivated by political exclusion might perhaps choose to commit some transnational terrorism to better popularize their grievances and political agendas. However, this is a very rare occurrence, mostly due to the fact that it requires a much higher level of sophistication and capacity on the part of the domestic terrorist group.

### **3. Understanding the Concept of Terrorism**

The history of terrorism is probably coextensive with the history of political violence. The term ‘terrorism,’ however, is relatively recent; it has been in use since late 18th century. Its use has repeatedly shifted in some significant respects. Moreover, in contemporary political discourse, the word is often employed as a polemical term whose strong

emotional charge occludes its somewhat vague descriptive meaning. The state also becomes terrorists in many occasions to some target or enemy citizens. As a matter of fact, the regimes of totalitarianism adopt terrorism as their method of rule. As Hannah Arendt (1958:464) put it, -terror is the essence of totalitarian domination. Sometimes, the representatives of totalitarian regimes, sensitive to the pejorative connotation of the word, portray the practice as defense of the state from internal enemies. However, state terrorism is not the preserve of totalitarian regimes. Some non-totalitarian states have resorted to terrorism against enemy civilians as was the case in Nigeria and several African countries, and elsewhere. All this tends to get in the way of sustained rational discussion of the nature and moral standing of terrorism and the best ways of coping with it.

Nevertheless, there are two fundamental and related questions with regards to terrorism. The first is conceptual: what is terrorism? The second is moral: can terrorism be morally justified? Philosophers have offered a range of positions on both questions. With regard to the problem of defining terrorism, the dominant approach seeks to acknowledge the core meaning 'terrorism' has in common use. Terrorism is understood as a type of violence the proximate aim of which is the experience of terror or fear. Neither violence nor terror is inflicted for its own sake, but rather for the sake of a further aim such as coercion, or some more specific political objective. But there are also definitions that sever the conceptual connection of terrorism with violence or with terror.

With regards to the moral standing of terrorism, philosophers differ both on how that is to be determined and what the determination is. Consequentialists propose to judge terrorism, like everything else, in light of its consequences. Non-consequentialists argue that its moral status is not simply a matter of what consequences, on balance, terrorism has, but is rather determined by what it is. Positions on the morality of terrorism range from justification when its consequences are good, or when some deontological moral requirements are satisfied, to its absolute, or almost absolute, rejection.

After the heyday of totalitarian terrorism in the 1930s and 1940s, Arendt (1958:23) domestic terrorism continued to be practiced by military dictatorships in many parts of the world, albeit in a less sustained and pervasive way. But the type of terrorism that came to the fore in the second half of the 20th century and in early 21st century is that employed by insurgent organizations. Many movements for national liberation from colonial rule resorted to it, either as the main method of struggle or as a tactic complementing guerrilla warfare. So did some separatist movements (Arendt 1958:25). Some groups driven by perceived injustices, political exclusion or some ideologies took to terrorism as the way of trying to destroy what they considered an unjust, oppressive socio-economic-political system.

This type of terrorism is, by and large, indiscriminate in its choice of target: it attacks men and women of whatever political (or apolitical) views, social class, and walk of life; young, and old, adults and children. It shoots at people, or blows them up by planting bombs in office buildings, places of worship, markets, cafes, cinemas, places of religious worship, on buses or planes, or in other vulnerable public places. And as terrorism has by now acquired a very pejorative meaning, no-one applies the word to their own actions or to actions and campaigns of those they sympathize with. Insurgents practicing terrorism portray their actions as struggle for liberation and seek to be considered and treated as soldiers rather than terrorists or criminals. They often depict their enemy – the government, or the agencies of the social, political and economic system – as the true terrorists. For them, perhaps, the test of terrorism is not harms done but rather the ultimate aim of doing it. If the ultimate aim is liberation or justice, the violence used in order to attain it is not terrorism, whereas the violence aiming at maintaining oppression or injustice is.

Government, on the other hand, tends to paint all insurgent violence with the brush of terrorism. They typically assume that terrorism is by definition something done by non-state agents, and that a state can never be guilty of terrorism (although it can sponsor terrorist organizations). For them, the test of terrorism is not the harm done but who does it. When a state agency uses violence, it is an act of war, or reprisal, or defense of the security of the state and its citizens; when an insurgent group or some freedom fighters does the same, it is terrorism. Under these circumstances, one person's terrorist is indeed another's freedom fighter, and public debate about terrorism is largely conducted at cross purposes and to little effect.

Today, the evaluative meaning of terrorism has shifted considerably. So has its descriptive meaning, but to a lesser degree. Whatever else the word may have meant, its ordinary use has typically indicated two things: violence and intimidation (the causing of great fear or terror, terrorizing). The dominant approach to the conceptual question in philosophical literature reflects this. Terrorism is usually understood as a type of violence. This violence is not blind or sadistic, but rather aims at intimidation and at some further political, social, or religious goal or, more broadly, at coercion. Per Bauhn defines (political) terrorism thus: -The performance of violent acts, directed against one or more persons, intended by the performing agent to intimidate one or more persons and thereby to bring about one or more of the agent's political goals (Buahn, 1989, p.28). It is the deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating some other people into a course of action they otherwise would not take.

It is noteworthy that the above definitions put aside both the question of who the actor is and the question of what their ultimate objectives are, and focus on the action itself as well as the aim. They present terrorism as a way of acting that could be adopted by different

agents and serve various objectives (mostly political). It can be employed by states or by non-state agents, and may promote national liberation or oppression, revolutionary or conservative causes (and possibly pursues some nonpolitical aims as well). One can be a terrorist and a freedom fighter; terrorism is not the monopoly of enemies of freedom. One can hold a high government or military office and design or implement a terrorist campaign; terrorism is not the preserve of insurgent. In this way, much of the relativism concerning who is and who is not a terrorist that has plagued contemporary public debate can be overcome; the general traits of terrorism being violence, against non-combatants or innocent people, intimidation, and coercion. Meanwhile, this study adopts the definition of terrorism by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD): -the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.

The question remains in any case, whether terrorism can be morally justified. There is no single answer to this question, as there is no single conception of what terrorism is. Philosophers generally tend to hold the view that terrorism that targets non-combatants or innocent persons is much more difficult to justify than that which attacks only those who cannot plausibly claim innocence of the injustice or oppression at issue (and which accordingly does not count as terrorism on a narrow definition of the term). Our discussion therefore focuses on terrorism understood as violence against innocent civilians or common citizens, intended to intimidate and thereby to achieve some further (political) objectives.

One might try to justify some acts or campaigns of violence of this kind in two ways. One could argue that the victims may be non-combatants or common citizens, but nevertheless are not innocent of the wrongs the terrorists are fighting against. Alternatively, one could concede the innocence of the victims and argue that attacks on them are nevertheless justified, either by their consequences or by some deontological considerations. In showing that an instance of violence was justified because targeted were not really innocent, we will have shown that the act of violence at issue was actually not a case of terrorism. This paper will not delve into the broad problem of morality of terrorism. It suffices to note that certain violent acts are truly triggered by social injustices, and they can be avoided by a reversal of injustices on the group concerned. In the long run, the perpetrators of both the violence and the injustice are equally terrorists.

#### **4. Political Exclusion: An Incentive to Domestic Terrorism**

It should be noted that Piazza's (2012) study failed to find political discrimination against minority groups to be a consistently significant and substantive predictor of domestic terrorism when it was evaluated along with economic discrimination; we expect, however, to find a different result in this study as we operationalize political exclusion differently. We find that countries in which certain ethnic populations are excluded from political

power are significantly more likely to experience domestic terrorist attacks and to suffer from terrorist casualties. Furthermore, ethnic group political exclusion is a more consistent and substantive predictor of domestic terrorist activity than general political repression or economic discrimination.

When people resent a government that has failed to recognize their tribal, racial, religious or linguistic group, it is more common strategy to withdraw from government control through autonomy or semi-autonomy rather than to jump into an insurgency movement; the former requires fewer material capabilities and less sophistication while still allowing disgruntled people to address their grievances. Terrorism, then, is more cost effective than civil war and thus becomes a more viable option for ethnic groups that intend to pursue their political rights through the use of force.

Furthermore, a terrorist movement which develops from a group of people with social, cultural or family ties provides a relatively stable support system. Shared ethnic ties may allow politically discriminated people to organize more easily into terrorist cells, to more readily provide emotional encouragement to their members, and more effectively prevent desertion or a breach of security. That is, ethnic groups may be better equipped to carry out successful terrorist operations as their deeply rooted social and cultural bonds provide an enhanced security and loyalty structure. As domestic terrorist organizations tend to create fewer cells and specialized teams, they are smaller in size than international terrorist organizations which often operate in several countries (Choi & Piazza, 2016).

There is also a micro-foundational argument to be made linking the political exclusion of ethnic minorities to the increased probability that members from the excluded community will engage in terrorism. Terrorism is frequently defined as a form of political violence perpetrated against civilians. Research by Goodwin (2006) indicates that members of terrorist movements hailing from segments of society experiencing repression by the government frequently opt to target other civilians who they perceive as ‘\_complicit’ with, or as benefiting from government policies, particularly if complicit citizens are viewed as significantly more powerful ‘\_others.’ We use this framework to anticipate that radicalized individuals excluded from political life due to their ethnic background are, therefore, more likely to see the use of terrorist attacks against ‘\_complicit’ citizens – members of the ethnic majority – as legitimate behavior.

Note that several case studies find the political exclusion of ethnic groups to be an import and precipitating factor for the formation of terrorist movements, community support for terrorism, and the maintenance of terrorist campaigns (for a summary, see Laqueur, 1999). For example, formal and informal barriers to influence representation in government have been credited with starting and fueling Kurdish terrorism in Iraq, Turkey and Iran, Moro terrorism in the Philippines, the Basque ETA movement in Spain (Choi & Piazza, 2016).

Survey research by Nwabunka (2015:34) finds that political – along with socioeconomic – exclusion fosters feelings of alienation among South East of Nigeria and helps to drive radicalization and support for extremism by some members of the area. Other terrorist movements nominally motivated by different concerns frequently invoke ethnic issues centering on political marginalization and exclusion as a core driving force. For example, the Maoist Naxalite movement in India began in the late 1960s as a non-sectarian urban guerilla movement aiming to foment a communist insurrection in the State of West Bengal. However, when the Communist Party of India took power in the state legislature of West Bengal, the Naxalites shifted their struggle to the disenfranchisement of the aboriginal population living in the rural areas across South and Eastern India (Choi & Piazza, 2016).

One expect exclusion to most significantly affect the local, rather than the transnational, environment for political violence. Although domestic terrorism is more pervasive than transnational terrorism and results in substantially more casualties (Choi & Piazza, 2016), it has, strangely, received less scholarly focus. We argue that the political exclusion of ethnically different people within a country increases the propagation of disgruntled individuals who, in the absence of access to executive power via orderly and nonviolent means are more likely to support the use of domestic terrorism to address grievances. One may suggest that the turn to terrorism is more likely if an excluded population consists of several smaller groups, whereas one large excluded group is more likely to instigate rebellion. By the same token, it is not difficult to imagine that a large excluded group would engage in domestic terrorism, as opposed to insurrection, because they do not necessarily possess a united military power capable of challenging the government. Simply put, whether an excluded population consists of one large ethnic group or many smaller ones, we expect domestic terrorism to arise in most cases where such groups are politically excluded due to their ethnic background.

We find that the political exclusion of ethnic groups is a more significant and substantive predictor of domestic terrorism than general restriction of political participation (see Li 2005) or minority economic discrimination (see Pizza, 2012), a finding which holds true even after accounting for a possibility of reverse causality. What follows is an assessment of how previous studies are related to our research topic.

While the role of ethno-political exclusion as a precipitant of terrorism has been rarely addressed in the context of analysis, related topics, such as the role of regime type and restriction and/or tolerance of general political participation, have been widely discussed and examined. Though empirical research has generally found that domestic regimes experience more terrorism than do dictatorships (e.g., Pizza 2008), a frequently cited study by Li (2005) determined that some elements of democratic institutions promote terrorism, while others significantly reduce it. Li found that constraints on executive power, a



hallmark of democratic rule, actually make states more likely to experience transnational terrorist attacks; however, he also found that countries with higher rates of popular political participation experience fewer terrorist incidents, suggesting that broadening democratic participation will reduce rates of terrorism (see also Chenowet, 2010).

More importantly, Li's political participation variable (through voting) may be misconstrued as a feature that leads to a decrease in transnational terrorism when it may have only a spurious effect. Li's study conceptualizes that the higher the voting rate in democracies, the less likely transnational terrorism is to occur (Li, 2005). However, because political nonparticipation (i.e., no voting) is pervasive within many full-fledged democracies such as the U.S., but less so within some emerging democracies like Nigeria, the high level of political participation may not necessarily be associated with a low level of terrorist incidents (see DeLuca, 1995). Furthermore, as Powell (1982) properly points out, the voter turnout rate is affected by many institutional and attitudinal factors and may have little to do with whether citizens have a reasonable chance to have their interests represented through elected officials. Simply put, the actual patterns of political participation through voting are quite complex and may vary from country to country.

This study argues that political participation may not affect terrorism. Low voting rates may simply indicate the prevalence of political apathy; political exclusion, on the other hand, exacerbates terrorism because it is likely to compel ethnic groups to fight for the political rights of which they are deprived. In this context, we expect that the political status of ethnic communities – the degree to which the political system in their home country integrates them into or excludes them from political decision making – is a more likely causal trigger for domestic terrorism than the overall measure of rates of political participation.

Recent research by Piazza (2011) finds that countries qualified by economic discrimination against minority groups – defined using data from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) database as groups that collectively suffer from disadvantages in income, housing, employment and unequal access to government social services – experience higher levels of domestic terrorism. While we expect our research to confirm the above, we have theoretical reason to suspect that ethno-political exclusion is a distinctly strong and consistent predictor of terrorism even while considering the possibility of economic discrimination against minority groups.

For example, research by Fox (1999, 2000) uses Gurr's basic theory of exclusion, grievance, group identity and mobilization to link cultural identity-based grievances to political violence. For Fox, cultural identity (he focuses mainly on 'religious cultural communal identities') are essential to people's everyday lives. When they are threatened, or disparaged, potent group grievances are produced that are easily manipulated by

extremists; this explains why conflicts over religious identity often result in higher levels of political violence. Juergensmeyer (1993) and Rapoport (1991) make similar observations about the intensity of conflicts over religious and cultural identities, and identify such conflicts as prime vehicles for terrorism.

In this study, one regards the political exclusion of ethnic minorities to be an affront on group identity insofar as excluded groups share similar religious and cultural heritages. We then argue that when their access to state power is deprived, these groups are likely to express high levels of grievances and intensified resentment which will, then, motivate the turn toward domestic terrorism. Undoubtedly, the experience of economic discrimination will also produce collective grievances as distinct from motivations of identity politics and, accordingly, control for minority economic status in our empirics.

There is a strong theoretical base to support the notion that countries with large ethnic populations excluded from political power would experience higher levels of domestic terrorist activity. Gurr's (2000) work on deprivation as a root precipitation of riots, rebellion and civil war helps to provide some of the theoretical motivation for our assertion that political exclusion due to ethnicity is likely to lead the excluded to support or engage in domestic terrorism. Gurr argues that when ethnic and religious – and, in principle, socioeconomic – subgroups within society face collective political and economic deprivations, such as discrimination or lack of opportunities to participate in mainstream political or economic life, several transformations occur, which make political violence more likely.

Initially, core anti-status quo grievances are formed and enhanced among group members by the experience of exclusion. This experience of grievance prompts the group to develop an enhanced sense of collective identity as well as a strong sense of alienation from the ethnic or religious majority in society, which, in turn, only serves to further reinforce the salience of group grievances. Then, enhanced group identity, alienation, and salient group grievances are exploited by elites within the community to radicalize members and mobilize opposition – both nonviolent and violent – to the state and status quo (Choi & Piazza, 2016).

Though Gurr is primarily interested in explaining the onset of episodes of mass political violence like rebellions, the thrust of his argument has been applied by other scholars to the formation of terrorist movements within aggrieved ethnic populations and the mobilization of community support for terrorism. Work by Crenshaw (1981) maintains that regimes characterized by political exclusion of ethnic minority groups are particularly likely to experience terrorism. The fact is that when ethnic communities experience political discrimination and formal and informal barriers to equality, Crenshaw (1981:383) specifically depicts this situation as ethnic minorities...that are discriminated against by

the majority population,‘ they develop grievances against the state and larger society. These grievances fuel the construction of social protest movements seeking representation and political change. Choi and Piazza write:

Fringe elements within the community will demand that direct action take place outside of mainstream governing institutions and processes and will, in extreme cases, advocate for terrorist violence. In the face of state unresponsiveness and continued repression, they will siphon community support away from mainstream nonviolent leaders and will cultivate their capacity to commit armed attacks (2016).

Not surprisingly, the demands for inclusion or equal treatment that characterize the social protest movement will grow into stipulations for wider sociopolitical change, for greater ethno-political autonomy and/or calls for irredentism and independence. This change in demands is easily manipulated by extremists, greatly radicalizes the community, and raises the likelihood of involvement with terrorist movements.

### **5. Political Exclusion is Inimical to the African**

Obviously, the issue at stake in ethno-political exclusion is unity and inclusiveness. The founding fathers, of the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U), according to Nyerere, set themselves two major objectives, namely the total liberation of Africa from colonialism and the unity of Africa. He regrets that the reality is that ours is the poorest and weakest continent in the world, and that our weakness is pathetic. Nyerere (1968:54) argues:

Unity will not end our weakness, but until we unite, we cannot even begin to end that weakness. So this is my plea to the new generation of African leaders and African peoples: work for unity with the firm conviction that without unity, there is no future for Africa.

He noted unequivocally his rejection of the glorification of the nation-state we inherited from colonialism, and the artificial nations we are trying to forge from that inheritance. For the implication is that we are all Africans trying very hard to be Ghanians or Tanzanians, which is impossible. For him, the outside world hardly recognizes our Ghanianess or Tanzanian-ness. What is recognized is our Africanness Nyerere (1968:34), which is being-with, and this is fundamentally hostile to political exclusion and its sister, terrorism.

That is the way we – the people of Africa are all being perceived: as brothers. So, accepting the fact that we are all Africans: all Nigerians, all Ghanians, etc (and not that I am from Yoruba or Ashanti) gives you a much worthwhile challenge than the current desperate attempts to fossilize Africa or its various countries, into the wounds inflicted upon it by the vultures of imperialism. This is rather shameful; and we should not be proud of our shame. We must reject the return to colonialism or to the tribes. We must reject sociopolitical exclusion of our brothers. For there is richness of culture out there which we must do everything we can to preserve and share.

An African, no doubt, has a distinctive outlook on life and a distinctive cultural identity. Individualism and capitalism are foreign to African traditional society and the African way of life which is communalistic. Africans have their own identity derived from a common heritage and different from the European culture, the European values and the European identity. The African for instance is truly religious. He understands that we cannot be truly human without being religious. This is unlike the European who tends to be more inclined to science than religion. The African identifies himself only in the -we| unlike the European who tends to emphasize the -I| at the detriment of the -we.|

From the ongoing, it is clear that the traditional African society is not based on conflict, struggle or tension but on what Nyerere calls ‘familyhood,’ that is, family relationship Nyerere (1968:35). This, for him is the root of authentic African socialism. But in the modern world, this ‘familyhood’ will have to be extended beyond the confines of the extended family, beyond the confines of the tribe; and made to embrace the whole society, the whole country, the whole of Africa, and the whole human race. The capitalistic spirit of acquisition, individualism, the exploitation of man by man, class struggle, political exclusion and conflicts will all be excluded from society. Inequality will be eliminated and everybody will be prepared to work for the good of the community in any capacity. Thus, the individual feels liberated, and only then will he pursue the goals of development and not those of conflicts and violence.

The future of Africa, the development and modernization of Africa, is linked with its decolonization and detribalization. Indeed, many Africans, especially political leaders, had a vested interest in keeping Africa divided. Hence, they promote the course for the return to the tribe. That kind of political and social atavism spells catastrophe for Africa and should be avoided. Indeed, it would be the end of any kind of genuine development for Africa; and it would fossilize Africa into a worse situation than the one in which we are. Indeed, tribal atavism would be giving up any hope for African country and for Africa in general. For Africa has more need of unity and the strength that comes from unity than Europe. Ours should be a commitment to the practice of shared power and social wealth and the work necessary to achieve wealth. The government of a people in democratic scenario belongs to the people and not to a faction. In fact, sharing of power and wealth

are other forms of communitarian exchange. But it is essential because without the principle and practice of sharing power and wealth, the social conditions for exploitation, oppression and inequality as well as terrorism and other forms of violence increased. The insistence on an African identity is, therefore, a worthwhile corrective against the phenomenon of political exclusion.

The African identity is based on the assumption of human equality, on the belief that it is wrong for one person or tribe to dominate or exploit another, and on the knowledge that every individual hopes to live in a society as a free person able to live a decent life, in conditions of peace with his or her neighbour. It is above all human centered. It is concerned principally with the wellbeing, happiness and development of the human person; and it is in the context of shared political inclusion that the conditions for such wellbeing, happiness and development are best achieved.

### **6. Prospects for Reducing Domestic Terrorism through Political Inclusion**

Political inclusion measures the extent to which all members of a society are able to access the institutions of democracy. This is the idea that every citizen, regardless of class, age, gender, group, culture and ethnic or religious background should have an equal right and opportunity to engage with and contribute to the functioning of the government institutions and processes (Bhojwani, 2015). For immigrants and ethnic minorities, this access allows them to be seen, be heard and be counted.

It is important to distinguish between individual access and group access, specifically as it relates to minority groups. For example, if *one* individual from these groups, by virtue of her social or economic standing, is able to run for office, or participate in civil leadership, we cannot assume that a society is politically inclusive. A more accurate measure of political inclusion is the ability of *any* individual, regardless of her socioeconomic background or ethnicity, to access the levers of political power. What are the levers of political power that we need to ensure anyone can access? For the purpose of this study, let us look specifically at the ability and opportunity to be represented in government (President, President's cabinets, ministers, chief of staff, etc) and to have voice in policymaking. These forms of inclusion allow us to be counted, be seen and be heard.

Our democracy is strong when everyone participates. Lower levels of participation and representation weaken our democratic institutions, preserving power in the hands of a few – leaders, voters, and donors. These political elites then shape policy in their interests, rather than in the interests of the majority. When a society is diverse in ethnicity, in religion, etc, its leaders need to reflect those diverse perspectives. This representation is not simply *\_for show.*‘ To cast our votes, to speak our minds, and to hear our experiences reflected in policy contribute to our sense of inclusion, our ability to participate, our access to power. If we don't feel our participation is welcome or possible, we feel

marginalized and silenced. In the short-term, that can contribute to isolation and misunderstanding. In the long-term, it can contribute to radical tension and civil unrest. The challenge of integrating diverse populations into democracies often designed to serve the privileged few might seem daunting. But at its core, political integration or inclusion is rooted in three values: authenticity, patriotism, and accountability. This is the true nature of a civil society. Specifically, policymakers can ensure that these values are embedded into democratic institutions by going beyond diversity and representation to inclusion and equity.

Societies whose political institutions are more inclusive and participatory tend to be more peaceful and resilient, just as societies practicing exclusion tend to be more vulnerable to fragility and conflict. Inclusive political processes are crucial to sustaining peace and conflict prevention, as they contribute to remedying structural inequalities and other root causes of conflict. Democracy is more likely to develop and endure when all segments of a society are able to participate and influence political outcomes without suffering bias or reprisal. But in many new and emerging democracies, large portions of the population are excluded from politics based on their ethnicity. Sometimes this exclusion is only implicit and not explicit. Nevertheless, these groups are practically marginalized and denied access executive powers of the society.

Our argument is rooted in an analytic perspective wherein non-state actors choose terrorism to coerce a government into granting concessions. If ethnic exclusion motives resort to terrorism on behalf of ethnic groups, then shifts away from discrimination and towards inclusion should also have the potential to reduce incentives for terrorist attacks, raise the attractiveness of other, non-violent strategies for expressing grievances, and undermine the ability of terrorist organizations to recruit active participants. Previous research has tended to assume a causal symmetry, whereby inclusion must have the opposite effect of exclusion, and the effects of changes towards inclusion simply follow from the difference in levels of terrorism between groups that are already politically included and groups that are excluded from access to political power. It appears that violence can be difficult to eradicate altogether, especially when there is a history of ethnic terrorist activity. However, even if we see more attacks by the groups, the overall number of terrorist attacks generally declines after inclusion. Our analysis provides considerable support for the claim that domestic terrorism declines in response to political inclusion.

Some scholars have examined the relationship between ethnic diversity and terrorism and find at best limited evidence for a relationship. A state could have limited ethnic diversity but high exclusion, or high diversity without political exclusion of any groups, as in contemporary South Africa (Gleditsch and Polo). Yet, unlike ethnic demography, the political status of an ethnic group can change dramatically, as shown by the example of

South Africa pre/post-apartheid. However, in a more recent study using information from the Ethnic Power Relations data, Choi and Piazza (2016) demonstrate that countries with large politically excluded ethnic populations are more likely to experience terrorist attacks and suffer more casualties from terrorism.

The size of the ethnically excluded population is a clear advance on the binary indicators of discriminated or disadvantaged groups, and better reflects motives and opportunities for mobilization and resort to terrorism. Yet, focusing on countries at large obscures the role of group agency and how the political status of an ethnic group affects behavior. For example, if both ethnic and other grievances stem from governments that are generally exclusive, then we may simply see more terrorism in general in countries with ethnic exclusion, but not necessarily ethnically motivated terrorism perpetrated by the excluded group. As an extreme example of misplaced agency, we could see organizations associated with dominant groups using terrorism to intimidate excluded groups, perhaps to prevent political mobilization. Plausible examples of this include hate crime against minority groups in the United States and South Africa.

This study applies a group perspective to domestic terrorism, expecting that ethnic groups have potential grievances or motivations to engage in terrorism when they are excluded from political influence or lack autonomy. We believe that the relationship between ethnic exclusion and violence should apply even more strongly to terrorist violence than to civil war, giving differences in the opportunities for and the feasibility of attacks. The wide resource symmetries between ethnic groups and the state should make organizations linked to ethnic groups particularly likely to engage in terrorism, as the covert nature of terrorist tactics makes it possible to evade state repression and target more powerful opponents when conventional warfare is unrealistic or unlikely to be effective (see Findley and Young, 2012).

Now, existing research has looked only at how current ethnic exclusion from political power is associated with terrorism and not whether changes away from active discrimination or towards inclusion can reduce domestic terrorism. If ethnic exclusion induces stronger incentives for terrorism, then we should also expect shifts in the direction of inclusiveness to reduce the motivation for terrorism. The above existing arguments on the effects of exclusion could be read as suggesting that any reduction in exclusion or move towards inclusion should likewise lessen terrorist activity. But this issue thus far has not attracted much direct theoretical or empirical attention. As we have observed, inclusion may also have limited ability to reduce terrorism when violent ethnic organizations have been established.

Reforms to bring greater inclusion could come in two ways. First, and most directly, we can have group-specific inclusion, or changes in the political status of an ethnic group

previously disadvantaged relative to a politically privileged ethnic group. Group-specific inclusion can include granting access to power for the group at the executive level, concessions offering regional autonomy, or reduction in overt discrimination against the group. Improvements in the political status of an ethnic group should reduce terrorist attacks by lessening motives for violent action. Changes in political status also will influence the ability of ethnic organizations to recruit for political violence. From our analytical perspective, any concessions towards greater political inclusion should satisfy some group members and induce substitution away from violence after inclusion.

Existing models of the growth trajectory of terrorist organizations show that attacks over time are shaped by recruitment (Gleditsch and Polo). Given some rate of attrition, organizations with better prospects for sustained recruitment are able to carry out more attacks, at a higher frequency, and wage more persistent terrorist campaigns. Thus, organizations who seek to continue violence on behalf of ethnic group will find it difficult to recruit participants after political inclusion, as long as it satisfies a sufficient number of individuals in their audience. This should lead to a decline in the ability of the organization to maintain a high number of terrorist attacks. Indeed, Gurr (2000) argued that greater inclusion has promoted a waning of ethnic warfare, and Cederman et al. (2016) demonstrate more systematically that ethnic political inclusion appears to reduce the risk of ethnic conflict onset and promote conflict termination.

## **7. Some Policy Oriented Advice/Recommendation**

In reacting to the inscrutable phenomenon of domestic terrorism, governments should reverse the cause of grievances by recourse to political inclusion. If political exclusion causes ethnic terrorism, it follows that promoting greater ethnic inclusion and democracy will, at least, reduce terrorist risks. We find that countries in which no ethnic populations are excluded from political power are significantly more likely to experience relative peace. They will likely be free from domestic terrorist attacks and from suffering from terrorist casualties. Moreover, Walsh and Piazza's (2010) study produced robust findings, showing that countries with higher levels of human right protection experience less terrorism. Our models therefore include the measure of respect for physical integrity rights – the right not to be abused or harmed – used by Walsh and Piazza (2010). Our expectation is that it will be a negative predictor of terrorism because promotion of physical integrity will reduce the level of abuse and thus produce fewer grievances. Again, Choi (2010) demonstrates that when an independent judiciary with fair-minded judges and police officers is present in a rule of law society, the risk of terrorism is small. Similarly, Findley and Young (2011) posit that independent judiciaries make government commitments seem more credible, thereby dis-incentivizing the use of terrorism. Consistent with these findings, we expect that the presence (or absence) of an independent judiciary is likely to decrease (or increase) the frequency of terrorist incidents.



Several recent studies also consider the effects of poverty and economic development on terrorism (e.g., Li, 2005). When a large percentage of a given country's population lives below the poverty line, terrorist groups may find it easier to recruit the disgruntled. People whose basic needs, such as clean water, nutrition, health care, education, clothing and shelter, are not fulfilled find fault with those who discriminate against their social welfare, namely the government and the rich. For this reason, economic development is viewed as an important factor for the control of terrorism. Furthermore, countries with large populations often find it difficult to provide adequate levels of security measures, resulting in greater vulnerability to terrorist plots and attacks (Eyerman, 1998). In fact, Savun and Philips (2009) find evidence that highly populated countries experience more domestic terrorist incidents. With this in mind, the population variable is projected to increase the rate of terrorism due to the relative difficulty of successfully policing a large population. The more all the citizens are given free access to political power, however, the less vulnerable to domestic terrorism a populated country will be.

## 8. Conclusion

While quantitative research in academic and policy circles has examined transnational terrorism and civil and interstate wars, research on the causes of domestic terrorism is severely lacking. Indeed, a serious limitation to the development of terrorism literature thus far has been the lack of domestic terrorism data and the absence of a probe into the connection between political grievances and domestic terrorism. This has slowed the accumulation of required knowledge regarding the relationships between domestic-level political phenomena (e.g. the degree of inclusiveness of the political system of a country) and political violence. Given its destructive impact on the daily functioning of human life and on national economies, a deeper probe of domestic terrorism is necessary. This study is one of the philosophical studies to conceptualize political exclusion as a root cause of domestic terrorism, and as such, it will hopefully serve as a stepping stone towards increased research interest in the neglected area of domestic terrorism and its motivations.

Questions of nationalism, sectarianism, ethnic and communal violence, and the collapse of states came to dominate academic analysis and political debates. The question of the possibility of a meaningful nation, in which all citizens with common national identity that overcome regional, ethnic, religious, clan, and other tensions, becomes critical. We must look back to the idea of *African identity as being-with* and see in it the deliberate construction of nationalist narrative. The European's underpinnings of the idea of communal living are perhaps less important than the call for nation building and the humanitarian agenda for justice and peace the African heritage promises.

This study has demonstrated that, irrespective of the measure of terrorism and estimation method, ethno-political exclusion fuels domestic terrorism. When people are

excluded from state power due to their ethnic background, they are more likely to resort to domestic terrorism in an effort to solve issues and avenge grievances. Moreover, this study finds that the size of the politically excluded ethnic population is a more consistent predictor of patterns of domestic terrorism than the general level of political participation in a country or the degree of economic discrimination suffered by ethnic minorities. The results of this study suggests that ethnic group political exclusion is a key element in the generation of domestic terrorism and, therefore, policies aimed at fostering inclusiveness could be a useful counterterrorism tool.

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